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The research reported on in this book spans a period of twelve years. In that
time I have been helped by many colleagues, students, innovators, and re-
search sponsors. I have striven to make the research and this book worthy of
the generous help I have been given.
I would like to thank Thomas Allen, Anne Carter, Zvi Griliches, Ken-ichi
Imai, Ralph Katz, Edwin Mansfield, Richard Nelson, Ikujiro Nonaka, Ariel
Pakes, Richard Rosenbloom, and Roy Rothwell for giving me many valuable
comments as the research proceeded.
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ars and graduate students join me in research and discussion over the years.
Especially prominent among these are: John Becker, Alan Berger, Julian
Boyden, Alan Drane, Abbie Griffin, David Israel-Rosen, Andrew Juhasz,
Toshihiro Kanai, Susumu Kurokawa, Walter Lehmann, Howard Levine, Wil-
liam Lionetta, Gordon Low, Richard Orr, Barbara Poggiali, Kiyonori
Sakakibara, Stephen Schrader, Frank Spital, Heidi Sykes-Gomez, Pieter
VanderWerf, and Walter Yorsz. All contributed greatly to the substance of
the work and to the sheer fun of research.
Over the years my students and I have interviewed hundreds of people.
Some were the developers of the important innovations we studied, while
others had less direct knowledge. Many loaned us materials and all strove to
help us to accurately understand their industries and their innovation-related
experiences. Thanks to all.
The research I report on here would not have been possible without funding
from the Division of Policy Research and Analysis of the National Science
Foundation. Alden Bean, Miles Boylan, Andrew Pettifor, Rolf Piekharz,
Eleanor Thomas, and anonymous peer reviewers supported my work over the
years with a series of grants, despite budgets for extramural research that
sometimes dropped perilously near zero.
Finally, I would like to thank Jessie Janjigian, who edited my manuscript and
tried, with partial success, to teach me that respectable sentences can be less
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It has long been assumed that product innovations are typically developed by
product manufacturers. Because this assumption deals with the basic matter
of who the innovator is, it has inevitably had a major impact on innovation-
related research, on firms' management of research and development, and on
government innovation policy . However, it now appears that this basic as-
sumption is often wrong.
In this book I begin by presenting a series of studies showing that the
sources of innovation vary greatly. In some fields, innovation users develop
most innovations. In others, suppliers of innovation-related components and
materials are the typical sources of innovation. In still other fields, conven-
tional wisdom holds and product manufacturers are indeed the typical innova-
tors. Next, I explore why this variation in the functional sources of innovation
occurs and how it might be predicted. Finally, I propose and test some implica-
tions of replacing a manufacturer-as-innovator assumption with a view of the
innovation process as predictably distributed across users, manufacturers,
suppliers, and others.
The Functional Source of Innovation
Most of the studies in this book use a variable that I call the functional source
of innovation. This involves categorizing firms and individuals in terms of the
functional relationship through which they derive benefit from a given prod-
uct, process, or service innovation. Do they benefit from using it? They are
users. Do they benefit from manufacturing it? They are manufacturers. Do
they benefit from supplying components or materials necessary to build or use
the innovation? They are suppliers. Thus, airline firms are users of aircraft
because the benefit they derive from existing types of aircraft-and the bene-
fit they would expect to derive from innovative aircraft as well-are derived
from use. In contrast, aircraft manufacturers benefit from selling aircraft, and
3
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TABLE 1-1. Summary of Functional Source of Innovation Data
Innovation Developed by
Innovation Type NAa Total
Sampled User Manufacturer Supplier Other (n) (n)
Scientific instruments 77% 23% 0% 0% 17 111
Semiconductor and printed
circuit board process 67 21 0 12 6 49
Pultrusion process 90 10 0 0 0 10
Tractor shovel-related 6 94 0 0 0 16
Engineering plastics 10 90 0 0 0 5
Plastics additives 8 92 0 0 4 16
Industrial gas-using 42 17 33 8 0 12
Thermoplastics-using 43 14 36 7 0 14
Wire termination equipment 11 33 56 0 2 20
aNA = number of cases for which data item coded in this table is not available. (NA cases excluded from
calculations of percentages in table.)
they would expect to benefit from an innovative airplane product by increas-
ing their sales and/or profits.
Of course, the functional role of an individual or firm is not fixed; it de-
pends instead on the particular innovation being examined. Boeing is a manu-
facturer of aircraft, but it is also a user of machine tools. If we were examining
innovations in aircraft, we would consider Boeing to have the functional role
of manufacturer in that context. But if we were considering innovations in
metal-forming machinery, that same firm would be categorized as a user.
Many functional relationships can exist between innovator and innovation
in addition to user, supplier, and manufacturer. For example, firms and indi-
viduals can benefit from innovations as innovation distributors, insurers, and
so forth. As we will see later in this book, any functional class is a potential
source of innovation under appropriate conditions.
Variations in the Source of Innovation
Novel ways of categorizing innovators are only interesting if they open the
way to new insight. The first clue that the functional source of innovation is a
potentially exciting way to categorize innovators comes with the discovery
that the source of innovation differs very significantly between categories of
innovation. Consider the several categories of innovation my students and I
have studied in detail over the past several years (Table 1-1). In each study
summarized in Table 1-1 the innovator is defined as the individual or firm
that first develops an innovation to a useful state, as proven by documented,
useful output.
Note the really striking variations in the functional source of innovation
between the several innovation categories studied. Major product innovations
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in some fields, such as scientific instruments, are almost always developed by
product users. In sharp contrast, product manufacturers are the developers of
most of the important innovations in some other fields, and suppliers in still
others (chapters 2 and 3).
An Economic Explanation
The observation that the functional source of innovation can vary is interest-
ing in itself. But if we can understand the cause(s) of such variation, we may
be able to predict and manage the innovation process much better.
There are many factors that influence the functional source of innovation.
But we need not necessarily understand all of these in order to understand this
variable usefully well and to predict the sources of innovation usefully often.
As the reader will see, I propose that analysis of the temporary profits ("eco-
nomic rents") expected by potential innovators can by itself allow us to pre-
dict the functional source of innovation usefully often (chapter 4).
This basic idea will certainly not be a surprise to economists. If it is to be
useful in this context, however, certain preconditions must be met,* and
expectations of innovation-related profits must differ significantly between
firms holding different functional relationships to a given innovation opportu-
nity. Since little is known about how firms formulate their expectations of
profit from innovation, I have explored this matter in several detailed case
investigations (chapter 5).
In all cases studied, it did appear that innovating firms could reasonably
anticipate higher profits than noninnovating firms. The reasons for such differ-
ences varied from industry to industry. Interesting hints of general underlying
principles did emerge, however, and sometimes these were related to the
functional relationship between innovator and innovation. For example, users
often had an advantage over other types of potential innovator with respect to
protecting process equipment innovations from imitators. (Users often can
profit from such an innovation while keeping it hidden behind their factory
walls as a trade secret. This option is seldom available to manufacturers and
others, who typically must reveal an innovation to potential adopters if they
hope to profit from it.)
Understanding the Distributed Innovation Process:
Know-how Trading Between Rivals
Once we understand in a general way why the functional sources of innova-
tion may vary, we can graduate to exploring the phenomenon in greater
*I discuss and test conditions later; two, however, may convey the flavor. For an economic
model of the functional source of innovation to predict accurately, it is necessary that potential
innovators (1) not be able to shift functional roles easily and (2) benefit from their innovations by
exploiting them themselves rather than by licensing them to others.
Overview 5
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detail. Are there general strategies and rules that underlie how expectations
of economic rents are formed and distributed across users, manufacturers,
suppliers, and others? If so, we may gain a more general ability to predict how
innovations will be distributed among these several functional categories of
firm.
It is not clear a priori that useful rules for generating or predicting innova-
tion strategies will exist: Such strategies are themselves a form of innovation,
and one may not be able to describe the possibilities in terms of underlying
components or rules. The only way to find out, I think, is by field investiga-
tion. I have undertaken one such investigation to date and have found an
interesting phenomenon-informal know-how trading-that seems to me to
have the characteristics of a generally applicable component for innovation
strategies (chapter 6).
Informal know-how trading is essentially a pattern of informal cooperative
R & D. It involves routine and informal trading of proprietary information
between engineers working at different firms-sometimes direct rivals.
(Know-how is the accumulated practical skill or expertise that allows one to
do something smoothly and efficiently, in this instance the know-how of engi-
neers who develop a firm's products and develop and operate its processes.
Firms often consider a significant portion of such know-how proprietary and
protect it as a trade secret.) Know-how trading exists in a number of industries
my students and I have studied, and it seems to me to be an important
phenomenon.
When I model informal know-how trading in terms of its effects on
innovation-related profits, I find that one can predict when this behavior will
or will not increase the expected profits of innovating firms. I propose that
know-how trading between rivals is a general and significant mechanism that
innovators can use to share (or avoid sharing) innovation-related costs and
profits with rivals. As such, it is one of the tools we can develop and explore as
we seek to understand the distributed innovation process.
Managing the Distributed Innovation Process:
Predicting and Shifting the Sources of Innovation
Even though our understanding of the distributed innovation process is at an
early stage, we should be able to get managerially useful results from it now.
Indeed, it would be risky to not subject this work to the discipline of real-
world experiment and learning by doing.
Since I have argued that variations in the sources of innovation are caused
to a significant degree by variations in potential innovators' expectations of
innovation-related profits, two managerially useful things should be possible.
First, by understanding how expected innovation profits are distributed, we
may be able to predict the likely source of innovation. Second, by changing
the distribution of such profit expectations, we may be able to shift the likely
source of innovation. If both of these fundamental things can be done, we
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would be well along the way to learning how to manage a distributed innova-
tion process.
My colleague Glen Urban and I worked together to test the possibility of
predicting the sources of a subset of user innovations: those having the poten-
tial to become commercially successful products in the general marketplace.
(Not all user innovations have this characteristic. A user will innovate if it sees
an in-house benefit from doing so and typically does not consider whether
other users have similar needs. In contrast, a manufacturer typically requires
that many users have similar needs if it is to succeed in the marketplace with a
responsive product.)
The particular context of our test (chapter 8) was the rapidly evolving field
of computer-aided-design equipment used to lay out printed circuit boards
(PC-CAD).' Here we found that we could identify a subset of users that we
termed lead users. We found innovation activity concentrated within this
group as predicted: 87% of respondents in the lead user group built their own
PC-CAD system versus only 1% of nonlead users. We also found that product
concepts based on these lead user innovations were preferred by all users and
therefore had commercial promise from the point of view of PC-CAD product
manufacturers. This result suggests, by example, that prediction of sources of
commercially promising innovation may be possible under practical, real-
world conditions.
My colleague Stan Finkelstein and I tested the possibility of shifting the
source of innovation in the field of automated clinical chemistry analyzer
equipment (chapter 7).2 Differences in clinical chemistry analyzer product
designs were found that made some analyzer brands more expensive for inno-
vating users to modify than others. If innovating users were seeking to maxi-
mize innovation benefit, we hypothesized that there should be more user
innovation activity focused on the economical-to-modify analyzers-for ex-
periments requiring equipment modification.
We tested this hypothesis in several ways and found it to be supported. We
concluded that managers may sometimes be able to shift the sources of innova-
tion affecting products of interest to them by manipulating variables under
their control, such as product design.
Implications for Innovation Research
When a model fits reality well, data fall easily and naturally into the patterns
predicted. I have been repeatedly struck by the clear, strong patterns that can
be observed in the data that my students and I have collected on the func-
tional sources of innovation. I hope that this aspect of the findings will not
escape the eye of researchers potentially interested in exploring the function-
ally distributed innovation process.
Can we use the strong patterns identified in the functional sources of innova-
tion to build a better understanding of the way innovation-related profits are
captured? It seems to me to be important to do so: The nature and effective-
Overview 7
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ness of strategies for capturing innovation-related profits probably have as
great an impact on economic behavior as do considerations of transaction
costs or economies of scale, yet we know much less about them.
As an example of a strong pattern in the functional source of innovation
data worth exploring, consider that my hypothesis simply states that innova-
tions will be developed by those who expect a return they find attractive. But
the data show that innovations of a specific type are typically developed by
firms that expect the most attractive return. Can we build from this to show
that those expecting the most attractive returns in an innovation category will
invest more and eventually drive out all others over time? If so, we will greatly
improve our ability to understand and predict the sources of innovation on the
basis of innovation-related profits.
As an example of how a better understanding of real-world patterns in
innovation-related profits may help us understand a range of economic issues,
consider the matter of why firms specialize. Current explanations of this
phenomenon focus on consideration of maximizing economy in production.
But in the instance of process equipment, decisions by users to develop their
own equipment do not appear to me to be motivated by such make-or-buy
savings. Instead, innovating users appear to be motivated by considerations of
increased profits they may obtain by having better equipment than that avail-
able to competitors. That is, they seem to be motivated primarily by consider-
ations of innovation-related rents.
The research my students and I have carried out to date has primarily
focused on product and process categories in which innovator firms have
developed innovations on their own and have had only a single functional role
with respect to those innovations. (An innovator was typically a user or a
manufacturer, but not both.) The world clearly has more complex cases in it.
In some fields of innovation, firms may customarily join with others to de-
velop innovations cooperatively. In other fields firms may typically be verti-
cally integrated or for some other reason contain multiple functional roles
within the same organization. These more complex patterns should be stud-
ied. Possibly, but not certainly, we will be able to understand them in terms of
the same principles found operating in simpler cases.
In the hope that some colleagues will find further research on the functional
sources of innovation intriguing, I provide case materials (appendix). These
may serve some as a convenient source of initial data.
Implications for Innovation Management
Innovation managers will, I think, find much of practical use in the research I
explore in this book. The fact that the sources of innovation can differ has
major consequences for innovation managers, both with respect to the organi-
zation of R & D and marketing and to management tools (chapter 9).
Firms organize and staff their innovation-related activities based on their
assumptions regarding the sources of innovation. Currently, I find that most
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firms organize around the conventional assumption that new products are-or
should be-developed by the firm that will manufacture them for commercial
sale. This leads manufacturers to form R & D departments capable of fulfilling
the entire job of new product development in-house and to organize market
research departments designed to search for needs instead of innovations.
Indeed, if a manufacturer depends on in-house development of innovations
for its new products, then such arrangements can serve well. But if users,
suppliers, or others are the typical sources of innovation prototypes that a
firm may wish to analyze and possibly develop, then these same arrangements
can be dysfunctional. (For example, one cannot expect a firm's R & D group
to be interested in user prototypes if its engineers have been trained and
motivated to undertake the entire product development themselves.) Once
the actual source of innovation is understood, the nature of needed modifica-
tions to firms' related organizational arrangements can be addressed.
New sources of innovation demand new management tools as well as new
organization. Marketing research methods traditionally used to seek out and
analyze user needs must be modified if they are to be effective for seeking out
prototype products users may have developed. Similarly, tools for analyzing
and possibly shifting the functional sources of innovation are not in firms'
current management inventory and must be developed.
Early versions of needed tools will be found in this book. Obviously, much
more work must be done. But I urge that innovative managers not wait for
better tools and experiment now. Where patterns in the functional sources of
innovation are strong, managers with a good understanding of their industries
can get useful results by combining the basic concepts presented in this book
with their own rich insights-and they should not be reluctant to do this.
Implications for Innovation Policy
Policymakers will find this research on the distributed innovation process
interesting for many of the same reasons that managers will: Attempts to
direct or enhance innovation must be based on an accurate understanding of
the sources of innovation.
As was the case for innovation managers, government policymakers need
new tools to measure and perhaps influence a functionally distributed innova-
tion process, and these have not yet been developed. Pending the develop-
ment of such tools, however, much can be done simply through an understand-
ing that the innovation process can be a functionally distributed one.
As an illustration, consider the current concern of U.S. policymakers that
the products of U.S. semiconductor process equipment firms are falling be-
hind the leading edge. The conventional assessment of this problem is that
these firms should somehow be strengthened and helped to innovate so that
U.S. semiconductor equipment users (makers of semiconductors) will not also
fall behind. But investigation shows (Table 1-1) that most process equipment
innovations in this field are, in fact, developed by equipment users. There-
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fore, the causality is probably reversed: U.S. equipment builders are falling
behind because the U.S. user community they deal with is falling behind. If
this is so, the policy prescription should change: Perhaps U.S. equipment
builders can best be helped by helping U.S. equipment users to innovate at
the leading edge once more (chapter 9).
The elements in the example I have just described can clearly be seen as
components in a distributed innovation process that interact in a systemlike
manner. Eventually, I hope we will understand such systems well enough to
have a ready taxonomy of moves, countermoves, and stable states. But even
our present understanding of the functionally distributed innovation process
can, in my view, help us to advance innovation research, practice, and policy-
making.
Notes
1. Glen L. Urban and Eric von Hippel, "Lead User Analyses for the Development
of New Industrial Products" (MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper No.
1797-86) (Cambridge, Mass., June 1986), and Management Science (forthcoming).
2. Eric von Hippel and Stan N. Finkelstein, "Analysis of Innovation in Automated





In this chapter I begin by exploring who actually develops novel, commercially
successful scientific instruments. Then I explore the actual sources of innova-
tion in two major classes of process equipment used by the electronics industry.
In both of these areas, I find that the innovators are most often users.
The discovery that users are innovators in at least some important catego-
ries of innovation propels us into the first major question I examine in this
book: Who actually develops the vast array of new products, process equip-
ment, and services introduced into the marketplace? The answer is clearly
important: An accurate understanding of the source of innovation is funda-
mental to both innovation research and innovation management.
The Sources of Scientific Instrument Innovations
Scientific instruments are tools used by scientists and others to collect and
analyze data. My study of scientific instrument innovations focuses on four
important instrument types: the gas chromatograph, the nuclear magnetic
resonance spectrometer, the ultraviolet spectrophotometer, and the transmis-
sion electron microscope. Each of these instrument types was, and is, very
important to science.l*
*The gas chromatograph was a revolutionary improvement over previous wet chemistry meth-
ods used to identify chemical unknowns. Analyses that formerly took years to do or that could not
be done at all prior to the innovation could now often be done in hours with gas chromatography.
The nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometer (lately applied to medical research but initially
used by chemists) opened an entirely new approach-the analysis of nuclear magnetic moments-
to the determination of molecular structures. The ultraviolet spectrometer made analysis of
materials by means of their ultraviolet spectra (a very useful research tool) easily achievable. The
transmission electron microscope allowed researchers for the first time to create images of objects
down to a resolution unit of approximately one angstrom (A), far better than could be achieved
by any optical microscope.
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TABLE 2-1. Scientific Instrument Sample Composition
Improvements
Instrument Type First-of- Type Major Minor Total
Gas chromatograph 1 11 0 12
Nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometer 1 14 0 15
Ultraviolet absorption spectrophotometer 1 5 ( 6
Transmission electron microscope 1 14 63 78
TOTAL 4 44 63 111
My innovation sample for each of the four instrument families included the
initial, first-of-type device as it was first commercialized and the many com-
mercially successful major and minor "improvement" innovations that en-
hanced the performance of that basic device over the succeeding 20 or more
years.
The sample structure, shown in Table 2-1, might initially seem rather odd.
Why focus on the innovations that improved just four types of scientific
instrument? After all, many types of scientific instrument exist2 and perhaps
the generalizability of results might be better served by a random sampling
from the whole field? Focusing on a few instrument types in depth, however,
offers several advantages.
First, by examining successive innovations affecting a given instrument
type, variables such as the nature of the market and industry structure, which
might affect the sources of innovation we observe, can be controlled for.
Second, a sample that follows the evolution of a few products over 20 or more
years allows us a longitudinal view of the sources of innovation. Any major
changes in the functional sources of innovation that may occur over time
should be visible. Finally, an instrument type such as those examined here
typically represents a product line from a manufacturing firm's viewpoint.
Therefore, patterns of innovation that we observe in our samples are similar
to those a manufacturer would have to face and deal with in the real world.
Methods
To guard against enthusiasm coloring my findings, I made my criterion for
determining the source of an innovation objectively codable. I defined an
innovator as the firm or individual that first developed a scientific instrument
innovation to a state proved functionally useful, as indicated by the publica-
tion of data generated by it in a scientific journal.
My next task was to identify a sample of major and minor improvement
innovations for each of the four instruments to be studied. This was done by,
first, identifying users and manufacturer personnel expert in each instrument
type.3 Then, to identify major improvement innovations, each expert was
asked to identify improvements developed after the basic innovation that
Users as Innovators
provided a significant improvement in instrument performance relative to
best preexisting practice.4 The experts turned out to have quite uniform
views. Either almost everyone contacted agreed that an innovation was of
major functional utility-in which case it was included-or almost no one did,
except the proposer-in which case it was rejected.
Minor improvement innovations were identified for the electron micro-
scope only.5 To generate a sample of these, the set of experts first listed all the
innovations they could think of that had produced any improvement to any
aspect of electron microscope performance and that had been commercial-
ized. I then augmented this initial list by a scan of the catalogs of microscope
manufacturers and microscope accessory and supply houses to identify any
innovative features, accessories, specimen preparation equipment, and so on,
that met the same criterion.
The samples of first-of-type and major improvement innovations that were
identified by these procedures are listed in Table 2-2.
Samples in hand, I next faced a rather daunting data collection task. I
wanted to understand the details of over 100 highly technical innovations and
their histories. To accomplish the task I evolved a pattern that has served well
during a number of studies. I set aside a summer and, with the aid of National
Science Foundation (NSF) funding, recruited several excellent, technically
trained MIT master's candidates to work with me. We all worked together in
a large office, collecting data through telephone calls, library work, and field
trips according to a standard data collection guide. Frequent comparing of
notes and joint work (with breaks for noontime volleyball and chess games)
kept our data to a high standard of reliability. (Additional discussion of data
collection methods will be found in the appendix, along with detailed innova-
tion case histories.)
The Sources of Innovation
As my students and I worked over the summer, we began to see that there was
a clear answer to our question regarding the source of innovation in the field
of scientific instruments. As can be seen in Table 2-3, it emerged that users
were the developers of fully 77% of all the innovations we studied. And, as
can be seen in Table 2-4, this pattern was uniformly present in all four
instrument families studied.
Some sample members were not clearly independent: Several innovations
were sometimes attributed to a single innovating user or manufacturer. 6 But,
as is shown in Table 2-5, the finding of user innovation is not affected by this:
A subsample that excludes all but the first case, chronologically, in which a
particular user or firm plays a role shows the same pattern of innovation as the
total sample. Employment of other decision rules in this test (e.g., the exclu-
sion of all but the last case in which a given firm or user plays a role) produces
the same outcome.
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TABLE 2-2. Sample of Major Scientific Instrument Innovations
First-of-type: Gas chromatograph (GC)
Temperature programming
Capillary column







Gas sampling valve with loop
Process control chromatography
Preparative gas chromatography
First-of-type: Nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spectrometer















Proton-enhanced nuclear induction spectros-
copy







First-of-type: Transmission electron microscope (TEM)
Major improvement innovations
Pointed filaments Three-stage magnification
Telefocus electron gun Scaled-up objective pole piece
Double condenser lens Goniometer specimen stage
Correction of astigmatism in objective lens Cold-specimen stage
Well-regulated high-voltage power supplies High-temperature specimen stage
Well-regulated lens power supply Biased electron gun
Rubber gasket sealing of vacuum system Out-of-gap objective lens
Recall that my measure of the source of innovation is based on who first
developed a later-commercialized scientific instrument innovation. When us-
ers were found to be first, I termed them the innovators. But is it possible that
in such cases manufacturers were also innovators, developing the same innova-
tions independently? It seemed implausible, but I checked.
On the basis of two types of evidence, it appears that users who are first to
innovate are indeed the innovators. First, most manufacturers who commer-
cialize innovations initially developed by users say that their commercial prod-
uct is based on the earlier, user-developed device. Second, as Table 2-6
shows, 78% of the instruments commercialized by scientific instrument manu-
facturers display the same underlying technical operating principles as their
14
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TABLE 2-3. Source of Scientific Instrument Innovations by Innovation Significance
% User Innovation Developed by
Innovation Significance Developed User Manufacturer NA Total
First-of-type 10(% 4 0 0 4
Major improvement 82 36 8 0 44
Minor improvement 70 32 14 17 63
TOTAL 77 72 22 17 111
user prototype predecessors. This would be exceedingly unlikely to occur if
users and manufacturers were engaged in parallel but independent research
efforts.7
Three abbreviated case histories can convey a good feeling for the innova-
tion patterns found in scientific instruments. The first is an example of a user-
developed major improvement innovation; the second is an example of a
manufacturer-developed major innovation; the third is an example of a minor
improvement innovation developed by a scientific instrument user.
Case Outline 1. A user-developed major improvement innovation: spinning
of a nuclear magnetic resonance sample.
Samples placed in a nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometer are subjected to
a strong magnetic field. From a theoretical understanding of the nuclear mag-
netic resonance phenomenon, it was known by both nuclear magnetic reso-
nance spectrometer users and personnel of the then-only manufacturer of
nuclear magnetic resonance equipment (Varian Associates, Palo Alto, Califor-
nia) that increased homogeneity of that magnetic field would allow nuclear
magnetic resonance equipment to produce more detailed spectra. Felix Bloch,
Professor of Physics at Stanford University and the original discoverer of the
nuclear magnetic resonance phenomenon, suggested that one could improve
TABLE 2-4. Source of Innovation by Type of Instrument
Innovations Developed byMajor Improvement % User
Innovations Developed User Manufacturer NA Total
Gas chromatograph 82% 9 2 0 11
Nuclear magnetic
resonance spectrometer 79 11 3 () 14
Ultraviolet
spectrophotometer 10() 5 0 0 5
Transmission
electron microscope 79 11 3 () 14
TOTAL 81 36 8 () 44
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TABLE 2-5. A Subsample, Selected to Assure Independence, Shows Substantially
the Same Pattern of User Innovation as Total Sample
Innovations Developed byMajor Improvement % User
Innovations Developed User Manufacturer NA Total
Gas chromatograph 86% 6 1 0 7
Nuclear magnetic
resonance spectrometer 100 5 0 0 5
Ultraviolet
spectrophotometer 100 2 0 0 2
Transmission
electron microscope 83 5 1 0 6
TOTAL 90 18 2 0 20
the effective homogeneity of the field by rapidly spinning the sample in the
field, thus averaging out some inhomogeneities. Two of Bloch's students, W.
A. Anderson and J. T. Arnold, built a prototype spinner and experimentally
demonstrated the predicted result. Both Bloch's suggestion and Anderson
and Arnold's verification were published in the same issue of Physical Re-
view. 8
Varian engineers went to Bloch's laboratory, examined his prototype sam-
ple spinner, developed a commercial model, and introduced it into the mar-
ket by December 1954. The connection between Bloch and Varian was so
good and Varian's commercialization of the improvement so rapid that there
was little time for other users to construct homebuilt spinners prior to that
commercialization.
Case Outline 2. A manufacturer-developed major improvement innovation: a
well-regulated, high-voltage power supply for transmission electron
microscopes.
The first electron microscope and the first few precommercial replications
used batteries connected in series to supply the high voltages they required.
The major inconvenience associated with this solution can be readily imag-
ined: voltages on the order of 80,000 v were required, and nearly 40,000
TABLE 2-6. Were the Operating Principles of the User's Design'Replicated in the
First Commercial Device?
Major Improvement Innovations % Yes Yes No NA Total
Gas chromatograph 78% 7 2 0 9
Nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometer 82 9 2 0 11
Ultraviolet spectrophotometer 100 5 0 0 5
Transmission electron microscope 64 7 4 0 11
TOTAL 78 28 8 0 36
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single wet-cell batteries had to be connected in series to provide this. A
visitor to the laboratory of L. Marton, an early and outstanding experimenter
in electron microscopy, recalls an entire room filled with batteries on floor-
to-ceiling racks with a full-time technician employed to maintain them. An
elaborate safety interlock system was in operation to insure that no one
would walk in, touch something electrically live, and depart this mortal
sphere. Floating over all was the strong stench of the sulfuric acid contents of
the batteries. Clearly, not a happy solution to the high-voltage problem.
The first commercial electron microscope, built by Siemens of Germany in
1939, substituted a power supply for the batteries but could not make its
output voltage as constant as could be done with batteries. This was a major
problem because high stability in the high-voltage supply was a well-known
prerequisite for achieving high resolution with an electron microscope.
When RCA decided to build an electron microscope, an RCA electrical
engineer, Jack Vance, undertook to build a highly stable power supply and by
several inventive means achieved a stability almost good enough to eliminate
voltage stability as a constraint on the performance of a high-resolution micro-
scope. This innovative power supply was commercialized in 1941 in RCA's
first production microscope.
Case Outline 3. A user-developed minor improvement innovation: the self-
cleaning electron beam aperture for electron microscopes.
Part of the electron optics system of an electron microscope is a pinhole-sized
aperture through which the electron beam passes. After a period of micro-
scope operation, this aperture tends to get contaminated with carbon. The
carbon becomes electrically charged by the electron beam impinging on it;
the charge in turn distorts the beam and degrades the microscope's optical
performance. It was known that by heating the aperture one could boil off
carbon deposits as rapidly as they formed and thus keep the aperture dynami-
cally clean. Some microscope manufacturers had installed electrically heated
apertures to perform this job, but these devices could not easily be retrofitted
to existing microscopes.
In 1964 a microscope user at Harvard University gave a paper at the EMSA
(Electron Microscope Society of America) in which he described his inven-
tive solution to the problem. He simply replaced the conventional aperture
with one made of gold foil. The gold foil was so thin that the impinging
electron beam made it hot enough to induce dynamic cleaning. Since no
external power sources were involved, this design could be easily retrofitted
by microscope users.
C. W. French, owner of a business that specializes in selling ancillary
equipment and supplies to electron microscopists, read the paper, talked to
the author/inventor, and learned how to build the gold foil apertures. French
first offered them for sale in 1964.
The User's Role in Innovation Diffusion
The innovating users in the case histories presented were researchers em-
ployed by universities. And, as we see in Table 2-7, this was generally true for
my sample of user-developed innovations.
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TABLE 2-7. Institutions Employing Innovative Users
Private
Major Improvement Universityl Manufacturing Self-
Innovations Institute Firm employed NA Total
Gas chromatograph 3 3 1 2 9
Nuclear magnetic
resonance spectrometer 9 0 0 2 11
Ultraviolet
spectrophotometer 4 1 0 0 5
Transmission
electron microscope 10 0 0 1 11
Given that the innovating scientific instrument users were university scien-
tists, we might expect them to be very active in speeding the diffusion of their
innovations-and they were. First (as required by the mores of science),
innovating users (researchers) published their research results and the details
of any homebuilt apparatus used to attain them. Second, they typically also
informed others of their innovations by presentations at conferences and visits
to the laboratories of other scientists.
Information diffused by innovators regarding major innovations was rap-
idly picked up by other scientists or by commercializing firms. In the instance
of major improvements to GC or NMR (the two areas where I looked into the
matter) one of two types of diffusion occurred within a year after the initial
publication by the original innovating user: Either (1) other scientists repli-
cated the homebuilt device and also published papers involving its use (fre-
quently the case) or (2) a commercial version was on the market (seldom the
case). Both patterns are shown in Table 2-8.
In sum, we see that the role of the user-depicted schematically in Figure
2-1-was both very rich and central to the scientific instrument innovation
process.
TABLE 2-8. When Instrument Manufacturers Did Not Commercialize
User Innovations Quickly, Other Users Made Homebuilt Copies
Homebuilts present, time
User time lag > 1 year lag 1 year or < 1 year
Innovation % Yes Yes No NA % Yes Yes No NA
Gas chromatograph 100% 5 0 0 0% 0 3 1
Nuclear magnetic resonance
spectrometer 100 8 0 1 0 0 1 1
TOTAL 100 13 0 1 0 0 4 2
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FIGURE 2-1. Typical Steps in the Development and Diffusion of a Scientific
Instrument Innovation
Typically the innovative user:
• Perceived that an advance in instrumentation was required.
• Invented the instrument.
• Built a prototype.
• Proved the prototype's value by applying it.
• Diffused detailed information on both the value of the invention and on
how the prototype device could be replicated.
In instances coded as user innovation, an instrument manufacturer entered
the process only after all of the above events had transpired. Typically, the
manufacturer then:
• Performed product engineering work on the user's device to improve its
reliability and convenience of operation.
• manufactured, marketed, and sold the innovative product.
The Sources of Semiconductor and
Printed Circuit Board Assembly Process Innovations
The study of scientific instruments I have just reviewed showed user innova-
tion as typical in that field. But is this pattern unique to scientific instruments?
After all, university scientists, the typical innovators in that field, are- clearly
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Initial practice 5 6
Major improvements 16 3
Minor improvements 11 0
PC board assembly
Initial practice 2 2
Major improvements 6 0
Minor improvements 9 0
TOTAL 49 11
To explore this matter, I decided to conduct a second study in other, more
"normal" fields, before suggesting that users-as-innovators might be a gener-
ally significant phenomenon. In this study, I examined innovations affecting
two types of processes: the manufacture of silicon-based semiconductors and
the assembly of printed circuit (PC) boards.*
Methods
Semiconductors and PC boards are, in common with most products, manufac-
tured by means of a series of process steps. Thus, the process of manufactur-
ing silicon-based semiconductors may start with a crystal-growing process
step, followed by a step in which the crystal is sliced into thin circular wafers,
and so forth.
My sample in this study consisted of the successive innovations that first
established and then improved several such manufacturing process steps (see
Table 2-9). Since the machinery used for a manufacturing process step often
represents a product line for an equipment manufacturer, the resulting sample
structure is similar to that used in the study of scientific instruments, and it
shares its advantages.
The 60 innovations included in this study (listed in Table 2-10) were identi-
fied by means of a process involving several steps. I began by studying process
flow sheets to identify the major process steps used to manufacture semiconduc-
tors and assemble printed circuit boards. Next, I selected some of these process
steps9 and identified the method used in the initial commercial practice of each
(i.e., the first method used by any firm to manufacture products for sale rather
*Most electronic products today use printed circuit boards to link the electronic components
they contain (integrated circuits, resistors, capacitors, etc.) into functioning circuits. The PC
board itself resembles a plastic board or card. It is typically rectangular, it is less than yl6-in. thick,
and it measures a few inches on each side. Electronic components are mounted on one or both
board surfaces, and thin metal paths that run on the surface of the board and/or within it
interconnect the components into the desired electronic circuitry. Board manufacture here in-
cludes the manufacture of the basic board, component insertion, interconnection, and testing.
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TABLE 2-10. Innovations Identified for Silicon Semiconductor and for
Printed Circuit Board Subassembly Processinga
Initial Commercial
Major Process Step Practice Major Improvement
Silicon semiconductor produi









7. Mask alignment and
wafer exposure
8. Oxide etching
9. Silicon junction fabri-
cation
10. Metalization



























1. Circuit fabrication PC boardd
Wire wrapping (optional)
















High acceleration wafer spinner
11 minor improvement innovations




Mechanical scriber and dicer








Automated wire wrapping (optional)
Single-component-per-station
component insertion





9 minor improvement innovations
aSource: Eric von Hippel, "The Dominant Role of the User in Semiconductor and Electronic Subassembly
Process Innovation," IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management EM-24, no. 2 (May 1977). 64-65 () 1977
IEEE.
bFloat zone refining and dislocation-free float zone refining offer an alternate silicon single crystal growing
technology.
'This process innovation was embodied primarily in operator technique rather than in novel process equipment.
dThe process machinery used in the initial commercial practice of this process step was commercially available
and being used in other industries. Innovation work needed in these instances consisted simply of identifying
the equipment as appropriate for the process step contemplated and/or redcfining the process step specifica-
tions until they fitted the capabilities of that equipment.
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% User User facturer facturer NA Total
Semiconductor process
Initial practice 100% 5 0 0 0 5
Major improvements 71 10 2 2 2 16
Minor improvements 56 5 3 1 2 11
PC board assembly
Initial practice 100 2 0 0 0 2
Major improvements 40 2 2 1 1 6
Minor improvements 63 5 2 1 1 9
TOTAL 67 29 9 5 6 49
than for laboratory purposes). Then, using the same process of polling experts
described earlier in the context of the scientific instrument study, I identified
the major improvements that had been made to each process step over the
following years. (A major improvement was defined as a change in equipment
or technique that provided a significant improvement in process step perfor-
mance relative to best preinnovation practice.) Finally (again following meth-
ods described earlier), I identified an exhaustive sample of minor process step
improvements affecting one semiconductor and one PC board assembly pro-
cess step. (Minor improvement innovations were defined as those that gave
the user any improvement in any dimension important in processing such as
cost reduction, increased speed, quality, consistency, and so on.10)
As in the scientific instrument study, I defined an innovator as the firm or
individual that first developed a sampled innovation to a state proved function-
ally useful. Here, proof of functional usefulness was documented use of the
innovation in commercial production. All of the innovations selected for
study were commercially successful, with commercial success being defined as
near-universal adoption by process users in the few years following the innova-
tion's debut. (Today, of course, many of the innovations have been sup-
planted by later improvements.)
Data collection methods used in this study are precisely the same as those
used in the study of scientific instruments that were described earlier in this
chapter.
The Sources of Innovation
As Table 2-11 shows, users developed all of the process machinery innova-
tions involved in the initial commercial practice of a process step and more
than 60% of the major and minor improvements to that machinery. (Conven-
tional wisdom suggests that user-developed innovations are rare. But even if
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Equipmenta Technique Onlyb Developed by
Semiconductor process
Initial practice 2 3 100% User
Major improvements 0 3 100% User
PC board assembly
Initial practice 1 1 100% User
Major improvements 0 0
TOTAL 3 7
aldentified in Table 2-10 by the superscript "d."
bdentified in Table 2-10 by the superscript "c."
we allow Ho to be that users will develop 50% of the sampled innovations, p <
.02, our sample would yield the 67% user-developed innovations reported in
Table 2-11.) Clearly, user innovation is not a phenomenon restricted to scien-
tific instruments only.
In this second study we see a modest amount of joint user/manufacturer
innovation activity (coded as user/manufacturer in Table 2-11). Also, we see
users active in two types of innovations that I have not discussed before.
First, from Table 2-12 note that users developed all of the technique-only
process innovations in the sample. (Such an innovation does not require any
novel equipment for implementation. Rather, it involves modifying the way in
which existing equipment is operated in order to make an improvement.)
Second, users were found to be the developers of all (three only) multistep
process concepts I examined in this study. These are the important process
concepts that underlie single process steps and give them meaning. For
example, in the semiconductor industry the process steps listed as 5-10 in
Table 2-10 are all steps in a photolithographic process that are intended to
implement a larger process concept known as the planar process of semicon-
ductor manufacture.
I did not explicitly collect a sample of this important type of innovation, but
I did note three in the course of collecting data on the single-step innovations I
was studying. The first of these was the planar process for manufacturing
semiconductors just mentioned. It was developed by Fairchild Semiconduc-
tor, a process user.The product/process concept of building semiconductors
on a silicon substrate rather than on germanium also affected many process
steps, and it was developed by Bell Laboratories and Texas Instruments, both
users of the process. Finally, the basic product/process concept of mounting
electronic components on a plastic board that had electrical circuits printed on
it (the basic concept of the PC board) was developed by the U.S. Signal
Corps, a user, in 1948 as part of an effort to miniaturize military electronics.
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TABLE 2-13. Patterns in Transfer of User Innovations to First Commercializing
Equipment Manufacturersa
Lag Between User Inno-
How Frequently vation and First Com-
Observed mercial Equipment Sale
Pattern Observed % (n) Mean Years SD
Multiple user/
manufacturer interactions 46% 11 3.7 1.3
No transfer found 25 6 1.8 0.4
User equipment order 21 5 1.0 1.3
User becomes manufacturer 8 2 4.0 0.0
aTotal user-developed process machine innovations = 29; transfer pattern data NA = 5.
Diffusion of Innovations
Unlike the situation in scientific instrument innovations, users of process
equipment innovations do not necessarily have an incentive to transfer what
they know to an equipment manufacturer. In fact they might have an incen-
tive to hide what they know to achieve a competitive advantage. (I will con-
sider this matter in depth in chapter 6.) Therefore, it would be interesting to
know how equipment manufacturers learned of the user process innovations I
studied, and I looked into the matter."1
Details of the transfer process were typically not well documented or re-
called by interviewees. However, I determined that the transfer of user-
developed process equipment innovations to the first equipment manufactur-
ing firm to produce them as a commercial product fell into one of four general
patterns (see Table 2-13).
In order of the frequency with which these were observed:
1. Multiple interactions between the staffs of user firms and manufacturer
firms made it impossible to isolate the events surrounding transfer. In
these instances, several user firms had homemade versions of the innova-
tion in-house at the time of transfer, and it was clear that a great deal of
information was being passed around. A typical interviewee comment:
"Everyone was talking about x user design at the time."
2. No transfer identified. Although a user was first to develop the equipment
used commercially (and was coded as the innovator on this basis), no
transfer process was identifiable retrospectively.
3. A user (not necessarily the initial innovating user) transferred the design
of the innovation along with a purchase order for units produced to that
design. The user's intent in these instances was to obtain an outside source
of supply for the novel equipment.
4. An equipment user (not necessarily the innovating user) also adopted the
role of equipment manufacturer and began to produce the innovation for
sale to other user firms.
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Primary Actor User | | Manufacturer 
Innovation Identify Research/ Build Apply/Commercialize TIME
Process Need Development Prototype Diffuse Innovation
Stage Diffuse InnovationStage
FIGURE 2-2. Steps Observed in the User Development of an Innovation
The User-Dominated Innovation Process
We have now found three innovation categories in which it is typically the
product user, not the product manufacturer, who recognizes the need, solves
the problem through an invention, builds a prototype, and proves the proto-
type's value in use. If we apply this finding to "stages" of the technical innova-
tion process, we find-somewhat counterintuitively-that the locus of almost
the entire innovation process is centered on the user. As is shown schematically
in Figure 2-2, only commercial diffusion is carried out by the manufacturer.
This finding is at odds with conventional wisdom and with most of the
prescriptive literature in the new product development process directed to
manufacturers. That literature characteristically assumes that the manufac-
turer must find a need and fill it by executing the new product development
stages in Figure 2-2.
It is perhaps natural to assume that most or all of the innovation process
culminating in a new industrial good occurs within the commercializing firm.
First, as we will see in chapter 3, the manufacturer is the usual innovator in
many product and process categories. Second, a manufacturer's association
with an innovation is usually much more public than that of users and others,
and this can inadvertently reinforce the presumption (sometimes false) of
manufacturer-as-innovator. Thus, very naturally, in the course of marketing
an innovation, manufacturing firms may advertise "their" innovative device.
These firms do not mean to imply that they invented, prototyped, and field
tested the advertised innovation. But, in the absence of countervailing adver-
tising by innovating users or other contributors to the innovative process
(advertising they generally have no reason to engage in), it is easy to make the
assumption.
Of course, some might feel that the data presented in this chapter are not
evidence of user innovation and that the within-manufacturer "norm" applies.
One might decide, for example, that the user-built prototype of an innovative
instrument available to an instrument firm simply serves as a new product
"need" that the firm (in the terminology of Figure 2-2) "identifies." It would
then follow that the succeeding stages in Figure 2-2 also occur within the
manufacturing firm. The "research and development" stage, for example,
might consist of the engineering work manufacturer personnel devote to con-
verting the user prototype into a commercial product.
Although one might make the argument outlined above, I myself find it
rather thin and unproductive to do so. Essentially, the argument enshrines
relatively minor activities within the manufacturer as the innovation process
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and relegates major activities by the user to the status of input to that process.
If, instead, we look at the scientific instrument and process equipment data
afresh, we see something very interesting: Product categories marked by a
great deal of innovation in which the firms manufacturing the products are not
necessarily innovative in and of themselves. Indeed, we might plausibly look
at the manufacturers of these products as typically only providing the manufac-
turing function for an innovative set of user/customers.
This finding that nonmanufacturers may be the innovators in some indus-
tries certainly opens the way to an interesting new view of the innovation
process. After all, accurate knowledge of who the innovator is is essential to
much innovation research and practice.
Notes
1. National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, Chemistry:
Opportunities and Needs (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1965),
88.
2. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Industrial Re-
ports: Selected Instruments and Related Products (MA38-B (80)-1 January 1982 SIC
Code 38112) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982).
3. The experts consulted were, on the manufacturer side, senior scientists and/or R
& D managers who had a long-time (approximately 20 years) specialization in the
instrument family at issue and whose companies have (or, in the case of electron
microscopy, once had) a share of the market for that instrument family. The users
consulted were interested in instrumentation and/or had made major contributions to
it (as evidenced in scientific review articles of each field).
4. This decision rule excluded "me-too" innovations from the sample, including
those that duplicated the successful performance increase of a previous innovation but
by different technical means.
5. Much of the improvement in performance of a product or process can be the
cumulative result of many minor, incremental innovations (see Samuel Hollander, The
Sources of Increased Efficiency: A Study of Du Pont Rayon Plants [Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1965], 196; Kenneth E. Knight, "A Study of Technological Innovation:
The Evolution of Digital Computers" [PhD diss., Carnegie Institute of Technology,
Pittsburgh, Penn., 1963]). Therefore, I had wanted to identify samples of minor im-
provement innovations for all four types of scientific instruments being studied. As
work proceeded, however, I only carried out this plan in the instance of the transmis-
sion electron microscope. Unfortunately, experience showed that participants could
not recall events surrounding minor innovations very well or very reliably. The events
had not seemed very significant at the time-indeed, they were not, they were minor-
and the details had faded with time.
6. The community of users and manufacturers associated with each of the four
instrument types I studied was small in the early days of each type. Therefore, as is
reasonable, my data contain several instances in which more than one major innova-
tion was invented by the same user or first commercialized by the same instrument
firm. With respect to a single user developing more than one innovation: 2 GC innova-
tions were developed by a single user, as were 3 NMR innovations, 2 UV innovations,
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and 4 TEM innovations. With respect to a single manufacturing firm being first to
commercialize more than one sample innovation, the 111 innovations in my sample
were first commercialized by only 26 companies: 12 GC innovations, first commercial-
ized by 8 companies; 15 NMR innovations, first commercialized by 3 companies; 6 UV
innovations, first commercialized by 2 companies; 15 TEM basic and major improve-
ment innovations, first commercialized by 6 companies; and 63 TEM minor innova-
tions, first commercialized by a total of 7 companies.
7. The coding of this question involves some existence of technical judgment by
the coder as no clear definitional boundary exists between the operating principles of
an invention and its engineering embodiment. Perhaps I can best convey a feeling for
the two categories by an illustration using Felix Bloch's sample spinning innovation
described later in this chapter. The concept of achieving an effective increase in mag-
netic field homogeneity through the operating principle of microscopically spinning the
sample can have many engineering embodiments by which one achieves the desired
spin. Thus one company's embodiment may use an electric motor to spin a sample
holder mounted on ball bearings; another might, in effect, make the sample holder
into the rotor of a miniature air turbine, achieving both support and spin by means of a
carefully designed flow of air around the holder.
8. F. Bloch, "Line-Narrowing by Macroscopic Motion," Physical Review 94, no. 2
(15 April 1954): 496-97; W. A. Anderson and J. T. Arnold, "A Line-Narrowing
Experiment," Physical Review 94, no. 2 (15 April 1954): 497-98.
9. I originally planned to study all 21 major process steps identified in Table 2-10.
Because of time limitations, however, only 14 were completed. These were not chosen
for study randomly, but were chosen by no conscious system.
10. Innovations that offered major or minor increments in functional utility to users
relative to previous best practice were identified independently for each process step
studied (i.e., major improvements in component insertion equipment were identified
by comparison with other component insertion equipment innovations only). This was
done because improvements in the different types of equipment typically had an
impact on various dimensions (precision, speed, reliability, and so on) not easily made
commensurable.
11. Eric von Hippel, "Transferring Process Equipment Innovations from User-




Variations in the Functional Source
of Innovation
We have seen that users sometimes innovate. But do they always? Or does the
functional source of innovation vary in some manner between users, manufac-
turers, suppliers, and others? To be able to answer these questions, we must
have data on the sources of innovation characteristic of at least a few more
types of innovation. Therefore, my students and I undertook the six brief
studies I will describe in this chapter.
Each of the six studies examines a different type of innovation. The first
four I will review consider innovation categories chosen to match my own
areas of technical knowledge and those of the graduate students participating
in our project. The choice of topics for the last two studies I will review was
made on a different basis, which I will spell out when discussing them.
Each study uses identical methods, so that their results are commensura-
ble, and each is tightly focused on a single issue: What are the sources of
innovation? These studies find that the functional source of innovation dif-
fers strikingly across the several types of product and process innovation I
have explored.
Users as Innovators: Pultrusion
Pultrusion is a valuable process for manufacturing fiber-reinforced plastic
products of constant cross-section. It is well suited to the production of high-
strength composites with reinforcement material that is aligned in known
directions-just what is needed for demanding structural applications such as
those in aerospace vehicles and sports equipment. Although pultrusion sales
at the time of the study were relatively small, they had been growing rapidly
and were expected to continue to do so. 
The pultrusion process is performed from start to finish on a single ma-
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TABLE 3-1. Pultrusion Process Machine Innovations
Basic Innovation: Original batch pultrusion process
Major process machinery improvements
Intermittent pultrusion process Tractor pullers
Tunnel oven cure Cut-off saw
Continuous pultrusion process Radio frequency augmented cure
Tooling innovations
Preforming tooling Improved dies
Hollow product tooling
chine. The process starts when reinforcing material such as fiberglass is pulled
simultaneously from a number of supply rolls and into a tank containing a
liquid thermoset resin such as polyester. Strands of reinforcement material
emerge from the tank thoroughly wetted with resin and then pass through
preforming tooling that aligns and compacts the strands into the desired cross-
section. The compacted bundle of glass and liquid resin is then pulled through
a heated die where the resin is cured. Next the cured product moves through
pullers, which are the source of the considerable mechanical force needed to
draw reinforcing material and resin through the steps just described. Finally a
saw cuts the continuously formed product into sections of the desired length.
The Sample
The basic pultrusion process was developed in the late 1940s. Since that time,
there have been major improvements to pultrusion process machinery and to
the resins and reinforcement materials used in the pultrusion process as well.
The sample (Table 3-1) focuses on pultrusion process machinery only. It
contains all machinery innovations that resulted in major improvements to the
pultrusion process when judged relative to the best practices obtaining at the
time each innovation was first commercialized. 2
In addition, the sample contains three tooling innovations. These are not
strictly part of a general-purpose pultrusion machine. Rather, they are acces-
sories to the machine (sometimes also called jigs or fixtures) that are designed
especially to aid in the manufacture of a particular product. (The ones in the
sample are each useful for a large category of pultruded product. Each is
described in detail in the appendix.)
All innovations studied were very successful and spread through much of
the user community in the form of user-made and/or commercially produced
equipment.
Findings: The Sources of Pultrusion Equipment Innovation
As can be seen in Table 3-2, almost all significant pultrusion process machin-
ery innovations were developed by machine users (producers of pultruded
products).
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TABLE 3-2. Sources of Pultrusion Process Machinery Innovations
Innovation Developed by
Innovation Type % User User Manufacturer NA Total
Original process 100% 1 0 0 1
Major improve-
ments 86 5 1 0 6
Tooling innovations 100 3 0 0 3
TOTAL 90 9 1 0 10
This finding follows the pattern of earlier studies, but in this case the user-
innovators appear much less technically sophisticated than those we encoun-
tered earlier. Innovating users of pultrusion process equipment were emphati-
cally not high-tech firms. They were essentially job shops making fiberglass
products by pultrusion and, often, by hand-layup methods as well. (Readers
who remember repairing the bodywork on their cars as teenagers will have
had firsthand experience with the hand-layup process. It simply involves wet-
ting fiberglass fabric or roving with a liquid plastic, shaping the wet material as
desired, then curing the plastic.)
These user firms had no formal R & D groups and, typically, no one with
formal technical training in plastics or plastics fabrication. If an order came in
for a part of novel shape, the foreman on the factory floor or one of the
workers would make up a mold to aid in shaping it. If the first design worked,
production would commence. If not, the mold and patterns of fiberglass layup
would be tinkered with until they did work acceptably. The more parts
needed of a given shape, the greater the effort put into making molds and
other aids to speed the layup process.
Typically, important pultrusion innovations were triggered when a user
firm received a large order for a part of uniform cross-section such as hun-
dreds of feet of one structural shape or thousands of feet of rod to be used for
fiberglass fishing poles. Faced with a massive task of this sort, a creative
person on the factory floor was sometimes inspired to innovate, using an
innate sense of engineering design and machine parts lying around the fac-
tory. In a few instances, these efforts resulted in process equipment innova-
tions of general value.
Manufacturers as Innovators: The Tractor Shovel
The tractor shovel is a very useful machine often used in the construction
industry. Initial conversations with experts in construction led us to suspect
that users would in fact be innovators in tractor shovels. Everyone had a story
to tell about a construction firm that, facing an unusual challenge and a tight
deadline, performed an overnight modification to some item of construction
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TABLE 3-3. Sample of Tractor Shovel Innovations
Basic Innovation: Original tractor shovel
Major improvements
Side lift arm linkage Double-acting hydraulic cylinders
Power steering Four-wheel drive
Hydraulic bucket control Torque converter
Fluid transmission coupling Articulation
Planetary final drive Power shift transmission
Significant special-purpose accessories
Lenthened boom arms Attachment coupler system
Log grapple Steel-shod tires
Bottom dump bucket
equipment that solved the problem and saved the day. In fact, however,
tractor shovel manufacturers turned out to be the dominant source of commer-
cially successful tractor shovel innovations.
The tractor shovel can be visualized as a four-wheeled, rubber-tired ma-
chine with a large, movable scoop mounted at the front end. It is normally
used for excavation and other construction tasks as well as for the general
handling of bulk materials, ranging from coal to chemicals to soybeans. House-
holders who live in states with severe winters may have a clear visual image of
tractor shovels: They are typically the machines that dig out roads after ordi-
nary trucks have been halted by deep snow.
Tractor shovels are built in many sizes. Today, one can find large tractor
shovels with massive, 20 cu-yd scoops working in open-pit mines loading ore
into trucks; one can also find small tractor shovels working in warehouses
shifting various materials from place to place 1 cu yd at a time. Approximately
41,000 tractor shovels of all sizes were manufactured in the United States in
1980, with an aggregate value of $1.5 billion dollars. 3
The Sample
The basic tractor shovel was developed in 1939. The sample consists of that
basic innovation plus all significant improvements to the tractor shovel com-
mercialized prior to 1970.4 The major improvements category in Table 3-3
consists of innovations that are installed in virtually all tractor shovels and that
are of value to essentially all users. For example, articulation, an innovation
that hinges the tractor shovel in the middle and greatly improves steering and
traction, is valuable to essentially allusers and is now incorporated in almost
all tractor shovels. In contrast, the special-purpose accessories listed are inno-
vations that are only of value in some specialized tasks. Thus, the lengthened
boom arms are used primarily by those who load high-sided trucks, whereas
the log grapples are primarily used by lumber companies in their logging
operations. Of course, many other special-purpose accessories exist, ranging
from asphalt pavers to snow blowers. The five chosen for study serve rela-
tively large user groups.
The Sources of Innovation
TABLE 3-4. Sources of Tractor Shovel Innovations
Innovation Developed by
Allied
% Manu- Manu- Manu-
Innovation Type facturer facturer facturer User NA Total
Basic shovel 100% 1 0 0 0 1
Major improve-
ments 100 10 0 0 0 10
Major accessories 80 2 2 1 0 5
TOTAL 94 13 2 1 0 16
Findings: The Sources of Tractor Shovel Innovation
As can clearly be seen in Table 3-4, almost all of the innovations studied were
developed by tractor shovel manufacturers. In two instances these innovating
manufacturers were what is known in the trade as allied manufacturers or
allied vendors. These are firms that make a specialty of manufacturing attach-
ments for tractor shovels and similar machines. Sometimes they are simply
equipment dealers who run a small manufacturing operation on the side.
(Tractor shovel manufacturers will often cooperate with such firms because
the accessories they build enhance the utility of the basic tractor shovel by
tailoring it to various specialized users.)
Only one innovation studied was completely developed by a user: the at-
tachment coupler system, which was developed by a farmer for use on his
farm. But users did some innovation work related to some of the other special
attachments studied (see the appendix). For example, before steel-shod tires
were developed by a manufacturer (they are used to protect tractor shovel
tires from cuts), some tractor shovel users were protecting the tires of their
machines by wrapping them with heavy steel chains.
Manufacturers as Innovators: Engineering Thermoplastics
Engineering plastics are triumphs of organic chemistry and most were created
after World War II. The term engineering plastic simply means a plastic that
can be used in demanding engineering applications. Examples of such applica-
tions are parts placed under mechanical stress or mechanical shock (e.g.,
gears or mallet heads) or parts placed in demanding temperatures and/or
chemical environments (e.g., parts used in automobile engines). Prior to the
advent of engineering plastics, such parts could only have been made of a
material like metal or glass. Now they can often be made better and more
cheaply from plastic.
All engineering plastics are produced in low volume but with a relatively high
selling price when judged against such bulk plastics as polyethylene. In 1976
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TABLE 3-5: Engineering Thermoplastics Sample
U.S. Consumption for Structural Usesa
Innovation (Trade Name) Millions of Pounds Millions of Dollars
Polycarbonate (Lexan) 150 143
Acetal homopolymer (Delrin) 20 15
Acetal copolymer (Celcon) 60 47
Polysulfone 12 22
Modified polyphenylene oxide (Noryl) 9 90
a 1976 data (James A. Rauch, ed., The Kline Guide to the Plastics Industry [Fairfield, N.J.: Charles H. Kline,
1978], 55-58 and Table 3-11).
engineering plastics counted for about 2% by volume of all plastics produced
but accounted for about 6% of the total value of all plastics produced.5
The Sample
The sample of engineering plastics innovations consists of all commercially
successful engineering thermoplastic monomers* introduced to the market
after 1955 that achieved sales of at least 10 million lbs annually by 1975. (This
definition of commercial success was suggested by plastics manufacturer
interviewees.) The five engineering thermoplastics innovations that met these
sample selection criteria are identified in Table 3-5.
Findings: The Sources of Engineering Thermoplastics Innovation
As can be seen in Table 3-6, "four and one-half" of the five engineering
plastics in the sample were developed by plastics manufacturers. Thus, this
very small sample shows a strong manufacturer-as-innovator pattern.
The innovation coded as 50% user developed and 50% manufacturer devel-
oped was polycarbonate resin (Lexan), which was developed by General
Electric in 1960. GE is both a major producer and a major user of polycarbon-
ate. In the period immediately following commercialization when production
capacity was low relative to that of today, GE personnel estimate that as much
as 50% of GE polycarbonate production was consumed internally. Currently,
GE consumes only a small percentage of annual polycarbonate production.
(See the appendix for further details.)
Happily, cases such as GE, where a single firm holds more than one func-
tional role with respect to an innovation, are very rare in our samples. When
*Engineering plastics are characterized as thermoset or thermoplastic resins, with thermoplas-
tics being more commonly used. The two types of plastics are distinguished by the way in which
they cure into usable plastic parts. Thermoset plastic forms molecular bonds when molded under
high temperature and pressure, and the process is irreversible. Thermoplastics, in contrast,
simply "freeze" into a shape on cooling, a process that can be reversed by the simple application
of sufficient heat. Monomers are the basic molecular building blocks of plastics.
The Sources of Innovation
TABLE 3-6. Sources of Engineering Thermoplastics Innovations
Innovation Developed by
Innovation Type %Manufacturer Manufacturer User NA Total
Engineering plastics 90% 4.5 0.5 0 5
dual or multiple roles are held by the same innovating firm or individual,
severe coding problems emerge. Often, one cannot determine which role the
innovator was "really" motivated by during the development work.
Manufacturers as Innovators: Plastics Additives
Plastics additives are used to modify the properties of a basic polymer in
desired ways. An enormous number of additives exist, and they are generally
categorized according to the function they perform. Thus, there are coloring
agents, flame retardants, fungicides, filling materials, reinforcing materials,
and so on. Each of these categories contains a number of materials of varying
properties to serve the specified function.
I decided to examine the sources of innovation in two categories of plastics
additives: plasticizers and ultraviolet (UV) stabilizers. These two additive
types address markets of very different size. (In 1983 more than 600,000
metric tons of plasticizers of all types were sold.6 In that same year, approxi-
mately 2300 metric tons of UV stabilizers of all types were sold.7 I do not have
data on dollar volumes in these two categories: Ultraviolet stabilizer prices
are typically somewhat higher than plasticizer prices, however.)
Plasticizers are materials that are incorporated into plastics to improve
properties such as workability and flexibility. Without plasticizers, plastics
such as polyvinyl chloride (PVC) would be hard and brittle. Ultraviolet stabi-
lizers are added to plastics to protect them from the effect of ultraviolet light
such as that present in sunlight. Without such protection, susceptible plastics
would quickly discolor, become brittle, or show other undesirable changes.
The Sample
The sample of plasticizer and ultraviolet stabilizer innovations included all
commercialized compounds that met four criteria. First, the additive was
appropriate for use with at least one of the four largest plastics in commercial
use: polyethylene, polyvinyl chloride, polystyrene, and polypropylene. Sec-
ond, the additive must have been first commercialized after the World War
II-a requirement added under the assumption that data on more recent
innovations would be of high quality. Third, the additive must have been
commercially successful, that is, it had to have been sold on the open market
and regarded as a successful product by expert interviewees in the additives
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TABLE 3-7. Sample of Plastics Additives Innovations
Plasticizers
Butyl benzyl phthalate Tri melitates
2 ethyl hexyl di phenyl phosphate Tri isopropyl phenyl phosphates
Citroflex type Epoxidized soybean oils
Di N undecyl phthalate Long chain aliphatic polyesters
Ultraviolet (UV) stablizers
2:4 dihydroxy benzophenone 2:4 di t butyl phenyl 3:5 di t butyl phenyl
Ethyl-2-cyano 3:3 diphenylacrylate 4 hydroxy benzoates
2 hydroxy 4 dodecyloxy benzophenone Zinc oxide and zinc diethyl dithio carbamates
Nickel complexes Benzotriozoles
P methoxy benzylidene malonic acid
dimethyl esters
industry. Fourth, the additive was included only if it represented an improve-
ment over previously commercialized additives on a property of importance
to users other than cost, for example, decreased toxicity or increased ease of
use.
The sample of plasticizers and ultraviolet stabilizers selected as meeting
these criteria is identified in Table 3-7.
Findings: The Sources of Plastics Additives Innovation
As can be seen in Table 3-8, more than 90% of the plastics additives innova-
tions studied were developed by firms that manufactured them. (Interest-
ingly, two UV stabilizer innovations coded as manufacturer developed
showed a pattern I had not found before: A single manufacturer did not
develop the innovation on its own. Instead, an association of manufacturers
funded the required R & D work at a private research firm.)
Suppliers as Innovators
Up to this point in the research on the functional sources of innovation, my
students and I had conducted six studies in total and had only observed
innovation by users and/or manufacturers. But experience gained in these
studies was leading me to speculate as to the cause of the striking variations in
the functional source of innovation that we had been observing.
I will discuss this matter in the next chapter. For present purposes, how-
ever, let me just say my speculation was that innovation appeared to be
"caused" by potential innovators' relative preinnovation expectations of
innovation-related benefit. And, therefore, it seemed to me that innovation in
any number of functional loci should exist, given only the proper level and
distribution of benefit expectations.
So, Pieter VanderWerf (Ph.D. candidate) and I set out deliberately to find
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TABLE 3-8. Sources of Plastics Additives Innovations
Innovation Developed by
Additive Type %Manufacturer User Manufacturer Supplier NA Total
Plasticizers 100% 0 5 0 3 8
UV stabilizers 86 1 6 0 1 8
TOTAL 92 1 11 0 4 16
innovation in a third functional locus, suppliers. (Suppliers are firms or indi-
viduals whose relationship to an innovation is that of supplying components or
materials required in the innovation's manufacture or use.) It seemed reason-
able in a rough way that suppliers might develop an innovation that they did
not expect to use or sell if that innovation would result in a large increase in
demand for something they did want to sell. (Thus, gas utilities might develop
novel gas appliances and give the designs away to appliance manufacturers,
hoping to capture rents from increased gas sales, rather than from making or
using the innovative appliance itself.) Based on this logic, we looked for
innovation categories that might contain supplier innovation by looking for
processes using a great deal of relatively expensive material or components as
an input.
Three categories of innovation seemed likely candidates for supplier innova-
tion on the basis of a preliminary inspection, and VanderWerf examined all of




In a first study, VanderWerf 8 explored the source of innovations in process
machines used in electrical wire and cable termination. The idea leading to
this focus was simply that many connector designs are unique to particular
connector suppliers. Thus, connector suppliers might have a strong incentive
to develop machines that would make it more economical for users to apply
their products.
Two types of wire termination machines were examined: those that simply
cut a wire to length and strip the insulation from its ends; those that cut the
wire and attach some sort of connector to one or both ends. Machines used for
these purposes range from simple and inexpensive hand tools to complex
machines costing as much as $100,000.
Some firms that manufacture wire and cable preparation process machines
are equipment manufacturers only. Others manufacture equipment and the
electrical terminal or connector supply items that the machinery applies to
electrical wires. These latter firms have both a manufacturer and a supplier
relationship to the process machinery innovations selected for study.
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TABLE 3-9. VanderWerf Sample of Innovations
in Wire Termination Equipmenta
Wire type: Single-insulated (hookup) wire
Equipment function: Cutting and stripping
INNOVATIONS
Automatic cut-and-strip machine
Linear feed cut-and-strip machine





Equipment function: Attachment of terminals
INNOVATIONS
Automatic lead-making machine
Power crimp bench press
Strip-fed crimp press
Wire type: Bundled single-insulated wires
Equipment function: Wire stripping
INNOVATIONS
Rotary stripper
Equipment function: Attachment of terminals
INNOVATIONS
Stripper-crimper
Heat shrink-sleeve assembly racks
(for soldered connectors)
Crimp connector assembly machine
Semiautomatic insulation-displacement terminator
Automatic insulation-displacement harness maker
Wire type: Ribbon cable
Equipment function: Cutting and stripping
INNOVATIONS
Automatic ribbon cable cutter
Automatic ribbon cable cut-and-strip machine
Equipment function: Connector attachment
INNOVATIONS
Pneumatic ribbon cable press
Semiautomatic ribbon cable terminator
Automatic ribbon cable harness maker
Wire type: Flat conductor cable
Equipment function: Attachment of cable terminals
INNOVATIONS
Crimp stitcher
aVanderWerf, Parts Suppliers as Innovators in Wire Termination Equip-
ment."
The Sample
Different types of wire termination machines are needed to process different
types of wire. VanderWerf focused on the machines used to prepare four
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TABLE 3-10. Sources of Innovation in Wire Termination Equipmenta
Innovation Developed by
Sup- Manu-
Innovation Type %Supplier plierb User facturer NA TOTAL
Machines that do 0% 0 1.5c 4.5c 2 8
not attach termi-
nals or connectors
Machines that do at- 83 10 0.5c 1.5c 0 12
tach terminals or
connectors
TOTAL 56 10 2 6 2 20
aVanderWerf, "Parts Suppliers as Innovators in Wire Termination Equipment."
blInnovating suppliers were found among connector manufacturers only, not wire manufacturers, except in the
case of ribbon cable innovators when both connectors and cable were supplied by innovating firms.
COne innovation in this category was developed jointly by a user and a manufacturer, and attributed 50% to
each.
types of wire frequently used in electronics equipment: single-strand hookup
wire, multiwire round cable, ribbon cable, and flat conductor cable. He then
identified an innovation sample that consisted of the first special-purpose
equipment used to cut and strip and/or attach connectors to each type of wire
as well as the major improvements to this equipment commercialized over the
years.9 This sample is shown in Table 3-9.
Findings
There are firms that specialize in manufacturing wire termination machinery.
And, as can be seen from Table 3-10, VanderWerf found that these machine
builders were the developers of almost all process machine innovations that
did not involve attaching a connector to a wire.
In sharp contrast, almost all of the innovative machines that did attach
connectors as part of their function were not developed by these machinery
specialists. Rather, they were developed (and manufactured) by the major.
connector suppliers. We will be able to suggest an explanation for this interest-
ing contrast later when we consider the causes of the variations we have
observed in the functional sources of innovation.
Suppliers as Innovators: Process Equipment
Utilizing Industrial Gases and Thermoplastics
In a second study VanderWerf10 examined two additional types of process
machinery for evidence of supplier innovation: (1) process machinery that
used a large amount of an industrial gas such as oxygen or nitrogen as an input
and (2) process machinery that used a large amount of thermoplastic resin as
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TABLE 3-11. Sample of Industrial Gas-using Innovationsa
Basic innovation Related major improvement
Basic oxygen process Mixed gas blowing
Detonation gun coating Electrical sequencing
Nitrogen heat treating Oxygen probe control
Cryogenic food freezing Conveyorized freezer
Pyrogenic oxidation Direct digital control
Argon-oxygen decarburization Argon-oxygen nitrogen decarburization
aVanderWerf, "Explaining the Occurrence of Industrial Process Innovation by Materials Suppliers," Table 5-
4, p. 46.
an input. In each of these areas, it seemed reasonable on economic grounds
that materials suppliers might develop innovative process machines they did
not want to manufacture or use, instead, hoping to capture rents from sales of
materials used in the process.
The Samples
For each of the two process areas he would study, VanderWerf chose a
sample design consisting of a number of innovation pairs: a major process
innovation and a related important improvement. He chose his sample of
industrial gas-using process innovations by, first, identifying the 6 industrial
gases with the highest U.S. production volume in 1978. Next, he asked ex-
perts to identify the single process innovation introduced after World War II
that now used the highest volume of each of these 6 industrial gases. (The
sample was restricted to post-World War II innovations so that one could
collect innovation history data from individuals with a firsthand knowledge of
innovation events.) Finally, the single most important improvement to each of
these 6 "basic" innovations was also identified by discussions with experts.
These were included in the sample as related major improvements. The 12
innovations identified in this way are shown in Table 3-11.
VanderWerf chose a sample of 7 pairs of thermoplastics-using process inno-
vations by a similar procedure. First, the 6 thermoplastics with the greatest
U.S. production volumes at the time of the study were identified. Then, the
major forming processes used with each as reported by Modern Plastics in
1983 were examined, and 7 were found to have been developed post-World
War II. These 7 basic innovations were included in the sample. Finally, ex-
perts were asked to identify the single most important improvement that had
been developed for each innovation up to the present day, and these were
included in the sample as related major improvement innovations. These 14
innovations are shown in Table 3-12.
Findings
Careful study showed that supplier innovation did indeed exist. As can be
seen in Table 3-13, about one third of both innovation samples had been
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TABLE 3-12. Sample of Thermoplastic-using Innovationsa
Basic innovation Related major improvement
Slush molding Water bath gelling
Rotational molding Three-arm RM machine
Direct foam extrusion Tandem screw extruder
Foam casting Continuous belt casting
Bead expansion molding Automatic molding press
Foam closed molding Cold mold process
Reaction-injection molding Self-clearing RIM head
aVanderWerf, "Explaining the Occurrence of Industrial Process Innovation by Materials Suppliers," Table 5-
2,p.4 4.
developed by materials suppliers. These firms had only a materials-supply link
to these process innovations: They did not themselves either manufacture or
use the machinery they had developed.
Additional Evidence on Nonmanufacturer Innovation
The six studies I have just reviewed will be useful when we attempt to
understand the causes of variations in the functional sources of innovation,
because they have determined the proportion of innovations that fall into
various loci. Other studies exist, however, to support the fact of
nonmanufacturer innovation.
Corey1l provides several case histories of important materials-using innova-
tions developed by materials suppliers. Cases of supplier innovation Corey
explores range from the development of vinyl floor tile to the development of
fiber-reinforced plastic water piping.
Recently, Shaw12 examined the role of the user in the development of 34
medical equipment innovations commercialized by British firms. He found
that 53% of these were initially developed and proven in use by users. He also
found users often aided manufacturers wishing to commercialize their innova-
tions in this field, sometimes helping to design, test, and even market the
commercial version.
TABLE 3-13. Sources of Materials-utilizing Process Innovationsa
Innovation Developed by
Material Type %Supplier Supplier User Manufacturer Other Total
Industrial gas 33% 4 5 2 1 12
Thermoplastic 36 5 6 2 1 14
TOTAL 35 9 11 4 2 26
aVanderwerf, "Explaining the Occurrence of Industrial Process Innovation by Materials Suppliers," Tables 8-
1, p. 57, and 8-2, p. 58.
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Everett M. Rogers and his colleagues explored the diffusion of several
innovations used in the public sector and observed that the version initially
diffused was often modified by its users. In a study of 10 Dial-a-Ride opera-
tions (Dial-a-Ride is a form of shared taxi service), Rice and Rogers 3 report
77 modifications to the original concept in management, technology, or opera-
tion (service provided) by adopting users. A similar pattern of user modifica-
tions was found by Rogers, Eveland, and Klepper' 4 in a study of the diffusion
and adoption of GBF/DIME-an information-processing tool developed by
the U.S. Census Bureau-among regional and local governments.
Notes
1. Stephen H. Pickens, "Pultrusion-The Accent on the Long Pull," Plastics Engi-
neering 31, no. 7 (July 1975): 16-21.
2. Candidate innovations for inclusion in the sample were obtained from a group of
experts working for both pultrusion process users and equipment firms. These experts
were identified by a two-step process. First, individuals whose names were frequently
cited in the technical literature on pultrusion were contacted. Second, the views of
these individuals were sought as to the identity of experts in the pultrusion process who
had a broad knowledge of the field from its inception to recent times. Individuals so
identified (13 in all) were then contacted and asked to identify those innovations that
would meet, in their view, the sample selection criteria stated in the text.
The experts polled regarding significant innovations in pultrusion were in substan-
tial agreement with all except the first two innovations listed in Table 3-1. The dissent-
ing experts felt that "true" pultrusion is a continuous process and that this characteris-
tic was not achieved until 1948 with the third innovation listed in Table 3-1. In
contrast, the view of other experts and (ultimately) of the author was that these two
innovations displayed enough other pultrusion-like characteristics to qualify for inclu-
sion. (See the appendix for further details on these and all other pultrusion innovations
studied.) In any case, the decision to include these two innovations did not affect the
findings with respect to the sources of innovation in pultrusion.
3. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1977 Census of Manufac-
tures, vol. 2, Industry Statistics (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1980).
4. Candidate innovations for the tractor shovel sample were identified by a two-step
method. First, Engineering News Record, a widely read trade journal in the civil
engineering field, was scanned for the period 1939-74 for mentions of possible candi-
date innovations. A list of possibilities developed by this method was then discussed
with personnel who had a long history in the tractor shovel industry and who appeared
to be both expert and knowledgeable as tractor shovel users or manufacturer person-
nel. Extensive discussion and numerous deletions from, and additions to, the initial list
allowed us to reach a consensus on the innovation sample identified in Table 3-3.
5. James A. Rauch, ed., The Kline Guide to the Plastics Industry (Fairfield, N.J.:
Charles H. Kline, 1978), 54.
6. "Chemicals & Additives '83: A Modern Plastics Special Report," Modern Plas-
tics 60, no. 9 (September 1983): 69.
7. Ibid., 60.
8. Pieter VanderWerf, "Parts Suppliers as Innovators in Wire Termination Equip-
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ment" (MIT Sloan School of Management Working Paper No. 1289-82) (Cambridge,
Mass., March 1982). (Forthcoming in Research Policy, entitled "Supplier Innovation
in Electronic Wire and Cable Preparation Equipment.")
9. The four wire types studied had annual sales ranging from $35 million to $250
million per year. Major improvements identified by industry experts all were found to
provide users with at least a one and two-thirds improvement in labor productivity
relative to best preceding practice extant at the time of their commercialization.
10. Pieter A. VanderWerf, "Explaining the Occurrence of Industrial Process Inno-
vation by Materials Suppliers with the Economic Benefits Realizable from Innovation"
(Ph.D. diss., Sloan School of Management, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., 1984).
11. E. Raymond Corey, The Development of Markets for New Materials: A Study of
Building New End-Product Markets for Aluminum, Fibrous Glass, and the Plastics
(Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard
University, 1956).
12. Brian Shaw, "The Role of the Interaction Between the User and the Manufac-
turer in Medical Equipment Innovation," R & D Management 15, no. 4 (October
1985): 283-92.
13. Ronald E. Rice and Everett M. Rogers, "Reinvention in the Innovation Pro-
cess," Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization 1, no. 4 (June 1980): 499-514.
14. Everett M. Rogers, J. D. Eveland, and Constance A. Klepper, "The Diffusion
and Adoption of GBF/DIME Among Regional and Local Governments" (Working
Paper, Institute for Communications Research, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif.;
paper presented at the Urban and Regional Information Systems Association, At-
lanta, Ga., 31 August 1976).
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The Functional Source of Innovation as an
Economic Phenomenon
We have now seen that striking variations do exist in the functional sources of
innovation. Next, we must understand the causes of such variations. Success
at this task will allow us to convert the functional source of innovation vari-
able from a "mere" phenomenon into a powerful tool that can be used to
explore and manage the innovation process.
I begin this chapter by proposing an economic explanation for variation in
the functional source of innovation. Next, I propose two preconditions that
must exist in the real world if this hypothesis is to be tenable. A review of the
available evidence suggests that the needed preconditions do commonly exist,
and this opens the way to a test of the hypothesis in chapter 5.
The Hypothesis
Variation in the functional source of innovation may have many contributing
causes. However, we need not necessarily explore all of these to gain a useful
ability to predict such variation. I propose that a straightforward economic
model will allow us to predict that source "usefully often."
Schumpeter1 argued that those who succeed at innovating are rewarded by
having temporary monopoly control over what they have created. This con-
trol, in turn, is the lever that allows innovators to gain an enhanced position in
the market and related temporary profits or "economic rents" from their
innovations.
Suppose that every firm was aware of the opportunity to develop each of the
innovations that I studied in chapters 2 and 3. And suppose every firm analyzed
each of these opportunities and said, in effect, "If I respond to this opportunity
and develop an innovation, I may expect a rent of x amount over y years." Then
my hypothesis, a familiar one to economists, is simply that innovating firms will
43
The Sources of Innovation
TABLE 4-1. Summary of Functional Source of Innovation Data
Innovation Developed by
Innovation Type NAa Total
Sampled User Manufacturer Supplier Other (n) (n)
Scientific instruments 77% 23% 0% 0% 17 111
Semiconductor and printed
circuit board process 67 21 0 12 6 49
Pultrusion process 90 10 0 0 0 10
Tractor shovel-related 6 94 0 0 0 11
Engineering plastics 10 90 0 0 0 5
Plastics additives 8 92 0 0 4 16
Industrial gas-using 42 17 33 8 0 12
Thermoplastics-using 43 14 36 7 0 14
Wire termination equipment 11 33 56 0 2 20
aNA = number of cases for which data item coded in this table is not available. (NA cases exluded from
calculations of percentages in table.)
be found among those whose analyses lead them to expect a rent they con-
sider attractive.
This hypothesis will allow us to predict the functional source of innovation
only if all or most firms expecting an attractive rent from a given innovation
opportunity are of one functional type. There are reasons for supposing that
this may often be the case, but let me defer discussion until the end of chapter
5 when we will have seen more data. At the moment, I will simply point out
that a summary of the empirical evidence we have collected on the functional
source of innovation (Table 4-1) does show that innovations of a specific type
are often developed by a single functional type of firm.
Necessary Preconditions
An ability to predict the functional sources of innovation on the basis of firms'
preinnovation expectations of rents requires that correlations exist between
such expectations and the functional role of innovating firms. More specifi-
cally, two conditions must hold:
1. It must be difficult (expensive) for innovators to adopt new functional
relationships to their innovations.
2. Innovators must have a poor ability to capture rent by licensing their
innovation-related knowledge to others.
In the remainder of this chapter I will explain the necessity for each condi-
tion and consider whether each is likely to be commonly present in the real
world. Significant empirical data on this matter only exist in the instance of
the second condition. However, indirect proof that both conditions at least
sometimes hold in the real world is provided in chapter 5 in the form of tests
of the hypothesis itself.
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Condition 1: Difficulty of Switching Functional Roles
The first condition states that one can only expect to predict the functional
source of innovation on the basis of related variations in expected rents if
firms do not frequently switch or adopt new functional roles. If role switching
were frequent or inexpensively accomplished, innovators might switch to the
functional role that offered them the best innovation-related return. And,
under such conditions, we would only be able to predict the functional locus
of innovation in a weak sense, that is, "the developer of x innovation will
become a user" rather than able to make the stronger statement that "the
developer of x innovation will be a firm or individual that currently is a
member of the user community."
I have no hard data on the general frequency of functional role switching in
the U.S. economy. However, I have two reasons for thinking that it is not
common. First, as can be seen in the case data contained in the appendix, role
switching occurred in only a few instances in the samples we examined. (Typi-
cally, in those instances a user firm employee would spin off to form a new
equipment manufacturing company based on a user innovation.) Second, the
switching of functional roles appears to be often both difficult and expensive.
Consider, as an example, the barriers that face a firm that is a member of an
industry characterized by a given functional relationship to an innovation
(e.g., an industry using semiconductor process equipment to make semicon-
ductors) and that wishes to join an industry characterized by another func-
tional relationship to that innovation (e.g., the industry manufacturing semi-
conductor process equipment). These two types of firms are in very different
businesses. Each has a great deal of know-how, organizational arrangements,
and capital equipment that is quite specialized to build its existing products
and to serve its existing customer base. Thus, the semiconductor manufac-
turer has a sales force that specializes in serving semiconductor buyers. This
force would be entirely inappropriate for selling semiconductor process equip-
ment: The customers are different; the sales techniques are different (samples
of semiconductor devices can be given out as a selling technique but not
samples of semiconductor process equipment); and the specialized knowledge
the salesman must have is completely different (a salesman with an electrical
engineering background can help customers with problems in selecting and
using semiconductor devices whereas a background in solid-state physics
would be considerably more appropriate for a salesman trying to sell the
semiconductor process equipment used to grow the ultrapure single silicon
crystals used in semiconductor device manufacture).
If the sales, organizational, and production infrastructure that a company
uses to serve one functional role relationship to a given innovation cannot
effectively be used in the service of a different functional relationship, then it
follows that a firm wishing to change such relationships must also set up a new
infrastructure appropriate to this new role. Further, since the costs of the
infrastructures of competitors already having the role relationships the innova-
tor wishes to acquire are typically allocated across many products (e.g., a line
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of process equipment or a line of semiconductor devices), the would-be new
entrant must develop, adopt, or buy a similar line of product to sell if he
wishes to be economically competitive. All these requirements, I suggest, can
indeed represent significant barriers to the switching of functional roles, al-
though the height of the barriers will, of course, differ from case to case.
Condition 2: Inability to Capture Rent
by Licensing Innovation-Related Knowledge
The second condition that must be in place if the hypothesis is to be useful is
that innovators must have a poor ability to capture rent by licensing their
innovation-related knowledge to others. The reasoning behind this require-
ment starts with the observation that, barring special situations such as when
prizes are awarded for successful innovation, an innovator has only two routes
toward capturing rents from an innovation: (1) exploiting the innovation him-
self while preventing others from doing so; (2) licensing others to use his
innovation-related knowledge for a fee.
From the innovator's point of view, it probably does not matter much which
of these courses he chooses: Whichever promises the most rent will do. But
from our point of view, it matters a great deal. Indeed, the hypothesis must
fail if innovators can capture rents efficiently through licensing because it
contains the implicit assumption that innovators in different loci have signifi-
cantly different abilities to capture rent from a given innovation. An ability to
license efficiently, however, allows an innovator in any functional locus to (in
a sense) tax licensees in different functional loci according to their differing
abilities to benefit, thus diminishing this crucial difference.
We can see the problem clearly by means of an extreme example. Suppose
that an innovator had a perfect ability to license his innovation-related knowl-
edge without risk or cost. Under these conditions an innovator could license
users, manufacturers, or others as he wished. He could set the fee he charged
to each innovation beneficiary and each class of beneficiaries so as to maxi-
mize his return. Therefore-and this is the crucial point-the functional role
that the innovator himself happened to play with regard to the innovation-
user, manufacturer, or other-would not influence his expectations of rent
because he would be equally able to capture innovation returns from his own
company or other companies.
If an innovator is to expect to capture rents from licensing efficiently, he
must be able to achieve two things. First, he must have some form of property
rights in his innovation-related knowledge that can be used to protect a li-
censee against those who would want to use the licensed knowledge without
paying. Second, he must expect to be able to license others and obtain rent
from them at a low risk and cost. In the remainder of this chapter I will focus
on the first of these two matters only because an inability to achieve the first
makes the second irrelevant. However, when rights to an innovation can be
protected, then efficiency in licensing becomes very interesting indeed. Since
licensing to oneself is costless, any costs or risks incurred in licensing to others
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will create a preference for in-house use of an innovation and tend to favor
those potential innovators who have the largest in-house use for it. (I will
return to this matter in chapter 5 when considering the case of engineering
plastics innovations.)
Licensing conveys an innovator's rights to innovation-related nonembodied
knowledge to another. (Nonembodied knowledge is "pure" knowledge, not
incorporated or embodied in physical property such as a product or a process
machine.) Currently, only two mechanisms exist in the United States that
potentially give an innovator property rights in the nonembodied knowledge
he may develop, rights that he may then choose to transfer to another by
means of licensing. First, patent law gives an innovator property rights in
publicly known information that he has published in his patent. Second, trade
secret legislation allows an innovator to license secret knowledge to a user(s)
and put the recipient under the legal duty of maintaining the secrecy of that
information so that it will not become a free good on the marketplace.
A useful amount of data exists on the real-world effectiveness of these two
mechanisms, and I will review it in the remainder of this chapter. If we find
that both mechanisms are generally ineffective at protecting innovators' rights
to nonembodied knowledge, then the preconditions for licensing that knowl-
edge effectively do not exist and I will have shown that the second condition
required for my hypothesis to be useful does often exist in the real world.
Patents and Licensing
A patent grants an inventor the right to exclude others from use of his inven-
tion for a limited period. In return for the right to exclude not only those who
copy the invention but also those who independently discover the same thing,
the inventor must disclose the invention to the public at the time of the
patent's issue. This disclosure, contained in the patent itself, must be suffi-
ciently detailed so that those "ordinarily skilled in the art" may copy and
utilize the invention after the patent's expiration. While the patent is in force,
however, the inventor is given the right to control the use of "his" knowledge.
The real-world value of patent protection to innovators is a much-examined
question. A series of studies conducted by several authors over a span of nearly
30 years (1957 to 1984) have asked whether inventors find patents useful for
excluding imitators and/or capturing royalty income. The answer uniformly
found: The patent grant is not useful for either purpose in most industries. In
the next few pages I will briefly review the several studies that came to this
conclusion. Then I will explain some of the mechanics of the patent grant and its
enforcement that lie at the root of its general ineffectiveness.
Levin et al.2 conducted a survey of 650 R & D executives in 130 different
industries. Several of the questions explored opinions regarding the effective-
ness of patents as a means of capturing and protecting the competitive advan-
tages of new and improved production processes and products. The results
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were that all except respondents from the chemical and pharmaceutical indus-
tries judged patents to be "relatively ineffective."3
Taylor and Silberston4 examined the impact of British and foreign patents
in a very rich study of 44 British and multinational firms. These firms were
selected from five broad classes of industrial activity: chemicals (including
pharmaceuticals and petrochemicals), oil refining, electrical engineering (in-
cluding electronics), mechanical engineering, and man-made fibers.5
The upper bound of rents innovators obtain from licensing their patented
knowledge can be approximately represented by licensing fees and/or other
considerations received, minus patenting and licensing costs incurred by the
innovating firm. Taylor and Silberston present such data (Table 4-2) for 30
firms and find these gained little benefit from licensing.
Wilson 6 also studied benefits that corporations reap from licensing their
patents. He explored data on royalty payments submitted by some U.S. corpo-
rations to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1971 on
Form 10K. 7 Wilson's data for the SIC categories he studied that are most
similar to the industrial activity classes examined by Taylor and Silberston are
compared in Table 4-3. Here too, corporate returns from licensing appear
generally low.8
The low returns from licensing patented knowledge found by Taylor and
Silberston and by Wilson could be caused by weakness in patent protection or
have some other cause. A second type of finding, however, suggests that,
whatever the cause, protection afforded by the patent system is in fact gener-
ally weak and that innovators in most fields probably could not expect to
benefit from licensing their patented knowledge even if they wanted to.
Taylor and Silberston reasoned that, if the patent system does in fact help
innovators protect and benefit from their innovations, the presence of patent
protection should increase innovators' willingness to invest in R & D. There-
fore they asked the companies in their sample: "Approximately what propor-
tion of your R & D in recent years would not have been carried out if you had
not been able to patent any resulting discoveries?"9 The data derived from
this question are shown in Table 4-4. Note that 24 of the 32 returns indicate
that only 5% or less of recent R & D expenditures would not have been
undertaken if patent protection had not been available. ° This suggests that
the patent system is not seen by innovators as very effective in general and, by
implication, that it is not seen as effective in protecting innovators' rights to
knowledge they might wish to license.
A study by Scherer et al.ll shows a similar result. Only 8 of 37 respondents
("executives responsible for technical change") reported that patents were
"very important" to their companies. Fourteen reported that patents had
"some importance," and 15 said they were "not very important" to their
firms.l2 This result is especially interesting because Scherer selected his sam-
ple only from the firms that presumably valued patents most highly-those
that held a large number of patents. 13
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Functional Source as an Economic Phenomenon
TABLE 4-4. Estimated Proportions of R & D Expenditure Dependent on Patent
Protection: Twenty-seven Respondent Firms
Estimate of R & D affecteda
None or Sub-
Negligible Very little stantial
(number of (less than Some (over Total
Industry returns) 5%) (5-20%) 20%) Returns
Chemicals
Finished and speciality 1 2 1 4 8
Basic 1 2 1 0 4
TOTAL CHEMICALS 2 4 2 4 12
Mechanical engineering 7 1 0 2 10
Man-made fibers 1 1 0 0 2
Electrical engineering 7 1 0 0 8
TOTAL 17 7 2 6 32b
Percentage of returns 53% 22% 6% 19% 100%
Source: From The Economic Impact of the Patent System: A Study of the British Experience by C. T. Taylor and
Z. A. Silberston. Copyright © 1973 Cambridge University Press. Reprinted with permission. Table 9.1, p. 197.
aPercentages refer to the estimated reduction in annual R & D expenditure in recent years that would have
been experienced had patent monopolies not been available.
bSome companies made returns for more than one activity.
to innovators in most fields. Are these data congruent with tests of reason?
Let us explore.
First, does it make economic sense that firms would take out patents if
these do not, on average, yield much economic benefit? The answer is yes,
because the cost of applying for patents is also low. The cost of the average
patent application prosecuted by a corporation is on the order of $5000 to-
day.14 Even this small cost is often not very visible to corporate personnel
deciding whether to pursue a patent application because it is typically sub-
sumed within the overall cost of operating a corporate patent department.
Second, what do we know about the nature of the patent grant and of the
real-world workings of the patent office and the courts? And, is it reasonable
in the light of what is known to conclude that the patent grant is likely to offer
little benefit to its holder? Consider the following points:
1. A patent, if valid, gives a patentee the right to exclude others from using his
invention, but it does not give him the right to use it himself if such a use
would infringe the patents of others. For example, Fairchild Semiconductor
has a patent on the so-called planar process, an important process invention
used in the manufacture of integrated circuits. If firm B invents and patents
an improvement on that process, it may not use its improvement invention
without licensing the planar process from Fairchild and in turn that firm
may not use the improvement either without licensing it from firm B. Thus,
in rapidly developing technologies where many patents have been issued
and have not yet expired, it is likely that any new patent cannot be exercised
without infringing the claims of numerous other extant patents. Given this
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eventuality, the benefit of a particular patent to an inventor would very
probably be diminished because the patentee might be prevented from
using his own invention or might be forced to cross-license competitors
holding related patents in order to practice his invention.
2. The patent system places the burden on the patentee of detecting an
infringer and suing for redress. Such suits are notoriously long and expen-
sive, and both defendants and plaintiffs tend to avoid them assiduously.
For the defendant the best outcome in recompense for all his time and
expense is judicial sanction to continue his alleged infringement, whereas
the worst outcome would involve the payment of possibly considerable
penalties. For the plaintiff the likelihood that a court will hold a patent
valid and infringed-as opposed to invalid and/or not infringed-is on the
order of one to three.15 If a patentee has licensees already signed up for a
patent at issue, he has a high incentive to avoid litigation: If he loses-and
the odds are that he will-he loses payments from all licensees, not just
the potential payments from the particular infringer sued.
3. The patent grant covers a particular means of achieving a given end but
not the end itself, even if the end and perhaps the market it identifies are
also novel. A would-be imitator can invent around a patent if he can
invent a means not specified in the original inventor's patent. In the
instance of the Polaroid and xerography processes (and a few other nota-
ble cases), determined competitors could not in fact invent around the
means patented by the inventor. In most instances and most fields, how-
ever, inventing around is relatively easy because there are many known
means by which one might achieve an effect equivalent to the patented
one, given the incentive to do so. Where inventing around is possible, the
practical effect is to make the upper bound value of an inventor's patent
grant equal to the estimated cost to a potential licensee of such inventing
around.
Taken in combination, the observations presented above provide a very
reasonable explanation for the typical ineffectiveness of the patent grant.
However, the data given in Tables 4-2 and 4-3 show clearly that patents are
more effective in some fields than in others. This is because the factors men-
tioned above are more salient in some fields than others, as the following two
examples illustrate. First, I will spell out the situation in semiconductors
where the patent grant is quite ineffective, and then I will describe the situa-
tion in pharmaceuticals where patents have historically been quite effective.
The semiconductor field is a very fast-moving one that contains many unex-
pired patents with closely related subject matter and claims. The possible
consequence-confirmed as actual by corporate patent attorneys for several
U.S. semiconductor firms whom I interviewed-is that many patentees are
unable to use their own inventions without the likelihood of infringing the
patents of others.
Since patents challenged in court are unlikely to be held valid, the result of
the high likelihood of infringement accompanying use of one's own patented--
or unpatented-technology is not paralysis of the field. Rather, firms in most
instances simply ignore the possibility that their activities might be infringing
the patents of others. The result is what Taylor and Silberston's interviewees in
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the electronic components field termed "a jungle" and what one of my
interviewees termed a "Mexican standoff."
Firm A's corporate patent department will wait to be notified by attorneys
from firm B that it is suspected that A's activities are infringing B's patents.
Because possibly germane patents and their associated claims are so numer-
ous, it is in practice usually impossible for firm A-or firm B-to evaluate
firm B's claims on their merits. Firm A therefore responds-and this is the
true defensive value of patents in the industry-by sending firm B copies of "a
pound or two" of its possible germane patents with the suggestion that, al-
though it is quite sure it is not infringing B, its examination shows that B is in
fact probably infringing A. The usual result is cross-licensing, with a modest
fee possibly being paid by one side or the other. Who pays, it is important to
note, is determined at least as much by the contenders' relative willingness to
pay to avoid the expense and bother of a court fight as it is by the merits of the
particular case.
Thus in the semiconductor field-except for a very few patent packages that
have been litigated, that have been held valid, and that most firms license
without protest-the patent grant is worth very little to inventors who obtain
it. Indeed, the one value noted to me-defense against the infringement suits
of others-suggests that perhaps the true net value of the patent system to
firms in the semiconductor industry is negative because it requires all to
assume the overhead burden of defensive patenting.
In sharp contrast to the situation pertaining in most other industries and the
electronics field in particular, the patent grant often confers significant benefit
to innovators in the pharmaceutical field. My discussions with patent attor-
neys working for pharmaceutical firms brought out two likely reasons for this
situation. First, unusually strong patents are obtainable in the chemical field,
of which pharmaceuticals is a part. Second, it is often difficult to invent
around a pharmaceutical patent.
Pharmaceutical patents can be unusually strong because one may patent an
actual molecule found to have useful medical properties and its analogs. One
need not make each analog claimed but can simply refer to lists of recognized
functional equivalents for each component of the molecule at issue. For exam-
ple, if a molecule has 10 important component parts, one patent application
might claim x plus 10 recognized functional equivalents of x for each part.
Obviously, by this means an inventor may claim millions of specific molecules
without actually having to synthesize more than a few. Furthermore, demon-
stration that any of the analogs so claimed does not display the medical
properties claimed does not invalidate the patent.
Many pharmaceutical patents are difficult to invent around today because
the mechanisms by which pharmaceuticals achieve their medical effects are
often not well understood. When this is so, potential imitators cannot gain
much helpful insight from examining a competitor's patented product. (Inter-
estingly, as biochemists' understanding of the biological basis of the effects
achieved by pharmaceuticals improves, one side effect may be to weaken the
protection the patent grant affords to inventors of pharmaceuticals.)
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Trade Secrets and Licensing
Trade secrets, like patents, can be used as a basis for licensing nonembodied
innovation knowledge. A trade secret, also sometimes called know-how, is
typically knowledge that can be kept secret even after development is com-
pleted and commercial exploitation begun. Trade secret legislation allows one
who possesses a trade secret to keep the information entirely secret or to
make legally binding contracts with others in which the know-how is revealed
in exchange for a fee or other consideration and a commitment to keep the
information secret. The possessor of a trade secret has an indefinite period of
exclusive use of his invention or discovery. He may take legal steps to prevent
its use by others if he can show that those others have discovered the secret
through unfair and dishonest means such as theft or breach of a contract
promising to keep it secret.
A legally protectable monopoly of indefinite duration would appear to
make trade secrecy a very attractive mechanism for capturing rents from
innovation. It is, however, an option only for innovations that can in fact be
kept secret: The holder of a trade secret cannot exclude anyone who indepen-
dently discovers it or who legally acquires the secret by such means as acciden-
tal disclosure or reverse engineering. In practice, trade secrets have proven to
be effective only with regard to (1) product innovations that incorporate
various technological barriers to analysis or (2) process innovations that can
be hidden from public view.
There are, in the first instance, certain innovations embodied in products
that, while sold in the open market and thus available for detailed inspection
by would-be imitators, manage nevertheless to defy analysis for some techno-
logical reason and that therefore cannot be reverse engineered. Complex
chemical formulations sometimes fall into this category, the classic case being
the formula for Coca-Cola. Such barriers to analysis need not be inherent in
the product; they can sometimes be added on by design. Thus, some elec-
tronic products gain some protection from analysis through use of a packaging
method (potting) and packaging materials that cannot easily be removed
without destroying the proprietary circuit contained within.16 Methods for
protecting trade secrets embodied in products accessible to competitors need
not be foolproof to be effective; they simply have to raise enough of a barrier
in a given case to create an unattractive cost-benefit equation for would-be
imitators in that case.
In the second instance, process innovations such as novel catalysts or pro-
cess equipment can be protected effectively as trade secrets, whether or not
they could be reverse engineered by a would-be imitator allowed to examine
them, simply because they can be exploited commercially while shielded from
such examination behind factory walls.
Few empirical data exist on the information protected as trade secrets:
There is no central registry for such material analogous to the U.S. Patent
Office; even those trade secrets that are licensed to others, the subset of
interest to us here, do not usually appear on any public record unless litigated.
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Although some examples exist of major rents from nonembodied knowledge
being reaped by innovators by means of licensing of trade secrets,17 I argue
that the typical effectiveness of this mechanism is severely limited for two
reasons. First, the mechanism is clearly not applicable to product or process
innovations that are not commercially exploitable while concealed behind
factory walls and that are amenable to reverse engineering if accessible to
inspection by imitators-considerations that apply to many industries and
many innovations. Second, a trade secret licensor can only gain redress under
trade secret legislation if he can document the specific illegal act that diffused
his innovation to unlicensed parties. A licensor finds such specificity difficult
to achieve if he seeks to license nonembodied knowledge to many licensees.
To conclude, it appears likely that both conditions that must exist for my
hypothesis to be useful are in fact frequently present in the real world. There-
fore, it is appropriate to proceed on to test that hypothesis.
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5
Testing the Relationship Between
the Functional Source of Innovation
and Expected Innovation Rents
In chapter 4 I proposed that it would often be possible to predict the func-
tional sources of innovation on the basis of differences in potential innovators'
expectations of innovation-related rents. Now it is time to test this hypothesis.
I begin by testing the hypothesis against five samples and find it supported in
these instances. Then I draw on the evidence presented to propose that gen-
eral rules may underlie innovators' expectations of rent.
Five Empirical Tests
In order to test the hypothesis that the functional source of innovation and
innovators' expectations of rent are related, we need data on both these
factors. Since the work described in chapters 2 and 3 has already provided
reliable innovation source data for nine quite diverse innovation types, I
found it efficient to create the data base for this test by adding rent expecta-
tion data to these same innovation samples where possible. After investiga-
tion I found that I could obtain these additional data for five of the nine
samples (listed in Table 5-1). These became the basis of the five empirical
tests of the hypothesis I have carried out to date.
The inability to use four innovation samples due to data problems is unfortu-
nate. However, the reasons for exclusion do not appear to bias our test of the
hypothesis. In the instance of semiconductor process innovations, a single
innovation caused multiple product and process impacts whose value I could
not isolate and estimate. In the instance of plastics additive innovations and
the sample of wire termination equipment innovations, needed data were
simply not available from innovating firms or from published sources. Finally,
the scientific instrument innovation sample could not be used here because
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TABLE 5-1. Summary of Functional Source of Innovation Data
Innovations Developed by
NA Total
Innovation Category User Manufacturer Supplier Other (n) (n)
Pultrusion process 90% 10% 0% 0% 0 10
Tractor shovel-related 6 94 0 0 0 11
Engineering plastics 10 90 0 0 0 5
Industrial gas-using 42 17 33 8 0 12
Thermoplastics-using 43 14 36 7 0 14
the innovation-related benefits expected by instrument users and instrument
manufacturers were different in kind and could not be readily compared.
(This is a problem of general interest and I will return to it at the end of the
chapter.)
My hypothesis requires that I estimate the rents firms could reasonably
expect if they had decided to develop specified innovations. This is not an
easy task because expectations of rent are not based on some straightforward
calculation. Rather, those who plan to innovate know they must struggle for
gain against the sometimes unpredictable actions of competitors, the possible
emergence of competing innovations, and other events.
In the battle for innovation-related rents, each firm with an interest in an
innovation devises strategies that may help it to minimize innovation costs and
maximize its returns from innovation. For example, if Boeing decides to
develop a new, more fuel-efficient plane, it will try to lower its innovation
costs by shifting some project development expenses to component suppliers
and by demanding some advance. payments from buyers. Also, it will try to
increase its share of the rents generated by the plane by, for example, raising
its price to capture some of the fuel savings benefit that users expect to reap.
At the same time, of course, suppliers and users are trying to resist these
moves and to carry out profit-increasing strategies of their own (e.g., General
Electric may attempt to charge more for the fuel-efficient jet engines that it
supplies to Boeing).
Given this complex reality, my general strategy for estimating rents that
firms might reasonably expect if they were to develop specific types of innova-
tions has been to study several innovation categories in detail and to try to
understand the thinking of and options open to potential innovators in these
fields.
Innovators capture temporary rents from their successful innovations by
first establishing some type of monopoly control over their innovation and
then using this control to increase their economic return. A successful innova-
tor's rents may come in the form of cost savings and/or increased prices and/
or increased sales obtainable during his period of temporary and partial
monopoly. Unfortunately, the available data do not allow us to assign values
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to these individual components of expected rents or to properly sum and
discount them with respect to time. Therefore, in each test that follows I will
first summarize information bearing on firms' relative abilities to capture
innovation-related rents and then will build a test of reason from this data.
The logic behind my tests of reason will be self-evident, I think, with the
possible exception of some of the elements I use to estimate relative abilities
to establish monopoly control over an innovation. Let me therefore elaborate
a little on the latter before proceeding to a discussion of the tests themselves.
Recall from chapter 4 that we found that innovators typically could not
expect to obtain rents from their innovations by licensing them to others
because both the patent grant and trade secrecy legislation did not typically
allow innovators the type of monopoly control necessary to achieve this.
Therefore, innovators must typically benefit by excluding imitators from ob-
taining rent from their own innovation-related outputs.
The patent grant, trade secret legislation, and response time are the only
mechanisms I have observed to date that are exclusively available to innova-
tors and may potentially give an innovator the control over his innovation that
he needs to exclude would-be imitators. (This seems a short list, but note that
it is not of fixed length. Mechanisms for enhancing an innovator's innovation
property rights are social inventions and their number or design has no inher-
ent limit. For example, in the United States one can currently observe the
extension of copyright protection to include software writings.)
In chapter 4 we saw that the patent grant generally offers only weak protec-
tion to innovators in the context of licensing. I find no apparent reason why it
should be any more effective in allowing an innovator to prevent others from
imitating his innovation without permission. However, trade secret protection
can be much more effective in preventing imitation than it was seen to be in
enabling licensing. The difference is that, as a practical matter, licensing of
trade secrets requires that they be revealed to licensees, and a secret shared
may not stay secret very long. In contrast, a secret kept by an innovator for his
own exclusive use need only be known within his factory walls and can often
be well protected there.
Finally, an interesting and often effective additional mechanism-response
time-became visible in the course of my investigations of innovators' strate-
gies for protecting their innovation-related knowledge. I define response time
as the period an imitator requires to bring an imitative product to market or to
bring an imitative process to commercial usefulness once he has full and free
access to any germane trade secrets or patented knowledge in the possession
of the innovator.
Response time exists because many barriers in addition to lack of knowl-
edge must be overcome in order to bring any product or process-even an
imitative one-to commercial reality. Engineering tooling must be designed,
materials and components ordered, manufacturing plants made ready, market-
ing plans developed, and so on. During the response-time period an innovator
by definition has a monopoly with respect to the innovation and is in a posi-
tion to capture rent from his innovation-related knowledge. 
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When an innovator is seeking to protect his innovation from imitators, he
may be able to use any or all three mechanisms-patents, trade secrecy, and
response time-to prolong his period of exclusive use, his lead time. Whether
any or all of these are usable or offer an advantage to a given class of potential
innovator is a function of situation-specific factors that will be discussed in the
context of the cases that follow.
I begin each case discussion by identifying the types of firm best positioned
to capture rents from the category of innovations under study. Next I describe
and compare four rent-related elements of the real-world situation facing each
type of firm. These are (1) the relative abilities of firms holding different
functional relationships to an innovation to establish some monopoly control
over it; (2) the nature and amount of innovation-related output generated by
innovating and noninnovating firms; (3) the anticipatable cost of innovation;
(4) the displacement of existing business that a firm undertaking the innova-
tion studied might expect. Finally, I draw on this information to assess the
reasonable preinnovation rent expectations of potential innovators. In this
final step I use a very conservative test with respect to my hypothesis. I simply
rank such rent expectations and count the hypothesis as supported only if the
functional source of innovation is populated by firms with the highest pre-
innovation expectations of rent. (I will return to this point at the end of the
chapter.)
Pultrusion Process Machinery:
Innovation and Innovation Rents
As we saw in chapter 3, users are the source of all sampled pultrusion process
machinery innovations save one. Therefore, the hypothesis I am testing may
be stated for this sample as: Innovating users of pultrusion process machinery
had higher preinnovation expectations of rent from their innovations than did
all firms holding other functional relationships to those same innovations.
There are many classes of firm that have some sort of functional relation-
ship to pultrusion process machinery innovations ranging from inventor to
user to manufacturer to distributor. However, it is not necessary to precisely
determine the reasonable rent expectations of all of these in order to test the
hypothesis. The only noninnovators who can represent a challenge to the
hypothesis are those with rent expectations that might conceivably equal or
exceed those of the innovating firms. It is therefore efficient to begin this test
with a simple inspection of the many extant functional relationships between
innovator and innovation and exclude all from further analysis that on the
face of it cannot reasonably expect a level of rent from pultrusion process
machinery innovations that is anywhere near that of the innovating process
users.
In the instance of pultrusion process machinery innovations, I have deter-
mined, by means of interviews with industry experts, that the only two func-
tional categories of firm likely to gain significant rent from innovations that
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improve pultrusion process machinery are process machine users and process
machine manufacturers.* I therefore explore the relative ability of these two
functional types of firms to capture such rent in what follows.
Relative Ability to Establish Monopoly Control
On the basis of both interview data and reason, it appears to me that innovat-
ing users of pultrusion process equipment are better able than innovating
manufacturers to establish temporary monopoly control over their innova-
tions. The key source of this difference is the ability of equipment users to
hide their innovations for a period of time as trade secrets. This option is not
open to manufacturers, who must display their innovations to customers in
order to sell them.
Patents and response time were both considered ineffective in this industry
by interviewees. Innovators sometimes applied for patents and sometimes
received some modest licensing income, but it was understood by all that the
patents did not really provide effective protection. Innovators typically would
not even attempt to contest infringement of their patents and expected only
the naive or exceedingly cautious to honor them. Response time in the in-
stance of pultrusion innovations is only months and is not considered to be of
significant value to either user or manufacturer innovators.
Relative Innovation-Related Output
The innovation-related output of the users of pultrusion process equipment
innovations is, of course, pultruded product. In general, the effect of the
innovations we have studied was to make it possible to extend the pultrusion
process to new types or sizes of product. This in turn allowed user firms to
create cheaper or better substitutes for products made by other methods or
other materials.
*Field investigation showed that the licensing of innovation-related knowledge was (and was
considered to be by industry participants) of minor importance in pultrusion processing. Innova-
tors' general inability to appropriate rents from the licensing of knowledge led me to eliminate
both independent inventors and suppliers of materials used in pultrusion as potential recipients of
significant innovation-related benefit. Independent inventors were eliminated because they only
have nonembodied innovation knowledge to sell. Suppliers of materials used in pultrusion were
eliminated because pultrusion used 2% or less of the huge amount of polyester resin and fiber-
glass consumed annually in the manufacture of fiberglass-reinforced plastics during the period of
the innovations studied (William G. Lionetta, Jr., "Sources of Innovation Within the Pultrusion
Industry" [SM thesis, Sloan School of Management, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., 1977], Table III, p.
41). These innovations needed only commodity plastic resin and fiberglass reinforcement prod-
ucts to implement. Therefore, the suppliers too could not embody innovation-related knowledge
in their outputs, and would also be dependent on the licensing of nonembodied innovation
knowledge for their innovation-related rents.
Other functional relationships between innovator and pultrusion process innovations-
wholesaler and so forth-were eliminated from further consideration after discussion with indus-
try personnel showed innovation benefit potentially accruing to these was clearly much less than
that potentially accruing to users and manufacturers.
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Pultrusion process machines vary in size, and early machines tended to be
smaller and slower than later ones. In 1975 the output of a single average
pultrusion machine working a single shift was about 200,000 lb of pultrusions
annually. At the 1976 market price of $1.70/lb, this means that a single innova-
tive pultrusion machine could produce $340,000 of novel pultruded product
during each year of that machine's service life.
The innovation-related output of a pultrusion machine manufacturer is the
incremental hardware on the pultruder that embodies a pultrusion improve-
ment innovation. However, it is more conservative with respect to the hy-
pothesis we are testing to regard innovation-related output as the entire ma-
chine embodying such an innovation. Early pultrusion machines tended to be
smaller and cheaper than later ones. In 1975 the price of a commercial
pultruder of average capacity was $75,000 to $85,000.2
Until 1966, all pultrusion process equipment was made by the firms that
used it. Then, in 1966 Goldsworthy Engineering began to manufacture a
standard line of pultrusion process machines. (Of course, prior to that year
there were many manufacturing firms that did produce other types of plastics
processing machines and were fully capable of producing pultruders.) By the
1970s each of the largest three user firms had 15 to 20 pultrusion machines
each and were making machines for internal use at roughly the same rate as
Goldsworthy was making them for the external market. In 1976, pultruder
operators reported that about 30 of the 175 pultruders operating in the United
States had been built by an equipment builder. The rest were built by users in-
house. In that year, pultruders built by users in-house cost less than the
commercial equivalent.3
Relative Costs of Innovating
The pultrusion process machinery innovations examined were built by both
users and manufacturers using general-purpose machine shop equipment that
both types of firm had on-site. No organized R & D effort was used to develop
these innovations: They consisted of good ideas that, once grasped, could be
implemented on the shop floor. Thus it can be assumed that innovation costs
would be similar in magnitude for both users and manufacturers of these
machines.
Relative Amount of Displaced Sales
No potential innovator in this field had reason to anticipate that pultrusion
process innovations would result in a significant displacement of his present
sales. In some instances, as can be seen in the innovation cases presented in
the appendix, users developed process improvements to reduce their costs of
production. In other cases, pultrusions were displacing metals, typically, in
high-performance applications. Neither the pultrusion process equipment us-
ers nor the equipment manufacturers had any position I am aware of in such
displaced products or processes.
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Discussion
Now I must speculate. Is it reasonable that even an optimally situated manu-
facturer of pultrusion machines could expect to gain as much or more rent as
innovating users? I do not think so. We have seen that a user has a basis to
expect some degree of monopoly control over his innovation, but that a
manufacturer does not. Further, I see no relative disadvantage that an innovat-
ing user might have with respect to an innovating manufacturer that might
offset the user advantage in monopoly control. Users and manufacturers con-
templating innovation could expect similar costs, and neither needed to fear
displacement of existing business as a result of the type of innovation studied.
Further, the possible impact of increasing returns to scale in production of the
machines embodying the innovation would be trivial at the levels of produc-
tion involved here. Even if a single manufacturer produced all of the machines
needed by the market (say, 20 per year) his direct per machine costs would
only be on the order of 10% less than those of a user producing only a single
machine. 4
In sum, then, the evidence leads me to conclude that the rents that process
machine users could reasonably expect prior to an innovation exceed those
that a pultrusion process machine manufacturer could expect if he contem-
plated the same innovation opportunity. Therefore the hypothesis is sup-
ported in this instance: Pultrusion process users, the functional type of firm
that I judge to have the highest reasonable expectations of innovation-related
rent, are also the type of firm that my data show most active in developing
pultrusion process equipment innovations.
The Tractor Shovel: Innovation and Innovation Rents
Since, as we saw in chapter 3, manufacturers are the source of almost all
tractor shovel innovations, the hypothesis I am testing may be stated for this
sample as: Firms that hold the functional relationship of manufacturer to the
sampled tractor shovel innovations are also the type of firm best positioned to
capture rents from such innovations.
As in the previous study, my first step in testing the hypothesis here was to
identify by inspection the few functional types of potential tractor shovel
innovators positioned to appropriate significant innovation rents. I found
tractor shovel users and tractor shovel manufacturers were clearly the two
functional categories of firm most favorably positioned in this regard,* and I
will therefore only attempt to rank the relative rent expectations of these two
types of firms here.
*My findings here precisely parallel those presented earlier regarding the pultrusion process
machinery study. As was the case in that field, innovation benefit was almost never captured from
the licensing of nonembodied knowledge. Further, industry participants had no illusions that this
could be done, given the general weakness and unenforceability of patents in the field of mechani-
cal invention. As a consequence, I judged that independent inventors were unlikely to be able to
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Relative Ability to Establish Monopoly Control
Tractor users and tractor shovel manufacturers apparently are in an equally
poor position to establish monopoly control over a tractor shovel innovation
they may undertake. Patents did not offer effective protection to innovators in
this field. Also, neither user nor manufacturer could expect to protect tractor
shovel product innovations as trade secrets. Tractor shovels are used on open
construction sites, and any innovations by users and/or manufacturers will be
open to the view of would-be imitators. Response times in the instance of
tractor shovel innovations are on the order of one year. That is, either a user
or a manufacturer of a tractor shovel who had good mechanical skills could
imitate a tractor shovel innovation he was able to inspect in a year or less.
Relative Innovation-Related Output
The innovation-related output of tractor shovel manufacturers consists of
hardware embodying such innovations. The advantage of the sampled major
improvement innovations over previous best practice was such that they were
immediately embodied in most or all of the units sold by the innovating firm.
Therefore, total tractor shovel sales of the innovating firm in the first post-
innovation year is a reasonable indicator of the units of output embodying the
innovation in that year.5
In the instance of the development of the tractor shovel itself, first-year
innovation-related sales were about $250,000 (50 units were sold). All im-
provement innovations were developed by manufacturers producing at least
hundreds of tractor shovels in the year the innovation was commercialized.
The major improvement innovations in the sample all added functional capa-
bilities to the tractor shovel at some increase in complexity and cost.
The function of a tractor shovel is to excavate and/or move bulk materials.
From a user's point of view, the innovation-related output of a tractor shovel
innovation is the increase in productivity that the innovation provides. I esti-
mate the improvement that an innovating user could expect from embodying
one of the improvement innovations studied on one tractor shovel is an in-
crease in output of on the order of 20%. This translates into an operating
savings of perhaps $1000 annually per machine. 6
Even the largest users of tractor shovels contemplating an innovation could
not expect to incorporate their innovation on more than a very few tractor
shovels. Today, with the exception of the U.S. Army and some municipali-
ties, even the major, national account users have a fleet of only 8 to 10 tractor
appropriate significant innovation benefit from any tractor shovel innovations they might at-
tempt. The same reasoning suggests that suppliers of components used to implement the innova-
tions were also unlikely to innovate. Components used to achieve an innovative effect when
applied to tractor shovels were not themselves novel and were typically available from a number
of suppliers as off-the-shelf items.
Industry experts contacted all judged that users and manufacturers ranked highest in the list of
fuctional types of firms able to appropriate innovation benefit from tractor shovel innovations.
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shovels-and that of mixed models and vintages. Presumably fleets of this size
were even more unusual in the period when the innovations we studied were
commercialized.
Relative Costs of Innovating
I estimate that user innovation costs would be somewhat higher than those
of innovating manufacturers because the equipment and engineering skills
needed for innovation are utilized by tractor shovel manufacturers in the
course of routine manufacturing and are therefore in place if needed for
innovation. In contrast, tractor shovel users have no routine need for such
equipment or related engineering skills and may need to acquire them espe-
cially for innovation-related tasks.
Relative Amount of Displaced Sales
In the instance of the tractor shovel, users might find that the development of an
improvement slightly reduced the value of older tractor shovels and other
functionally similar construction equipment that they had in inventory. In con-
trast, with the exception of Clark Equipment Company (a tractor shovel manu-
facturer that developed one of the sampled innovations), none of the innovat-
ing equipment manufacturers also made construction equipment of similar
function, such as bulldozers. Therefore, these manufacturers would anticipate
no displaced sales as a result of developing tractor shovel innovations.
Discussion
On the basis of the above discussion, I reason that both users and manufactur-
ers of tractor shovels could only expect to have a monopoly of a year's dura-
tion if they chose to develop a tractor shovel innovation. However, it also
seems clear that a tractor shovel manufacturer's ability to capture rent on the
basis of this period of temporary monopoly is greater than that of any user.
Tractor shovel manufacturers inform me that they generally tend to try to
increase sales on the basis of an innovation rather than to increase prices.
They feel that they may gain a significant advantage over competitors in a
year, possibly selling hundreds of additional tractor shovels due to the pres-
ence of the innovation. And, even after imitators enter, innovators' first-to-
market reputation may continue to give them a marketplace advantage. 7
In contrast, it is not clear to me or to users how a year's monopoly on a
tractor shovel innovation might significantly benefit innovating users beyond
the small operating savings discussed earlier. Because there are many substi-
tute ways to move materials, a given user's unique possession of an innovation
would not seem to give him monopoly control over any unique capabilities
that would possibly command a high rent from the market.
In this industry, users appeared to have no plausible offsetting advantages
that might raise their expectations of rent relative to manufacturers. Indeed,
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significant returns to scale obtainable from hardware embodying the innova-
tions studied in the tractor shovel market were available to manufacturers but
not users. 8
In sum, then, I conclude that tractor shovel manufacturers are both the
functional type of firm likely to have the highest preinnovation expectations
of innovation-related rent and also the functional type of firm that in fact did
innovate. Thus, I find support for my hypothesis in this sample.
Engineering Plastics: Innovation and Innovation Rents
Since, as we saw in chapter 3, the manufacturers of engineering plastics are
the source of almost all innovations sampled in that field, my hypothesis may
be stated here as: Manufacturers of the sampled engineering plastics innova-
tions are also the functional type of firm best positioned to capture rents from
such innovations.
On the basis of inspection and discussion with industry experts, I concluded
that firms with either a user or a manufacturer relationship to engineering
plastic resin innovations are most likely to gain significant rents from them.*
Therefore, I focus on assessing the relative rents appropriable by each of
these two functional groups in this test.
Relative Ability to Establish Monopoly Control
In the instance of engineering plastics, all the innovators studied could and did
protect their innovations effectively through patents. This observation fits the
general evidence regarding the high effectiveness of patents in the field of
chemical inventions9 and discussion with industry personnel shows that such
protection is an important part of the commercial strategy of innovators in the
field.
Recall from our earlier discussion in chapter 4 that any innovator could
expect similar amounts of rent from a given innovation, given that he had
perfect, costlessly enforceable property rights to it. To the extent that the
patent protection available in the engineering plastics field has these character-
istics, the reasoning applies here and I would expect user and manufacturer
innovators to have roughly similar expectations regarding the rents they might
obtain from engineering plastics innovations.
However, as was also discussed earlier, in the real world even strong pat-
ents do not provide protection that is either perfect or costlessly enforced.
*Although patents offer effective protection in this field, licensing of engineering plastics
innovations is unlikely for reasons to be discussed in the text. As a consequence, independent
inventors and others without significant innovation-related outputs did not seem to me to be
potential appropriators of significant innovation-related rents. Suppliers were eliminated from
consideration as potential innovators because the materials used in the manufacture of the plas-
tics studied were commodity chemicals, whose suppliers did not appear well positioned to obtain
benefit from innovation-related knowledge through sale of a commodity output.
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Indeed, an innovator cannot realistically expect to license his patent rights to
others without risk or cost.
Relative Innovation-Related Output
The innovation-related output of an engineering plastics manufacturer is the
novel plastic itself. Manufacture of each of the engineering plastics studied is
highly concentrated. In my sample the innovator retained a dominant share of
the market for his novel product for at least several years. In 1976 Du Pont
(the innovator) produced 100% of acetal homopolymer (Delrin), Celanese
100% of acetal copolymer (Celcon), General Electric 100% of modified
polyphenylene oxide (Noryl), and Union Carbide 100% of polysulfone. Gen-
eral Electric also produced 75% of all polycarbonate (Lexan) in 1976 and Du
Pont produced 57% of all polyamides and 57% of all fluoropolymers.l 0
The innovation-related output of the user of engineering plastics is the
products in which these plastics are embodied. I have no data on the volume
of engineering plastics consumed by individual users. However, I can report
that there are literally thousands of users of each of the innovative engineer-
ing plastics studied and that no single user buys more than a small fraction of
total production. (The sole exception I identified was in the early days of
Lexan production when GE used as much as half of its pilot-plant production
internally. This fraction quickly dropped to just a few percent when larger
plants were brought on line.)
Relative Costs of Innovating
The costs for the actual innovating firms in this field were either equal to or
lower than those that other would-be innovators could reasonably anticipate.
All of the innovating firms had substantial ongoing research programs in
organic chemistry and thus did not have the significant R & D start-up costs
firms without such programs could expect. Some, but not many, users also
had such programs in place.
The R & D investment that innovators expend to develop an engineering
plastic is orders of magnitude higher than the R & D costs associated with
other categories of innovation examined in this chapter. Du Pont's R & D and
pilot plant expenditures for Delrin, for example, were $27 million in 1959
dollars.'l Commercialization is also expensive, because engineering plastics
manufacture requires special-purpose plants. Thus, the cost of the first com-
mercial plant for Delrin was $15 million' 2; for Celcon $15 to $20 million' 3; and
for Lexan $11 million. 14
Relative Amount of Displaced Sales
Engineering plastics are intended to be substitutes for other engineering
plastics or more traditional engineering materials such as metal and glass.
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Potential innovators who currently produce such materials do risk displace-
ment of sales of existing products if they innovate. However, the problem
can be minimized or eliminated by proper selection of the properties of the
innovative material so that it is not a substitute for the innovator's existing
products.
Discussion
As mentioned above, patent protection in this field is good, but there is no
reason to expect licensing to be either costless or risk-free for an innovator
attempting it. As a consequence, I reason that potential innovators would
expect somewhat higher rates of rent for innovation-related output produced
by the innovator's own firm. Taken by itself, this fact would not create a
higher rent expectation for either user or manufacturer innovators. However,
important economies of scale issues tip the balance toward the manufacturer.
Major engineering plastics such as those I studied are manufactured in
single-purpose, continuous-flow plants that have significant economies of
scale associated with them. As an approximation, processing costs per pound
in a plant sized to produce 1 million lb of plastic a year are 10 times those in a
plant sized to produce 100 million lb annually.15 Consider the impact of this
factor on a user contemplating developing a new engineering plastic. Since
any individual user represents only a small portion of the total demand for an
engineering plastic, a user firm considering innovation could not expect to
achieve attainable economies of scale by producing for in-house use only. If a
user, nonetheless, built a plant sized to fill in-house demand only, it would be
in a risky position: Any manufacturer that came up with a functional substi-
tute for the user innovation and produced it in a plant sized to serve the entire
market could render the user plant and material uneconomic.
In effect, therefore, both users and manufacturers in this industry are both
in a position to control the rights to an innovative engineering plastic that they
may develop. But only a manufacturer (or a user who becomes a manufac-
turer) is in a position to exploit the significant economies of scale associated
with engineering plastics manufacture. Given that this is so, a manufacturer
that innovates is the only functional type of firm that does not have to incur
the cost and risk of licensing this type of innovation to a manufacturer. The
consequent saving in licensing-related cost and risk results in a higher expecta-
tion of net innovation-related rent for an innovating manufacturer than that
which an innovating user might expect.
Process Equipment Utilizing Industrial Gases
and Thermoplastics: Innovation and Innovation Rents
The final two tests of the hypothesis were conducted by VanderWerf. 16 These
studies were designed precisely to test the hypothesis that rent expectations
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and the functional sources of innovation are linked and therefore they do not
require extra data or analyses to serve my purposes. As a consequence, the
review I will present can be relatively brief.
Recall from chapter 3 that by the time VanderWerf began his research, he
and I had the hypothesis reported on here in mind. It seemed on the basis of
that hypothesis that materials suppliers might be found to innovate under the
right conditions. As a consequence, VanderWerf elected to focus on catego-
ries of process machinery innovations that used large amounts of material as
input and where an innovating supplier might hope to have some level of
monopoly control over that input material. Under such circumstances it ap-
peared possible that materials suppliers might benefit from and develop inno-
vative process equipment that used their material-even if they did not plan
to build or use the innovative equipment themselves. Thus, in the instance of
these two studies, we were attempting to predict the functional source of
innovation on the basis of assumptions regarding the likely functional source
of highest innovation rents. As the reader will see, this experiment worked
well.
The Studies
VanderWerf's first sample consisted of innovations in process machines that
utilized large amounts of industrial gases as an input, whereas his second
sample consisted of innovations in process machines that used large amounts
of specific thermoplastics as an input. He began his research by determining,
by means of discussions with industry experts, that process machine users,
manufacturers, and suppliers of materials processed on the innovative ma-
chines all had some reasonable expectations of innovation-related rents.
Next, he compared the levels of such benefit that these three functional
categories of firm might reasonably expect.
VanderWerf estimated the benefit firms could potentially appropriate from
each innovation under study by studying the actual commercial history and
innovation-related behavior of users, manufacturers, suppliers, and others.
By means of discussions with industry participants, he then estimated the
relative appropriable benefits (rent), innovation costs, and the new business
fraction (a measure that serves the same function as my displaced sales) each
class of would-be innovators could reasonably expect if they had been able to
accurately foresee the commercial results actually attained by the various
innovations. Possible error in these estimates was compensated for by resolv-
ing ambiguity in a direction against the hypothesis under test.
Discussion
For each innovation, VanderWerf ranked four functional categories of innova-
tor (user, manufacturer, supplier, and other) in the order of their expected
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TABLE 5-2. Test of Hypothesis; The Source of Innovation Benefit and
Innovation Activity Compareda
(A) Industrial gas-using innovations:
Predicted probability of innovation
Highest Second Third Lowest
Innovator 8 4 0 0
Noninnovator 4 8 12 12
(chi 2p < .01)
(B) Thermoplastics-using innovations:
Predicted probability of innovation
Highest Second Third Lowest
Innovator 12 1 1 0
Noninnovator 2 13 13 14
(chi2 p < .01)
aVanderWerf, "Explaining the Occurrence of Industrial Process Innovation by Materials Suppliers," 65-66.
level of benefit from that innovation. In the top (bottom) rows of Table 5-
2(A) and 5-2(B), VanderWerf positions each firm that actually did (did not)
develop each innovation in that expected benefit ranking. As can be clearly
seen in Table 5-2, these two samples also strongly support the hypothesis
under test.
Conclusions and Discussion
The hypothesis I set out to test was that the functional sources of innovation
could be predicted on the basis of potential innovators' expectations of
innovation-related rents. We now see that this hypothesis is supported in the
instance of the five samples examined (Table 5-3). These test data are encour-
aging but clearly cannot prove the matter beyond dispute. Nevertheless, I
myself find the results encouraging enough to warrant moving ahead to both
further research and practical applications.
It would be interesting, for example, to use expectations of rents to predict
and empirically explore functional sources of innovation in addition to the
user, manufacturer, and supplier sources documented in this book. Thus,
wholesale or retail distributors of innovative products, processes, or services
should have high expectations of innovation-related rents under some condi-
tions, and they probably will be found to innovate where these pertain.
I speculate that the model will be applicable to industrial products, pro-
cesses, and services-a very considerable universe. It will also be quite practi-
cal in these fields: It requires data on variables that innovators and policymak-
ers in firms may already have at hand.
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TABLE 5-3. I There a Relationship Between the Functional Source of Innovation
and Reasonable Expectations of Innovation Rent?
Number of Innovations found in
sources with expected rent rank
Innovation Type Relationship Highest 2nd 3rd 4th
Pultrusion process Yes: p < .02a 9 1
Tractor shovel-related Yes: p < .02a 13 3
Engineering plastics Yes: p < .2b (NS) 4 1
Industrial gas-using Yes: p < .01c 8 4 0 0
Thermoplastics-using Yes: p < .01c 12 1 1 0
aChi2 test. The null hypothesis used in these tests was that innovations would be found equally distributed
between the two loci of highest expected rents.
bBinomial test (used due to very small sample size). The innovation coded 50% user and 50% manufacturer in
Table 3-6 is coded conservatively with respect to the hypothesis here (i.e., coded as 100% not in the locus of
highest expected rents).
CChi 2 test. Same as note (a) except that VanderWerf was able to rank expected rents reasonably anticipatable
by members of four functional loci with respect to each innovation (see Table 5-2).
However, the model will not be practicable in fields where all potential
innovators do not measure the rents they expect in commensurable ways. This
is so simply because the hypothesis that underlies the model requires that one
compare levels of expected rents across functional groups in order to predict
the functional source of innovation. And this is only possible in fields where
all classes of potential innovators with a significant potential interest in an
innovation use commensurable measures. Two examples will illustrate the
problem.
In scientific instruments, innovating scientist-users typically work in
nonprofit institutions. Usually, their research is supported by governmental
agencies who distribute grants on the basis of the expected scientific value of
the proposed research rather than on its expected economic value. Therefore,
neither users of scientific instruments nor their employers appear to have any
reason to measure expected innovation-related benefit in economic terms.
Rather, acknowledgement by peers of scientific accomplishment appears to
be a major innovation-related incentive for this group.' 7 In contrast, scientific
instrument manufacturers are profit-making firms and presumably do mea-
sure their expected innovation-related benefit in economic terms. Similarly,
in the field of consumer goods, consumers are known to evaluate innovations
in part in terms of psychological benefits not easily measured in economic
terms. 18
In this chapter I have been able to assess the relationship between innova-
tion and firms' expectations of innovation-related rents only by very careful
attention to the details of industry structure and behavior that form such
expectations. An important next step in this work, it seems to me, is to move
toward generalization by seeking out real-world principles and common
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strategies-successful and unsuccessful-that underlie innovators' attempts to
capture such rents.19
The empirical work I have done to date contains clues that might lead to
such an ability to generalize. For example, note that the functional source of
innovation was shown in the five studies to be populated by firms expecting
the highest innovation-related rents (Table 5-3). Since the hypothesis itself
proposes only that innovation will be found concentrated among firms who
find their expected rents attractive, this result is striking. Perhaps it signals
that expectations of rent will often differ significantly between firms holding
different functional relationships to a given innovation opportunity. This
seems to me to be possible because at the moment I can see two general
reasons why the rent expectations of potential innovators could differ signifi-
cantly as a consequence of the functional relationship they hold to an innova-
tion opportunity.
First, the abilities of firms to protect and benefit from identical innovation-
related information can differ as a consequence of functional role. For exam-
ple, innovating users can often protect process and process machinery innova-
tions as trade secrets better than any other type of innovator. This is so
because only users can obtain rent from their innovations while keeping them
hidden within their factory walls. Innovators with any other functional rela-
tionship to an innovation such as manufacturer or supplier must sell the
innovation they develop or persuade others to adopt it before they can bene-
fit. The process of selling or persuading typically involves revealing related
secret knowledge to prospective innovation adopters and, as a practical mat-
ter, usually destroys the basis for trade secrecy protection.
Also, the risk users face in developing a cost-reducing innovation for their
own use may typically be lower than that facing any other functional category
of innovator. This is because only users do not have to market such innova-
tions in order to derive rent from them-their own use constitutes a source of
such rent. Therefore, the risk to users engaging in an innovation process is
that the completed device will not work as intended or will be obsoleted by
some other innovation or event. Manufacturers and all other nonusers consid-
ering developing that same innovation, on the other hand, face these same
risks plus the risk that the innovation will not be accepted in the marketplace.
A second general reason why the rent expectations of potential innovators
could differ significantly as a consequence of the functional relationship they
hold to an innovation opportunity has to do with industry competitive struc-
ture. Firms having user, manufacturer, and supplier relationships to a given
innovation often come from different industries. These industries may have
different structures, for example, the industry that will manufacture an innova-
tion may be more concentrated than the industry that will use it. Since a firm's
innovation-related output is not likely to be determined entirely on the basis
of a particular innovation, we can see that expectations of rent are likely to be
affected by factors such as preinnovation concentration ratios.
A better general understanding of how firms capture innovation-related
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rents would have implications beyond innovation. For example, consider the
possible impact on current views on when and why firms specialize.
Stigler20 hypothesizes that "vertical disintegration" will occur as a new indus-
try grows and matures. He reasons that many functions that firms in the new
industry require have increasing returns to scale. Initially, the firms in the new
industry might perform such functions for themselves because specialization is
limited by the extent of the market and because total demand for a particular
function might not be great enough to support a specialist firm. But, as the
industry grew, demand would increase and eventually it would be reasonable
for firms in the industry to spin such functions off to specialist firms that could
carry them out on a larger scale and thus more cheaply.
It does seem reasonable to me that Stigler's hypothesis may explain real-
world behavior under circumstances in which economies of scale and consider-
ations of production cost are very important. However, different patterns will
emerge when innovation-related rents (a factor not included in the Stigler
hypothesis) are important-as they often are.
Consider, for example, that users may only be able to obtain rents on
innovative process machinery if they build it in-house and protect it as a trade
secret. Such rents might be far more significant than any scale-related econo-
mies potentially offered by a specialist process equipment manufacturer. An-
ecdotal evidence exists in support of this idea. Thus: "Most world class Ger-
man and Japanese manufacturing companies have large, well-staffed, very
active machine shops. Much of the success of these companies is a result of the
proprietary production processes that are incubated in these shops and there-
fore unavailable to their competitors."21
Notes
1. In principle, if an imitator became aware of an innovator's protected knowledge
at the moment he developed it, there would be no response-time protection for the
innovator: both innovator and imitator could proceed with commercialization activi-
ties in tandem. Response time is an important innovation benefit capture mechanism
in reality, however, because would-be imitators seldom become aware of an innova-
tor's knowledge at the moment he develops it. Typically, in fact, an imitator only
becomes aware of a promising new product when that product is introduced to the
marketplace. Until that point the innovator has been able to protect his product from
the eyes of interested competitors inside his factory. After that point, if the product is
easily reverse engineered and has no patent protection, only the response-time mecha-
nism can provide the innovator with some quasi-monopoly protection from imitators.
No formal studies yet exist, but the value of response time to innovators can be
reasoned to be a function of various situation-specific factors. For example, consider
the effect of the length of response time divided by length of the customer purchase
decision cycle. A high value of this factor favors the innovator over imitators. Consider
one extreme example: a consumer fad item (very short purchase decision time) that
sells in high volume for six months only. Assume that the item can be readily imitated
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but can only be produced economically by mass-production tooling that requires six
months to build. Obviously, response time here allows the innovator to monopolize
the entire market if he can supply it with his initial tooling. At another extreme is an
expensive capital-equipment innovation that customers typically take two years to
decide to buy, budget for, and so on-and that competitors can imitate in one year.
Obviously, response time in this instance affords an innovator little protection.
2. The source of figures in this section is William G. Lionetta, Jr., "Sources of
Innovation Within the Pultrusion Industry" (SM thesis, Sloan School of Management,
MIT, Cambridge, Mass., 1977), chap. 2.
3. A homebuilt machine of average capacity (i.e., a machine capable of pultruding
product with a cross-section of 6 in. by 7 in.) had a direct cost of at most $60,000 in
1977 (Lionetta, "Sources of Innovation Within the Pultrusion Industry," 43) versus the
price of $95,000 charged for an equivalent commercial machine. Presumably the user-
built machines were cheaper because the user does not incur some expenses that the
machine builder must, such as selling expenses.
4. C. F. Pratten, Economies of Scale in Manufacturing Industry (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1971), Table 17-4, p. 173.
5. The primary exception was four-wheel drive. Although it offered advantages to
all users, it was a costly feature most advantageous to those operating on difficult
terrain and, so, penetrated the market more slowly. The inclusion of four-wheel drive
in a tractor shovel added over $1000 in direct cost per unit at the time of the innova-
tion.
6. This estimate of operating savings is derived in the following manner. Standard
industry assumptions are that the life of a tractor shovel is five years and that it will
operate 2000 hr/yr. Productivity savings primarily involve savings of labor and capital.
If we assume an operator was paid $1/hr plus 50% fringe and overhead, which was
average at the time of the innovations (Council of Economic Advisers Annual Report
1981, in Economic Report of the President, Transmitted to the Congress, January 1981,
Together with the Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers [Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981], 21-213), an innovation that made a
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ment innovations studied-would involve a savings of 20% of an operator's salary (or
$600/yr) and a savings of 20% the capital cost of a machine. Since, at the time of the
innovations, tractor shovel prices ranged from $5000 to $10,000/unit (or a maximum of
$2000 depreciated over five years straight line), total maximum annual savings to the
user in capital and labor therefore were $1100/yr/machine/innovation.
7. Glen L. Urban et al., "Market Share Rewards to Pioneering Brands: An Empiri-
cal Analysis and Strategic Implications," Management Science 32, no. 6 (June 1986):
645-59.
8. Pratten, Economies of Scale in Manufacturing Industry, Table 17-4, p. 173.
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Cooperation Between Rivals: The
Informal Trading of Technical Know-how
We have seen that variations in the functional sources of innovation can
sometimes be explained in terms of potential innovators' relative expectations
of economic rents. Since this is so, it becomes worthwhile to think about
developing a more general understanding of patterns in the sources of innova-
tion on the basis of a more general understanding of rents and how innovators
may seek to maximize them. In this chapter I begin this process by focusing on
a mode of cooperative R & D that I call informal know-how trading.
I begin by describing informal know-how trading in general terms. Next, I
document how it operates in the field of steel minimill process know-how.
Then, I explore how one might explain this form of cooperation in terms of
patterns in the rents obtainable from innovation-related knowledge.
Informal Know-how Trading
Know-how is the accumulated practical skill or expertise that allows one to do
something smoothly and efficiently. The know-how I focus on here is that
held in the minds of a firm's engineers who develop its products and develop
and operate its processes. Often, a firm considers a significant portion of such
know-how proprietary and protects it as a trade secret.
A firm's staff of engineers is responsible for obtaining or developing the
know-how its firm needs. When required know-how is not available in-house,
engineers typically cannot find it in publications either: Much is very special-
ized and not published anywhere. They must either develop it themselves or
learn what they need to know by talking to other specialists. Since in-house
development can be time consuming and expensive, there can be a high
incentive to seek the needed information from professional colleagues. And
often, logically enough, engineers in competing firms that make similar prod-
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ucts or use similar processes are the people most likely to have that needed
information. But are these professional colleagues willing to reveal their pro-
prietary know-how to employees of competing firms? Interestingly, it appears
that the answer is quite uniformly yes in at least one industry-and quite
probably in many.
The informal proprietary know-how trading behavior I have observed to
date can be characterized as an informal trading network that develops be-
tween engineers having common professional interests. In general such trad-
ing networks appear to be formed and refined as engineers get to know each
other at professional conferences and elsewhere. In the course of such con-
tacts, an engineer builds his personal informal list of possibly useful expert
contacts by making private judgments as to the areas of expertise and abilities
of those he meets. Later, when Engineer A encounters a difficult product or
process development problem, A activates his network by calling Engineer
B-an appropriately knowledgeable contact who works at a competing (or
noncompeting) firm-for advice.
Engineer B makes a judgment as to the competitive value of the informa-
tion A is requesting. If the information seems to him vital to his own firm's
competitive position, B will not provide it. However, if it seems useful but not
crucial-and if A seems to be a potentially useful and appropriately knowl-
edgeable expert who may be of future value to B-then B will answer the
request as well as he can and/or refer A to other experts. B may go to
considerable lengths to help A: for example, B may run a special simulation
on his firm's computer system for A. At the same time, A realizes that in
asking for, and accepting, B's help, he is incurring an obligation to provide
similar help to B-or to another referred by B-at some future time. No
explicit accounting of favors given and received is kept, I find, but the obliga-
tion to return a favor seems strongly felt by recipients-" ... a gift always
looks for recompense."'
Informal know-how trading can occur between firms that do and do not
directly compete. Informal but extensive trading of information with competi-
tive value between direct competitors is perhaps the most interesting case,
however, because if we can explain that phenomenon, we can more easily
explain trading with less competitive impact. Therefore, I focus much of the
ensuing data and discussion on the case of informal know-how trading be-
tween direct competitors.
Case Study: Informal Trading of Proprietary Process
Know-how Between U.S. Steel Minimill Producers
To date, my data on informal know-how trading between competitors are
most complete in the instance of process know-how trading in the U.S. steel
minimill industry. I offer this data here as an existence test of the phenome-
non and as a means of conveying its flavor.
Minimills, unlike integrated steel plants, do not produce steel from iron
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TABLE 6-1. U.S. Steel Minimill Sample
Melt Capacitya
Steel Minimill Firm (tons per year, 000)
Four largest firms
Chaparral, Midllothian, Texas 1400
Florida Steel, Tampa 1578
North Star, Salt Lake City, Utah 2300
Nucor, Charlotte, North Carolina 2000
Other (randomly selected)
Bayou Steel, LaPlace, Louisiana 650
Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, McMinnville, Oregon 250
Charter Electric Melting, Chicago, Illinois 130
Kentucky Electric Steel, Ashland 280
Marathon Steel, Tempe, Arizonab 185
Raritan River Steel, Perth Amboy, New Jersey 500
Specially selected outlier
Quanex, Houston, Texas
aSource: Nemeth, "Mini-Midi Mills," Table 1,,pp. 30-34.
bFirm closed in July 1985.
ore. Rather, they begin with steel scrap that they melt in an electric arc
furnace. Then, they adjust the chemistry of the molten steel, cast it in continu-
ous casters, and roll it into steel shapes. Modern facilities and relatively low
labor, capital, and materials costs have enabled U.S. steel minimill firms to
compete extremely effectively against the major integrated U.S. steel produc-
ers in recent years. Indeed, they have essentially driven U.S. integrated pro-
ducers out of the market for many commodity products.
There are approximately 60 steel minimill plants (and approximately 40
producers) in the United States today.2 The most productive of these have
surpassed their Japanese competitors in terms of tons of steel per labor-hour
input, and they are regarded as among the world leaders in this process.
Methods
The sample of minimills I studied is a subset of a recent listing of U.S. firms
with one or more minimill plants.3 I selected the four firms with the largest
annual molten steel production capacity (melt capacity) from this list and then
added six others selected at random from the same list. Later, some inter-
viewees in these firms suggested that I also study Quanex Corporation be-
cause it was viewed as an industry outlier in terms of trading behavior; so I
also added this firm. All firms included in the study sample are identified in
Table 6-1.
Interviews were conducted with plant managers and other managers with
direct knowledge of manufacturing and manufacturing process engineering at
each firm in the study sample. The questioning, mostly conducted by tele-
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TABLE 6-2. Know-how Trading Patterns
In-house Process Know-how
Steel Minimill Firm Development Trade
Four largest firms
Chaparral Major Yes
Florida Steel Minor Yes
North Star Minor Yes
Nucor Major Yes
Other
Bayou Steel Minor Yes
Cascade Steel Rolling Mills Minor Yes
Charter Electric Melting Minor Yes
Kentucky Electric Steel Minor Yes
Marathon Steel Minor Yes
Raritan River Steel Minor Yes
Quanex Minor No
phone, was focused by an interview guide and addressed two areas primarily:
(1) Has your firm/does your firm develop proprietary know-how that would
be of interest to competitors? If so, give concrete examples of process or
product improvements you have developed and some estimate of their value.
(2) Do you trade proprietary know-how with competitors? With whom? Do
you hold anything back? What? Why? Give concrete examples.
The source of major, well-known innovations claimed by interviewees was
cross-checked by asking interviewees in several firms, "Which firm developed
x?" The accuracy of self-reported trading behavior could not be so checked. I,
nevertheless, have confidence in the pattern found because interviewees in all
but one of the sampled firms provided independent, detailed discussions of
very similar trading behavior.
Results
Personnel at all firms except Quanex (selected for study specifically because
its behavior differed from the norm) did report routinely trading proprietary
process know-how-sometimes with rivals.
Interestingly, reported know-how trading often appeared to go far beyond
an arm's-length exchange of data at conferences. Interviewees reported that,
sometimes, workers of competing firms were trained (at no charge), firm
personnel were sent to competing facilities to help set up unfamiliar equip-
ment, and so on.
Of course, the firms that report informal know-how trading with competi-
tors in Table 6-2 do not trade with every competitor and do not necessarily
trade with each other. (The interviewed firms differ widely in technical accom-
plishment and, as we will see later, a firm will only offer to trade valuable
know-how with those who can reciprocate in kind.)
79
The Sources of Innovation
TABLE 6-3. Minimill Costs per Ton (Wire Rod, 1981) a
Cost Category $ per Ton Percentage of Total
Labor $60 21%
Steel scrap 93 33
Energy 45 16




Miscellaneous tax 3 1
TOTAL COSTSc $284 100
aSource: Barnett and Schorsch, Steel: Upheaval in a Basic Industry, Table 4-3, p. 95.
bIncludes alloying agents, refractories, rolls, and so on.
CExcluding any return on equity.
Before turning to consider why the trading of proprietary process know-
how occurs in the steel minimill industry, let me examine that behavior in
more detail under three headings: (1) Did minimills studied in fact develop/
have proprietary process know-how of potential value to rivals? (2) Did firms
possessing know-how trade with rivals? (3) Was know-how in fact traded, as
opposed to simply revealed without expectation of a return of similarly valu-
able know-how?
Valuable Know-how?
Since many minimill products are commodities, it is logical that process inno-
vations that save production costs will be of significant value to innovating
firms and of significant interest to competitors. Barnett and Schorsch 4 report
U.S. minimill 1981 costs to manufacture wire rod (a reasonably representative
commodity minimill product) to be as shown in Table 6-3.
On the basis of Table 6-3 data, it seems reasonable that all minimills would
have a keen interest in know-how that would reduce their labor and/or energy
costs. And, indeed, all those interviewed reported making in-house improve-
ments to methods or equipment in order to reduce these costs. In addition,
some reported making process innovations that increased the range of prod-
ucts they could produce.
Nucor and Chaparral conduct major and continuing in-house process devel-
opment efforts (conducted, interestingly, by their production groups rather
than by separate R & D departments). Thus, Nucor is now investing millions
in a process to continuously cast thin slabs of steel. If successful, this process
will allow minimills to produce wide shapes as well as narrow ones and also
will perhaps double the size of the market open to minimill producers-an
advance of tremendous value to the industry.
The in-house know-how development efforts of other interviewed minimills
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are much less ambitious, consisting mainly of relatively small refinements in
process equipment and technique. For example, one firm is experimenting
with a water-cooled furnace roof that is more horizontal (has less pitch) than
that of competitors. (The effect of the flatter furnace roof is expected to be
increased clearance and faster furnace loading times, a cost advantage.) Other
firms develop modified rollers for their rolling mills that allow them to make
better or different steel shapes, and so forth. Although many such process
refinements have only a small individual impact on production costs, their
collective impact can be large. 5
In sum, then, most steel minimill firms do appear to develop proprietary
know-how that would be of significant value to at least some rivals.
Rivals?
Our next question is: Are steel minimill firms that trade know-how really
rivals (direct competitors)? If they are not, of course, the know-how trading
behavior we observe becomes more easily explicable: Noncompetitors cannot
turn traded proprietary know-how to one's direct disadvantage. *
Many minimills do compete with each other today, although this was not
always the case. When minimills began to emerge in the late 1950s to late
1960s, they were usually located in smaller regional markets and were pro-
tected by transportation costs from severe competition with other minimills.
Today, however, there are many minimill firms and significant competition
between neighboring plants. In addition, the production capacity of minimill
plants has steadily increased and the larger facilities "define their markets as
widely as do integrated [steel mill] facilities." 6
Some minimill interviewees report that they do trade know-how with per-
sonnel from directly competing plants. Others report that they try to avoid
direct transfer to rivals, but they are aware that they cannot control indirect
transfer. (Since traders cannot control the behavior of those who acquire their
information, the noncompeting firms they select to trade with may later trans-
fer that information to competitors.)
Is It Really Trading?
Proprietary know-how is only a subject for trading if free diffusion can be
prevented. Therefore, I asked interviewees: Could the proprietary know-how
you develop in-house be kept secret if you wanted to do this?
In the instance of know-how embodied in equipment visible in a plant tour,
free diffusion was considered hard to prevent. Many people visit minimill
plants. Members of steelmaking associations visit by invitation, and associa-
tion members include competitors. In principle, such visits could be pre-
vented, but the value of doing so is unclear since two other categories of
visitors could not be as easily excluded. First, suppliers of process equipment
*Firms that produce identical products may not be rivals for many reasons. For example, firms
may be restricted to a regional market by the economics of transport (as with liquified industrial
gases or fresh milk products) or by regulation (as with banks and utilities).
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often visit plants for reasons ranging from sales to repair to advice. They are
expert at detecting equipment modification and are quick to diffuse informa-
tion around the industry. Second, customers often request plant tours in order
to assure themselves of product quality and may notice and/or request infor-
mation on process changes.
On the other hand, interviewees seem to believe that they can effectively
restrict access to know-how if they really want to, and there is evidence for
this on a general level. Thus, Nucor and Chaparral both attempt to exert some
control over their process innovations, and interviewees at other firms think
they have some success. Quanex does not allow plant visits at all and feels it
effectively protects its know-how thereby.
Data on this matter are also available at the level of specific innovations,
although I have not yet collected them systematically. As an example, how-
ever, a firm with a policy of being generally open reported that it nevertheless
was able to successfully restrict access to a minor rolling innovation for several
years. That firm reported gaining an "extra" $140/ton because it was the only
minimill able to roll a particular shape desired by some customers. It appar-
ently only lost control of its innovation when production people explained it
to a competitor at a Bar Mill Association meeting.
Interviewees, including top management, were aware of know-how ex-
change patterns in their industry and emphasized that they were not giving
know-how away-they were consciously trading information whose value they
recognized. Thus, Bayou Steel: "How much is exchanged depends on what
the other guy knows-must be reciprocal." Chaparral: "If they don't let us in
[to their plant] we won't let them in [to ours]-must be reciprocal." These
statements are convincing to-me because most interviewees who did engage in
information exchange had clearly thought about whom to trade with and why.
When asked, they were able to go into considerable detail about the types of
firms they did and did not deal with and why dealing with a given firm would
or would not involve a valuable two-way exchange of know-how.
Know-how trading in the steel minimill industry was not centrally con-
trolled beyond the provision of general guidelines by top management. Also,
no one was explicitly counting up the precise value of what was given or
received by a firm, and a simultaneous exchange of valuable information was
not insisted on. However, in an informal way, participants appeared to strive
to keep a balance in value given and received, without resorting to explicit
calculation. On average over many transactions a reasonable balance was
probably achieved, although individual errors in judgment are easy to cite.
(E.g., in the instance of the minor rolling innovation mentioned above, the
innovating firm's sales department was furious when, in their view, engineer-
ing "simply gave" the unique process know-how and the associated monopoly
rents away.)
Quanex, the Exception
Quanex was the sole exception to the minimill trading norm I found. The firm
was not on the list of minimills I used to generate our sample, and I only
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became aware of it and its outlier status because I routinely asked each firm
interviewed if it knew of any firm whose trading behavior differed from its
own.
When contacted, Quanex explained its behavior by saying that, first, it did
not trade because it felt it had nothing to learn from rival firms (a contention
disputed by some interviewees). Second, it said that, while it did produce steel
by a minimill-like process, it produced specialty steels and considered its
competitors to be other specialty steel producers (e.g., Timkin) and not
minimills. And, Quanex reported, it was not an outlier with respect to spe-
cialty steel producers where, it said, secrecy rather than trading was the norm.
(We think this latter point very interesting, but will not pursue it here. If
confirmed, it suggests that know-how trading patterns may differ between
closely related industries. This in turn opens the way to empirical study of the
underlying causes of know-how trading under well-controlled conditions.)
Other Empirical Evidence Regarding Know-how Trading
Is know-how trading unique to the U.S. minimill industry? Or is it a signifi-
cant form of R & D cooperation in many industries? At the moment, I am
aware of only three sources of empirical data on this important matter, and all
tend to suggest that informal know-how trading exists in many industries.
First, my students and I have now conducted pilot interviews in several
U.S. industries in addition to steel minimills. And, on an anecdotal basis, I
can report that we have found informal know-how trading apparently quite
common in some industries and essentially absent in others. Thus, self-report
by interviewees suggests that trading is widespread among aerospace firms
and waferboard manufacturing mills, but rare or absent among powdered
metals fabricators and producers of the biological enzyme klenow. Interest-
ingly, however, trading seems a more quasi-covert, secretive activity by engi-
neering staffs in some of these industries than was the case in steel minimills.
In minimills, top management was typically aware of trading and approved.
This does not seem to be necessarily the case in all industries where significant
trading is present.
Second, data in a study by Thomas J. Allen et al.7 of a sample of Irish,
Spanish, and Mexican firms appear consistent with what I am calling informal
know-how trading. Allen examined the "most significant change, in either
product or process" that had occurred in each of 102 firms during recent
years. Interviews were conducted with innovation participants to determine
the source of the initial idea for the innovation and important sources of help
used in implementation. Coding of the data showed that approximately 23%
of the important information in these categories came from some form of
personal contact with "apparent competitors" (firms in the same industry).
T. J. Allen elaborates on the behavior observed:
In a typical scenario, the manager from one of these firms might visit a
trade show in another country, and be invited on a plant visit by representa-
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tives of a foreign firm. While there he would encounter some new manufactur-
ing technique that he would later introduce into his own firm. In other cases
managers approached apparently competing firms in other countries directly
and were provided with surprisingly free access to their technology. 8
Third, Robert C. Allen9 reports "collective invention" in the nineteenth-
century English steel industry-and I think that what he has observed might in
fact be an example of informal know-how trading. Allen explored progressive
change in two important attributes of iron furnaces during 1850-75 in En-
gland's Cleveland district: an increase in the height of furnace chimneys and
an increase in the temperature of the blast air pumped into an iron furnace
during operation. Both types of technical change resulted in a significant and
progressive improvement in the energy efficiency of iron production. Next, he
examined technical writings of the time and found that at least some who built
new furnaces reaching new chimney heights and/or blast temperatures pub-
licly revealed data on their furnace design and performance in meetings of
professional societies and in published material. That is, some firms revealed
data of apparent competitive value to both existing and potential rivals, a
phenomenon that he called collective invention.
The essential difference between know-how trading and what R.C. Allen
calls collective invention is that know-how trading involves an exchange of
valuable information between traders that is at the same time kept secret from
nontraders. In contrast, collective invention requires that all competitors and
potential competitors be given free access to proprietary know-how.10 Allen
finds that this free access requirement presents interpretive difficulties, how-
ever.*
As will be seen later when I discuss the causes of know-how trading, the
difficulty R. C. Allen notes is not present if the iron manufacturers he exam-
ined were actually engaged in know-how trading rather than in collective
invention. This seems likely to me. Allen deduced that technical data were
made available to all because he observed that much was published and
presented to technical societies. Certainly, what was published was public:
But know-how with trading value might well have been withheld from publica-
tion and/or published only when it had lost proprietary status with the passage
of time. Both of these suggested behaviors would be difficult to discern in
written records but are in fact part of the trading behavior of present-day
firms.
*The interpretive difficulty reported by R. C. Allen: "It is extremely puzzling why firms
released design and cost information to potential entrants to the industry. If (as we continue to
assume) the industry was competitively organized, it would appear that this action could only
rebound to the disadvantage of the firm. To the degree that the information release accelerated
technical progress, the price of the product would decline and so would the net income of the firm
that released the information" (R. C. Allen, "Collective Invention," 16).
Allen proposes three possible explanations for such behavior (a firm's desire to publicize its
accomplishment even at the penalty of lost profit, a firm's inability to keep the know-how secret
even if it wished to, speculations regarding special conditions under which a firm might possibly




An Economic Explanation for Know-how Trading
I propose that it may be possible to explain both the presence and absence of
informal trading of proprietary know-how between direct competitors in
terms of economic rents accruing to trading firms. I begin by framing the
phenomenon in the context of a Prisoner's Dilemma, and then initially ex-
plore the plausibility of such a model by reference to the limited amount of
real-world information currently available to me.
Know-how Trading as a Prisoner's Dilemma
Let us consider know-how trading between rivals as a two-party Prisoner's
Dilemma. It has been shown that the two parties involved in such a Dilemma
are likely to achieve the highest private gain over many interactions (moves in
the game) if they cooperate." However, each player is continuously tempted
to defect from cooperation because he will reap higher returns from a single
move if he defects while his partner behaves cooperatively.
Two conditions must hold for a situation to be defined as a Prisoner's
Dilemma. The first condition is that the value of the four possible outcomes
must be t > r > p > s, where t is the payoff to the player who defects while the
other cooperates; r is the payoff to both players when both cooperate; p is the
payoff to both players when both defect; and, finally, s is the payoff to the
player who cooperates when the second player defects. The second condition
is that an even chance for each player to exploit and be exploited on succes-
sive turns of the game does not result in as profitable an outcome to players as
does continuing mutual cooperation (i.e., 2r > t + s).
Let me begin placing know-how trading in the context of a two-party Prison-
er's Dilemma by observing that traded know-how is often possessed by more
than one firm prior to a trade. Assume, therefore, that n - 1 firms possess a
particular "unit" of know-how prior to a given trade. The total rent, Rtota,, that
a firm (player) possessing that know-how reaps from it can then be expressed
as:
RtotaI = R + A R
Here R is the rent that a firm may expect from implementing a unit of know-
how if it reveals it to its trading partner and, as a result, n firms possess that
know-how. A R is the extra increment of rent that the firm can expect to
garner if it does not trade the unit of proprietary know-how. In that case only
n-1 firms possess that unit, and the player possessing it therefore gains extra
competitive advantage from its use. (In instances when a given unit of know-
how is possessed by only one firm prior to a trade and by two posttrade, R will
be a duopoly rent and A R will be the monopoly rent associated with exclusive
possession of the know-how minus the dupoly rent.)
A Base Case
As a base case, assume that in each play of the game two firms both start out
with one unit of proprietary know-how unknown to the other. Assume also
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that each of these two units, although different, has identical R and A R
associated with it. Then each firm starts with proprietary know-how having a
preplay value of R + A R.
Because knowledge is the good being traded here, a cooperative trade, r,
between the two firms will result in each firm having both units of know-how
posttrade, and each having the posttrade rent:
R=2R
That is, posttrade each will have lost that increment of rent, A R, that was
associated with a more exclusive possession of its own know-how unit, but will
have gained the additional rent associated with an additional know-how unit.
Similar reasoning allows us to work out the consequences of all four possible
outcomes of a single play of the game by the two firms as:
t = 2R + A R, r = 2R, p = R + A R, and s = R
We therefore find that both the first condition (t > r > p > s) and the
second condition (2r > t + s) required for a situation to be defined as a
Prisoner's Dilemma hold if R > A R. Therefore, if R > A R, a policy of know-
how trading will usually pay better in the long run than any other strategy. On
the other hand, both conditions fail and continuing defection or no exchange
is the best option if R < A R.
The simple model just given can obviously be brought into more precise
alignment with the real world if we add refinements. But at this point I have
only anecdotal data to use in testing, so it is reasonable to defer complexity.
Instead, I will attempt to assess the intuitive plausibility of the simple model
by reference to real-world examples.
When Proprietary Know-how Offers Little Competitive Advantage
In essence, R > A R holds when the exclusive possession of a know-how unit
offers relatively little competitive advantage. This, I suggest, is often the case
in the real world. To understand why, it is important to first understand a little
more about the actual nature of most (but not all) proprietary know-how.
Know-how may have the ring of something precious and nonreproducible
to the nontechnical reader. In fact, most proprietary know-how shares two
characteristics: (1) it is not vital to a firm and (2) it can be independently
developed by any competent firm needing it, given an appropriate expendi-
ture of time and money. Consider two examples of typical proprietary know-
how:
An engineer at an aerospace firm was having trouble manufacturing a part
from a novel composite material with needed precision. He called a profes-
sional colleague he knew at a rival firm and asked for advice. As it happens,
that competitor had solved the problem by experimenting and developing
some process know-how involving mold design and processing temperatures,
and the colleague willingly passed along this information.
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It was certainly convenient for the firm now facing the difficulty to learn of
a solution from the rival, but it was not in any way vital. First, it was possible
to struggle along without solving the problem at all. The part was in fact being
made but with a high scrap rate and much effort. Second, the engineer as-
signed to solve this problem was competent and could certainly develop a
solution independently, given appropriate time and funds.
Process engineers at a manufacturer of waferboard (a fabricated wood
product somewhat like plywood) were having trouble involving frequent jam-
ming of a production machine with wood being processed. As it happens,
competitors had solved this problem by experimenting and developing some
process know-how involving the regulation of wood moisture content. When
contacted, they passed along what they had learned.
Again, it was convenient for the firm now facing the difficulty to know this
solution, but it was not essential or even very important. First, the cost of
struggling on without solving the problem at all was not exorbitant: Machine
operators could continue to cope simply by stopping the troublesome machine
and clearing it as often as necessary. Second, a competent engineer assigned
to solve this problem could certainly solve it independently.
When proprietary know-how does have the attributes just described, we
can perhaps intuitively see the plausibility of the model's prediction that rival
firms will find it profitable to engage in know-how trading. Conceptually, the
consequences of noncooperation in know-how sharing under such conditions
are similar to those of a policy of not cooperating in sharing spare parts with
rivals who use an identical process machine. An industrywide policy of
noncooperation between rivals with respect to spares would under most cir-
cumstances not permanently deprive any firm of needed spares nor otherwise
significantly affect the competitive position of rival firms in the industry. It
would simply result in increased downtime and/or spares-stocking costs for
all--a net loss for all relative to the consequences of a policy of cooperation.
When Proprietary Know-how
Offers Significant Competitive Advantage
Sometimes, the competitive value of a unit of know-how is large, and R < A R.
According to the model, one would then expect that informal know-how trad-
ing would not occur. I can illustrate this possibility with an interesting example
that appears to show know-how trading behavior shifting as the value of a given
type of know-how shifts over time.
Aerospace engineer interviewees have informed my students and me that
they freely exchange most know-how under normal conditions. But, when a
competition for an important government contract is in the offing, the situa-
tion changes, and trading of information between rivals that might affect who
wins the contract stops. Later, after the contract has been awarded, the same
know-how that was recently closely guarded will apparently again be traded
freely.
The reported behavior seems reasonable. Much aerospace know-how has
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the characteristics discussed earlier: It is not critical and under normal condi-
tions it can be independently reproduced by competent engineers if need be.
Therefore, it is likely that R > A R for such know-how, and that know-how
trading would pay according to the model. But when a competition for an
important government contract is near, conditions are not normal. Often,
there will not be enough time to produce needed know-how independently,
and therefore the A R value of a given piece of competition-related know-how
could increase temporarily. If the increase reached the point where R < A R,
it is reasonable according to the model that know-how trading temporarily
stop-the behavior in fact reported by interviewees. And, of course, after the
contract is awarded, it is reasonable that the A R value of competition-related
know-how will drop and trading resume-as interviewees report that it does.
In the example just given the know-how at issue could have been indepen-
dently redeveloped by anyone who wanted it. But the know-how nonetheless
yielded competitive advantage to its possessor because the time needed for
independent redevelopment was simply not available. Sometimes, however,
know-how that can yield a major competitive advantage cannot be routinely
reinvented. (It may, for example, be the result of unusual insight and/or
major research efforts.) Then, R < A R for years, and trading of that know-
how may never be in the best interests of the firm possessing it.
When Proprietary Know-how Offers No Competitive Advantage
Unique possession of proprietary know-how offers essentially no competitive
advantage to a firm with respect to nonrivals. Therefore I would expect know-
how trading to be to the advantage of firms in such a situation (assuming that
the traded information does not leak from nonrivals to rivals) and would pre-
dict it to occur. Anecdotal evidence available to this point supports this predic-
tion, but it is certainly only of illustrative value. For example, on the basis of
interviews, I find that electric and gas utilities (which serve different regions
and are therefore not rivals) do appear to share know-how extensively.
When Diffusing Proprietary Know-how Has Competitive Value
In at least some real-world conditions it appears that competition is enhanced
by wide sharing of some know-how. As an example consider the establish-
ment of uniform standards in a product category that can sometimes enlarge
markets and benefit all participating manufacturers (e.g., standards set for
computer networks and compact audio disks). The establishment of such
standards requires some sharing of know-how by participating firms. As a
second example consider the sharing of proprietary information on safety
hazards between rivals (e.g., on the hazards of dioxin among rivals in the
chemical industry).
Informal Know-how Trading in Context
Informal technology trading can usefully be compared with and contrasted to
two other forms of R & D exchange between firms: (1) agreements to perform
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R & D cooperatively and (2) agreements to license or sell proprietary techni-
cal knowledge. As we will see, informal know-how trading can usefully be
seen as an inexpensive, flexible form of cross-licensing. Under appropriate
conditions, it appears to function better than either of these better-known
alternatives.
Agreements to trade or license know-how involve firms in less uncertainty
than do agreements to perform R & D cooperatively. This is because the
former deals with existing knowledge of known value that can be exchanged
quickly and certainly. In contrast, agreements to perform R & D offer future
know-how conditioned by important uncertainties as to its value and the
likelihood that it will be delivered at all. The value of the know-how con-
tracted for is uncertain because R & D outcomes cannot be predicted with
certainty. The delivery of the results of cooperative R & D projects to sponsor-
ing firms is somewhat uncertain because such results are best transferred back
to the sponsoring firms in the minds of employees participating in the coopera-
tive research. Given the U.S. tradition of frequent job changes, participants
run significant risk of losing the benefits of their investment by losing the
employee(s) they assigned to the project.
Informal know-how trading such as that reported here has a lower transac-
tion cost than more formal agreements to license or sell similar information.
Transaction costs in informal know-how trading systems are low because
decisions to trade or not trade proprietary know-how are made by individual,
knowledgeable engineers. No elaborate evaluations of relative benefit or seek-
ing of approvals from firm bureaucracies are involved. Although informal,
each engineer's assessment of the relative likely value of the trades he elects
to make may be quite accurate: An information seeker can tell on the basis of
his first interaction whether the expert advice he is given is of good quality-
because he will immediately seek to apply it. An information provider can test
the level of the inquirer's expertise and future value as a source of information
by the nature and subtlety of the questions asked. Also, although a particular
informal judgment of the value of a trade may be quite incorrect, many small
transactions are typically made. Therefore, the net value of proprietary pro-
cess know-how given and received will probably not be strongly biased for or
against any participating firm.
In general, informal know-how exchange between rival and noncompeting
firms is the most effective form of cooperative R & D when (1) the needed
know-how exists in the hands of some member of the trading network, when
(2) the know-how is proprietary only by virtue of its secrecy, and when (3) the
value of a particular traded module is too small to justify an explicit negoti-
ated agreement to sell, license, or exchange. Taken together, the second and
third conditions have the effect of insuring that the know-how recipient will be
free to use the information he obtains without fear of legal intervention by the
donor firm. Since much technical knowledge key to progress consists of small,
incremental advances, the universe bounded by these three conditions is
likely to be a substantial one.
Formal know-how sale or licensing is likely to be preferred when the know-
how in question (1) already exists and (2) is of considerable value relative to
89
The Sources of Innovation
the costs of a formal transaction. Experts in the oil and chemical industries
report that they may engage in formal licensing and sale rather than informal
exchange precisely because the value of the know-how in question is typically
very high.
Agreements to perform cooperative R & D must be the form of coopera-
tion of choice when (1) the needed information does not exist within any firm
willing to trade, license, or sell, and when (2) individual firms do not find it
worthwhile to develop modules of the needed know-how independently. This
would occur when know-how modules have no profitable applications as mod-
ules. Perhaps this is often the case, but I am not sure. Perhaps most "new"
know-how in fact consists largely of existing modules of know-how developed
for other purposes.
Discussion
Up to this point, I have discussed informal know-how trading as a firm-level
phenomenon involving the trading of innovation-related know-how between
technical personnel. But the model of such trading that I have presented here
contains no inherent restriction as to the nature of know-how traded or as to
the nature of the trading parties. Perhaps, therefore, the phenomenon exists
and makes sense for individuals and other types of organizations and for other
types of know-how as well. A certain answer must await appropriate research,
but there are intriguing suggestions that informal know-how trading may be
quite general. For example, Collins12 has shown that scientists employed by
nonprofit laboratories (university and governmental) selectively revealed data
to colleagues interested in know-how related to the TEA laser. He noted that
individuals and laboratories made conscious and careful discriminations as to
what know-how would be revealed to what recipient, and he noted also that
"nearly every laboratory expressed a preference for giving information only to
those who had something to return."1 3
In arenas where know-how trading is applicable, what is its significance?
An answer to this question also awaits further research. However, it seems to
me possible that it may be an important phenomenon in some arenas. For
example, Mansfield14 recently found a general pattern of rapid transfer of
proprietary industrial information from the firms that generated it to others,
and he suggested that this might be caused by uncompensated "leakage" of
such information to the detriment of the originating firms. But is it perhaps,
instead, an indicator of massive know-how trading? If the observed informa-
tion transfer is indeed simple leakage without compensation to the informa-
tion generator, then, as Mansfield suggests, innovators face very serious
appropriability problems. If, on the other hand, the rapid transfer observed is
the result of information trading such as that present in the steel industry,
then we may be observing a phenomenon that actually increases firms' ability
to appropriate benefit from technical know-how.
Whatever the generality of know-how trading turns out to be I am sure that
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further study will also show it can be quite an elaborate phenomenon. Thus,
we will surely find know-how trading strategies more complex than those
envisioned in a simple, two-party Prisoner's Dilemma, and we may find multi-
ple layers of trading incentives and strategies active in a single trading entity
as well.
One obvious form of know-how trading strategy builds on the observation
that many firms often have a unit of know-how that a trader needs-and some
of these potential trading partners may be direct rivals and some not. I have
focused on trading between rivals here simply because it is the costliest form
of trade and thus potentially the hardest to explain as economically rational
behavior. However, in the real world it is likely that firms would prefer to
trade know-how with nonrivals because traded information may then have
less or no competitive cost.
Second, consider that firms can form coalitions with respect to know-how
trading and restrict that activity to only a subset of firms in their industry. This
can be profitable under some conditions. For example, the members of such a
club may collectively face a more elastic demand than is faced by the industry
as a whole and therefore may gain greater returns from (cost-reducing) innova-
tions. Thus, U.S. or Japanese semiconductor producers may decide it is to
their advantage to trade know-how with other domestic firms but not with
foreign firms--or vice versa.
Third, consider that strategies may exist that are possible because the sub-
stance of know-how trades is knowledge. For example, firms may find a
strategy of relatively rapid know-how trading may pay dividends. Such a
strategy is based on the assumption that a firm receiving know-how in trade
does not care who originally developed it: The recipient only cares that it has
value to him. Since only novel know-how is valuable to a recipient (there is no
value in getting the same information twice), a strategy of rapid know-how
trading might allow a firm to exchange its own know-how and the know-how
developed by others (obtained from earlier trades) to firms that still find that
know-how novel, a trading advantage.
As an example of multiple levels of trader existing within a given trading
entity, consider that trading between firms such as that I have documented
here must also involve a different level of trader-the individuals who actually
conduct the trades. It is clear that the benefits to individuals actually engaged
in the trading may differ from those of the firms that employ them. (But they
do not necessarily differ. Consider that an engineer's motive in trading may be
in part to improve his potential marketability to competing firms. In this case,
a strategy of being helpful to colleagues employed by competitors without
hurting the interests of one's present firm by revealing vital proprietary se-
crets might be optimal for the individual trader as well as for the firm since no
one wants to hire someone with a penchant for betrayal.) Research may show
that the benefits expected by the different active interests in a trading entity
are correlated in important arenas. When this is the case, simple models such
as the one presented here may provide us with a practical ability to predict the
role of know-how trading in the distributed innovation process.
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We have now found that differences in the functional source of innovation
may be caused by potential innovators' differing expectations of innovation-
related rents. If this is so, we may be able to shift the likely source of innova-
tion by changing the distribution of these expectations of rent. Further, by
understanding how expected innovation rent is distributed, we may be able to
predict the likely source of innovation. And if we can do these two fundamen-
tal things, we are well on the way to learning how to manage an innovation
process that is actually or potentially distributed across different functional
loci.
In this chapter, I report on a natural test of the possibility of shifting the
functional source of innovation. In chapter 8, I report on a test of the possibil-
ity of predicting the sources of innovation.
Nature of the Test
The test I present here deals with a variable that is under the control of firm
managers: product design. It starts with the observation that product manufac-
turers can design products that are easy (inexpensive) or difficult (expensive)
for users to modify. An easily modified product will lower a user's expected
costs for innovations that require such modification. In contrast, of course, a
product that is expensive for users to modify should raise users' expected
costs. Such differences in expected costs should in turn affect users' expecta-
tions of innovation-related rents and cause differences in the amount of inno-
vation activity involving product modification.
We should be able to observe this hypothesized shift in the functional
source of innovation if we can contrast two products-one difficult for users to
modify and one easy for users to modify-that are otherwise identical in
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function and market. Stan Finkelstein and I explored such a situation in the
clinical chemistry-analyzer market. 
Automated clinical chemistry analyzers are used in clinical laboratories to
determine the level of a chemical such as glucose in blood. These automated
machines execute a clinical chemistry test method by first combining a sample
of blood serum with one or more reagents and then allowing the chemical
reaction(s) thus initiated to take place under prescribed conditions of time
and temperature. Substances that would interfere with the test measurement
are removed (by precipitation, dialysis, or other means), the test measure-
ment is made (through techniques such as colorimetry, fluorometry, etc.),
and, finally, the test result is recorded. Automated clinical chemistry analysis
has been widely adopted in the United States.2
This study focuses on the three brands of automated clinical chemistry
analyzer equipment that were most frequently present in hospital clinical
chemistry laboratories at the time of our study: Technicon, Du Pont, and
Abbott.3 Each of these analyzers was designed by its manufacturer to perform
a number of common tests. Users who wish to use them to develop and
perform other tests must use different chemicals and/or modify the analyzers
themselves to achieve their goals.
According to clinical chemistry autoanalyzer users and manufacturers,
Technicon and Abbott analyzers were much easier to adapt to new test devel-
opment than were Du Pont analyzers. The cause of this difference lay in the
design of each product's reagent handling system. Let me briefly describe that
aspect of each brand's design to make the matter clear.4
Technicon automated clinical chemistry analyzer models are based on a
principle called continuous flow analysis, and they function much like minia-
ture, continuous-process chemical plants. They consist of functional modules-
for example, pump modules, dialyzer modules, and so on-interconnected by
plastic tubing. Reagent is placed in bulk reservoirs and metered into the system
as needed.
Abbott Laboratories automated clinical chemistry analyzers meter the
amount of reagent(s) needed for a particular test from bulk reservoirs into
transparent, disposable, open-topped plastic cups called cuvettes. Samples of
patient serum are also metered into these cuvettes and the desired test reac-
tion proceeds.
Finally, the Du Pont aca clinical chemistry analyzer uses reagents supplied
in single-use, disposable, factory-sealed test packs. These are quite complex.
Each contains a plastic pouch divided internally into several sealed compart-
ments that contain reagent quantities needed for a single execution of a par-
ticular test. The pouch itself is sealed to a plastic header that contains a serum
inlet valve and, for tests that require it, a built-in chromatographic column.
All chemical reactions required for a test occur inside the disposable test
pack; the pack itself is never opened during its transit through the analyzer
equipment.
On the basis of the above capsule descriptions, the reader may find it
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reasonable that users could experiment with novel test methods and equip-
ment configurations by using Technicon or Abbott Laboratories equipment at
a lower cost than could be done by using Du Pont equipment. Technicon
modules may be purchased and connected up in a novel configuration. In both
Technicon and Abbott equipment, desired novel reagents can be mixed up in
bulk, placed in the machine's reservoirs, and the machine will meter out the
proper amount of reagent(s) and serum needed for each test.
Setting up the same novel method on Du Pont equipment, on the other hand,
requires buying empty test packs from Du Pont (empty packs without chromato-
graphic columns are for sale-these have a standard use in machine calibra-
tion). The experimenter would then inject precisely measured amounts of
reagent into selected compartments of each pack and reseal each compartment.
If 1000 tests were required for an experiment, experimenters would have to
perform these operations on 1000 packs. This would clearly be a great effort,
and the end result would be the accomplishment of a reagent proportioning
task Technicon and Abbott Laboratories equipment does automatically.
The Test
Users employ automated clinical chemistry analyzers in research that (1) do
and (2) do not utilize tests available commercially from the analyzer manufac-
turer. In the latter case, the needed test is developed by an equipment user.
Since (as we saw) Du Pont equipment is relatively difficult for innovating
users to modify, we hypothesize that research projects using Du Pont analyz-
ers will involve a lower proportion of user-developed tests than will research
using either Technicon or Abbott analyzers. That is, we hypothesize that one
particular type of user innovation activity only, that involving modifications to
equipment or test reagents, will be shifted away from Du Pont analyzers
owing to their design.
Stan Finkelstein and I tested this hypothesis through a search of the medical
research literature. If the hypothesis was correct, we would expect that the
ratio of research reports involving commercial versus user-developed test
methods should be significantly higher when Du Pont analyzers are used in
the research than when Technicon or Abbott Laboratories analyzers are used.
First, we searched the medical literature through MEDLINE, a computer-
ized index of approximately 3000 biomedical journals, to identify all research
articles that reported using a Technicon, Abbott Laboratories, or Du Pont
clinical chemistry autoanalyzer. 5 Next, we read the identified articles and
coded those that did in fact use one of these analyzer brands shown in Table
7-1.
As can be seen in Table 7-1, the results of our test support the hypothesis.
Thus, it does appear that product manufacturers can influence the amount of
user-innovation activity related to their products by raising or lowering the
cost of such activity, in this instance, through product design.
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TABLE 7-1. Frequency of User Research Articles
Involving Commercially Supplied Versus User-Developed Chemical Methods
as a Function of Manufacturer of Analyzer Used
Number of articles found reporting research by user personnel only that involved:a
Performed on automated clini-
(A) Manufacturer- (B)Researcher-developed cal chemistry analyzers manu-
commercialized chemistriesb chemistries factured by
20 22 Technicon
6 0 Du Pont
5 6 Abbott Laboratories
Null hypothesis that (B)-type research as likely on Du Pont
analyzers as others is rejected:
Du Pont vs. Technicon p = .02;
Du Pont vs. Abbott Labs p = .04
(Fisher exact)
aSince our goal is to determine user ability to, and interest in, modifying manufacturer-supplied chemistries for the
analyzer brands listed, papers written by manufacturer personnel only or written jointly by manufacturer and user
personnel are excluded. One paper thus excluded was written jointly by a Du Pont and a user research team and
reported a researcher-developed chemistry for the aca (Gopal S. Rautela and Raymond J. Liedtke, "Automated
Enzymic Measurement of Total Cholesterol in Serum," Clinical Chemistry 24, no. 1 [January 1978]: 108-14).
Through telephone inquiry we determined that the test packs used in the research were filled to the researchers'
specifications at the Du Pont plant. This would be in line with the hypothesis that users would find it hard to do this
task themselves.
bDu Pont commercial chemistries are always sold to the user prepackaged. Technicon commercialized chemistries
may be either premixed reagents sold to the user or Technicon-specified formulas the user mixes up in his
laboratory as needed.
Commercial Value of User-Developed Innovations
Of course, the practical value manufacturers can expect from shifting user
innovation toward, or away from, their products depends on the potential
commercial value of such user innovation. Do users really develop product
modifications of general commercial interest? We explored this question in
the case of both user-developed test methods and user-developed hardware
modifications to Technicon and Du Pont clinical chemistry autoanalyzers.
Commercial Value of User-Developed Test Methods
The test methods of most commercial interest to manufacturers of clinical
chemistry analyzers are generally those most frequently used (purchased) by
clinical chemistry laboratories. To get an indication of the commercial poten-
tial of user activity in test development, we decided to explore whether users
had played a role in adapting some of these frequently purchased test methods
for use on the Technicon and Du Pont brands of autoanalyzer.
Our sample of commercially successful test methods consisted of the 20
most frequently performed clinical chemistry tests.6 Automated methods for
performing 20 of these tests were offered by Technicon and 18 by Du Pont;
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TABLE 7-2. Source of Automated Test Methods Offered Commercially by
Equipment Manufacturersa
Equipment Reagent
% User Userb Manufacturer Manufacturer NA Total
Du Pont aca 0% 0 18 0 0 18
Technicon
SMACr 74 14 4 1 1 20
Null hypothesis that test method
source identical for both brands of
analyzers rejected:
p < .0001 (Fisher exact)
aAs explained in the text, the sources of adaptation to automation of the 20 clinical chemistry tests performed
with greatest frequency in 1977 were examined. These 20 tests are: albumin; alk phos; calcium; chloride;
cholesterol; CPK; creatinine; direct (conjugated) bilirubin; total bilirubin; glucose; SGOT; SGPT; inorganic
phos; LDH; potassium; sodium; total protein; triglycerides; urea nitrogen; uric acid. All 20 are offered by
Technicon; Du Pont offers all but potassium and sodium.
In the numerous instances in which manufacturers offered different methods for the performance of a given
test on their equipment with the passage of time, the method offered for use on the most recently introduced
equipment model at the time of the study was the one we selected for inclusion in the sample. At the time of the
study, Technicon's latest model was trade named the SMAC High-Speed Computer-Controlled Biochemical
Analyzer. Du Pont's latest model at the time of the study was trade named aca (automated clinical analyzer).
bThe measure used: Did one or more users publish a report of adaptation and clinical use of a given test method
on Du Pont or Technicon equipment with publication date prior to the date of commercial introduction of that
method (as reported by equipment manufacturer personnel)? Those who performed the adaptation to automa-
tion of a test method were coded on the basis of professional affiliation. In the event, all except three innovating
users were found to be professionals working in clinical laboratories of nonprofit hospitals. The three excep-
tions worked in an automated methods laboratory in a Veteran's Administration hospital and were affiliated
with that hospital's clinical laboratory.
cSome of the user-developed methods offered by Technicon to SMAC users had been developed by users on
earlier models of Technicon equipment.
this yielded a sample of 38 adaptations to automation for study. (Because Du
Pont and Technicon analyzers have different performance characteristics, the
task of developing an analyzer-compatible version of test method x for a Du
Pont analyzer is independent of the task of developing an analyzer-compatible
version of the same method for a Technicon analyzer.) The innovation history
of each sample member was determined through literature searches and struc-
tured interviews with manufacturer and user personnel.7
In Table 7-2 we see that user-developed adaptations of test methods to
automation clearly can be commercially important. For example, 74% of the
test methods most frequently used by Technicon customers were first adapted
for use on Technicon autoanalyzers by users. In sharp contrast [p < .0001], no
user-developed adaptations to automation were commercialized by Du Pont.
As we saw earlier, the Du Pont equipment was not hospitable to user innova-
tion and attracted very little of it. Users may develop product modifications
that the manufacturer will find commercially valuable but only if they have an
incentive to modify that manufacturer's products.
The Sources of Innovation
TABLE 7-3. Du Pont and Technicon Autoanalysis
Equipment Innovations
Du Pont autoanalyzer equipment innovations
Basic innovation: Original Du Pont aca autoanalyzer
MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS
Improved computer control
Technicon continuous flow autoanalyzer equipment innovations









Shorter flow path/type C membrane
Type H membrane
REDUCTION IN SAMPLE CARRYOVER
Reduced tubing diameter
Air/sample/reagent pump synchronization
Multiple bubble introduction by sample probe




Commercial Value of User-Developed Hardware
We have seen that user-developed test protocols have value for autoanaly-
zers. What about user-designed modifications to the analyzer hardware? We
examined this matter in the case of Technicon and Du Pont analyzers.
Our sample for this test consisted of the first autoanalyzer hardware com-
mercialized by Technicon and Du Pont and all major improvements to that
hardware commercialized by each manufacturer over the succeeding years
(Table 7-3). We identified these innovations by first talking to manufacturer
personnel to identify all hardware changes they had commercialized. Then,
expert users and manufacturer personnel helped us determine which of these
had resulted in a significant increment in functional utility to the user of the
analyzers.
As Table 7-3 shows, we were able to identify 13 Technicon equipment
improvement innovations that met our selection criterion, but only 1 such
innovation in the instance of Du Pont. (Du Pont equipment, we found, had
remained almost unchanged since its commercial introduction.8) Data collec-
tion to determine the functional sources of innovation for this sample was
done by telephone interviewing of expert user and manufacturer personnel.
Since Technicon was the only firm we examined that did commercialize a
98
Shifting the Functional Source of Innovation
TABLE 7-4. Sources of Clinical Chemistry Autoanalyzer Innovations
Innovation Developed by
Analyzer Type % User User Manufacturer NA Total
Du Pont aca
Basic innovation 0% 0 1 0 1
Major improvements 0 0 1 0 1
Technicon continuous flow
Basic innovation 100 1 0 0 1
Major improvements 46 6 7 0 13
TOTAL 7 9 0 16
significant number of improvements to analyzer hardware, we can only really
test whether user-developed hardware innovations sometimes had commer-
cial value in the instance of the Technicon equipment. As Table 7-4 shows,
user hardware innovations did in fact have significant commercial value for
Technicon. The first clinical chemistry autoanalyzer they produced (in fact it
was the first instrument of this type introduced by any firm) was developed by
a user. Also, almost half of the hardware improvements Technicon commer-
cialized during the succeeding years were developed by users. In contrast, the
basic Du Pont aca and the single major hardware improvement to that ana-
lyzer commercialized over the years was developed by Du Pont itself.
Note that the absence of commercialized user-developed hardware modifi-
cations for the Du Pont aca is not a consequence of Du Pont policy. Instead, it
is likely that users simply did not develop hardware modifications for the aca
because this was more costly than modifying functionally similar Technicon
equipment. As we mentioned earlier, the Technicon equipment consisted of
modules interconnected by plastic tubing. In contrast, the Du Pont analyzer is
of a more monolithic design.
Summary
Our data on innovation in clinical chemistry autoanalyzers suggest that the
functional source of innovation related to particular products can be modified
or shifted by actions taken by individual firms.
In the particular sample we have studied, product design appears to be the
principal cause of the interbrand difference in the user innovation activity we
observed. But any variable that will create shifts in the locus of innovation-
related rents, however achieved, should be usable to achieve similar effects.
Thus, product manufacturers who wish to increase user innovation affecting
their products might offer free equipment or design help to the innovating
users they want to encourage. Or, if they want to decrease user innovation,
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they could refuse to service products users have modified, seal the product
physically to hamper user access, or refuse user requests for technical help,
circuit diagrams, software source codes, and so on.
Finally, although our study has dealt with a product manufacturer's ability
to affect user innovation, the reasoning is perfectly general: Users, suppliers,
and even government (for example, through tax policy and/or government
purchases and/or government-sponsored research) should also be able to en-
gage in shifting the functional source of innovation if they wish to do so.
Notes
1. Eric von Hippel and Stan N. Finkelstein, "Analysis of Innovation in Automated
Clinical Chemistry Analyzers," Science & Public Policy 6, no. 1 (February 1979): 24-
37.
2. Approximately 44% of the 677 million clinical chemistry tests performed in
hospital laboratories in the United States in 1977 were performed on automated clini-
cal chemistry analyzers. In 1975 there were some 14,000 clinical chemistry laboratories
in the United States. Some 50% of these were affiliated with hospitals, 30% were
affiliated with doctors' offices, and 20% were independent commercial entities. Their
aggregate revenues were on the order of $6.2 billion in 1975 and growing at 10%
annually (L. H. Smithson, Overview of the Clinical Laboratory Market [Menlo Park,
Calif.: Stanford Research Institute, n.d.]).
3. IMS America, Semi-Annual Audit of Laboratory Tests, Hospital Labs, January-
June 1977, July-December 1977 (Ambler, Penn.: IMS America, n.d.). IMS America
generates its data by surveying and auditing laboratory records of 204 of the approxi-
mately 5800 nonfederal, short-term hospitals in the United States. The sample of
hospital laboratories used is stratified by bed size, region, and hospital ownership.
(IMS restricts circulation of its data; it is used here by permission of the company.)
4. Technicon offers several models of automated clinical chemistry analyzer, Ab-
bott Laboratories offers two models, and Du Pont one. All models of a given manufac-
turer are fitted with the same type of reagent proportioning system; however, as a
consequence, we will be able to examine the hypothesis by collecting data on analyzer
brands rather than on specific models of analyzer.
5. To accomplish this MEDLINE was instructed to search for articles that were
coded under the subject heading "autoanalysis" and that also contained the words "Du
Pont," "Technicon," or "Abbott Laboratories" in the article's title and/or abstract.
(Although this procedure flags only the subset of research publications that name the
autoanalyzer equipment manufacturer in the title and/or abstract, it is reasonable that
the ratio of the two types of research usage we are considering will be equal in this
subset and in the total population.)
Autoanalysis is the subject heading assigned in the MEDLINE thesaurus (National
Library of Medicine, Medical Subject Headings-Annotated Alphabetical List, 1978
[Springfield, Mass.: U.S. Department of Commerce, National Technical Information
Service (No. PB-270-894), 1978]) to research using clinical chemistry autoanalyzers.
This thesaurus of standard subject headings is maintained for use by indexers and
those wishing to retrieve citations. The MEDLINE system provides access to articles
published in most biomedical journals (approximately 3000) from 1964 to 1975 to the
present by title, author, subject heading, and textword. Subject headings are assigned
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to articles by indexers working for the National Library of Medicine as a function of
the subject matter dealt with in the article. Textwords are simply any word or combina-
tion of words. Users of the system may specify textwords and the system will flag
articles containing them in the article title and/or abstract.
6. IMS America, Semi-Annual Audit of Laboratory Tests, Hospital Labs, Table
6-2.
7. Work on each case began with a search of the literature for papers related to the
test method being examined. Authors whose papers were found germane were con-
tacted and were told that we were interested in exploring the early history of the
application of the innovation discussed in their papers to autoanalyzers. We then asked
them for the names of fellow experts with user and/or manufacturer and/or other
relationships to the innovation who might have a good knowledge of these matters.
Finally, we asked these initial contacts for any knowledge they themselves might have
on the topic of interest. Individuals identified for us by initial contactees were con-
tacted in turn, and the process repeated until we felt we had the well-documented
information we needed.
We found that FDA-required product labeling was an especially useful data source
for all sampled innovations. (Product labeling is U.S. Food and Drug Administration
[FDA] terminology for methods-related information suppliers of clinical test chemistry
methods must make available to their customers. Among other things, product label-
ing contains references to research behind those methods.)
8. Several equipment changes to the Du Pont aca are listed in B. W. Perry, et al.,
A Field Evaluation of the Du Pont Automatic Clinical Analyzer (Wilmington, Del.: Du
Pont, n.d.; 2nd printing, January 1978). We did not include these changes in our
sample because they were made prior to the commercial introduction of that analyzer.
If we had included them, they would not have changed our finding that users do not
develop equipment improvement innovations for the aca. Although the monograph
authors were users at the University of Alabama Medical Center in Birmingham, the
equipment problems uncovered by their evaluation work were rectified by changes
developed by Du Pont personnel.
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Predicting the Source of Innovation:
Lead Users
The experiment I report on in this chapter involves predicting the source of
innovation, user innovation in this instance. The specific context of the work
addresses an important problem facing industrial and consumer marketing
research: How can one accurately determine user needs for new products
(processes and services) in fields that are rapidly changing such as those
touched by high technology?
I begin by exploring the difficulty faced by marketing research in more
depth. Then, I spell out the lead user methodology I have proposed as a
solution.I Finally, I describe a first application of the method.2
Root of the Problem: Marketing Research
Constrained by User Experience
Users selected to provide input data to consumer and industrial market analy-
sis have an important limitation: Their insights into new product (and process
and service) needs and potential solutions are constrained by their real-world
experience. Users steeped in the present are, thus, unlikely to generate novel
product concepts that conflict with the familiar.
The notion that familiarity with existing product attributes and uses inter-
feres with an individual's ability to conceive of novel attributes and uses is
strongly supported by research into problem solving (Table 8-1). We see that
experimental subjects familiar with a complicated problem-solving strategy are
unlikely to devise a simpler one when this is appropriate. 3 Also, and germane to
our present discussion, we see that subjects who use an object or see it used in a
familiar way are strongly blocked from using that object in a novel way. 4 Fur-
thermore, the more recently objects or problem-solving strategies have been
used in a familiar way, the more difficult subjects find it to employ them in a
novel way.5 Finally, we see that the same effect is displayed in the real world,
where the success of a research group in solving a new problem is shown to
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depend on whether solutions it has used in the past will fit that new problem.6
These studies thus suggest that typical users of existing products-the type of
user-evaluators customarily chosen in market research-are poorly situated
with regard to the difficult problem-solving tasks associated with assessing
unfamiliar product and process needs.
As illustration consider the difficult problem-solving steps potential users
must go through when asked to evaluate their need for a proposed new
product. Since individual industrial and consumer products are only compo-
nents in larger usage patterns that may involve many products and since a
change in one component can change perceptions of, and needs for, some or
all other products in that pattern, users must first identify their existing
multiproduct usage patterns in which the new product might play a role.
Then, they must evaluate the new product's potential contribution to these.
(E.g., a change in the operating characteristics of a computer may allow users
to solve new problem types if they also make changes in software and perhaps
in other, related products and practices.) Next, users must invent or select the
new (to them) usage patterns that the proposed new product makes possible
for the first time and then evaluate the utility of the product in these patterns.
Finally, since substitutes exist for many multiproduct usage patterns (e.g.,
many forms of problem analysis are available in addition to the novel ones
made possible by a new computer), the user must estimate how the new
possibilities presented by the proposed new product will compete (or fail to
compete) with existing options. This problem-solving task is clearly a very
difficult one, particularly for typical users of existing products whose familiar-
ity with existing products and uses interferes with their ability to conceive of
novel products and uses when invited to do so.
The constraint of users to the familiar pertains even in the instance of
sophisticated marketing research techniques such as multiattribute mapping
of product perceptions and preferences.7 Multiattribute (multidimensional)
marketing research methods, for example, describe users' (buyers') percep-
tion of new and existing products in terms of a number of attributes (dimen-
sions). If and as a complete list of attributes is available for a given product
category, the users' perception of any particular product in the category can
be expressed in terms of the amount of each attribute they perceive it to
contain, and the difference between any two products in the category can be
expressed as the difference in their attribute profiles. Similarly, users' prefer-
ences for existing and proposed products in a category can in principle be built
up from their perceptions of the importance and desirability of each of the
component product attributes.
Although these methods frame user perceptions and preferences in terms of
attributes, they do not offer a means of going beyond the experience of those
interviewed. First, for reasons discussed earlier, users are not well positioned
to accurately evaluate novel product attributes or accurately quantify familiar
product attributes that lie outside the range of their real-world experience.
Second, and more specific to these techniques, there is no mechanism to
induce users to identify all product attributes potentially relevant to a product
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TABLE 8-1. The Effect of Prior Experience on Users' Ability to Generate or
Evaluate Novel Product Possibilities
Impact of Prior Experience on
Study Nature of Research Ability to Solve Problems
Two groups of subjects (n = )
were given a series of problems in-
volving water jars, for example,
"If you have jars of capacity A,
B, and C, how can you pour wa-
ter from one to the other so as to
arrive at amount D?" Subject
group 1 was given five problems
solvable by formula, B - A - 2C
= D. Next, both groups were
given problems solvable by that
formula or by a simpler one (e.g.,
B-C = D).
The ability to use familiar objects
in an unfamiliar way was tested
by creating five problems that
could only be solved by that
means. (E.g., one problem could
be solved only if subjects bent a
paper clip provided them and
used it as a hook.) Subjects were
divided into two groups. One
group of problem solvers saw the
crucial object being used in a fa-
miliar way (e.g., the paper clip
holding papers), the other did not
(e.g., the paper clip was simply ly-
ing on a table unused).
Replication of Duncker, above.
Replication of Duncker, above.
The variation of functional fixed-
ness with time was observed by
the following procedure. First,
subjects were allowed to use a fa-
miliar object in a familiar way.
Next, varying amounts of time
were allowed to elapse before sub-
jects were invited to solve a prob-
lem by using the object in an unfa-
miliar way.
Government agencies often buy R
& D services through a request
for proposal (RFP) that states the
problem to be solved. Interested
81% of experimental subjects
who had previously learned a com-
plex solution to a problem type ap-
plied it to cases where a simple so-
lution would do. No control
group subjects did so (p = NA).a
Subjects were much more likely
to solve problems requiring the
use of familiar objects in unfamil-
iar ways if they had not been
shown the familiar use just prior
to their problem-solving attempt.
Duncker called this effect "func-
tional fixedness" (n = 14; p =
NA).a
Duncker's findings confirmed (n
= 25;p < .05).
Duncker's findings confirmed (n
= 57;p < .01).
If a subject uses an object in a fa-
miliar way, he or she is partially
blocked from using it in a novel
way (n = 32; p < .02). This block-
ing effect decreases over time.
Bidders were significantly more
likely to propose a successful task
approach if they had prior experi-













bidders respond with proposals rather than prior experience with
that outline their planned solu- inappropriate approaches only.
tions to the problem and its com-
ponent tasks. In this research the
relative success of eight bidders'
approaches to the component
tasks contained in two RFPs was
judged by the agency buying the
research (n = 26). Success was
then compared to prior research
experience of bidding laborato-
ries.
Source: Eric von Hippel, "Lead Users: A Source of Novel Product Concepts," Management Science 32, no. 7
(July 1986), 794-95. Copyright 1986, The Institute of Management Sciences, 290 Westminster Street, Provi-
dence, Rhode Island 02903.
aThis relatively early study showed a strong effect but did not provide a significance calculation or present data
in a form that would allow one to be determined without ambiguity.
category, especially attributes that are currently not present in any extant
category member. To illustrate this point, consider two types of such meth-
ods, similarity-dissimilarity ranking and focus groups.
In similarity-dissimilarity ranking, data regarding the perceptual dimen-
sions by which users characterize a product category are generated by asking a
sample of users to compare products in that category and assess them in terms
of their similarity and dissimilarity. In some variants of the method, the user
interviewee specifies the ways in which the products are similar or different.
In others, the user simply provides similarity and difference rankings, and the
market researcher determines-through his personal knowledge of the prod-
uct type in question, its function, the marketplace, and so on-the important
perceptual dimensions that must be motivating the user rankings obtained.
The similarity-dissimilarity method clearly depends heavily on an analyst's
qualitative ability to interpret the data and correctly identify all the critical
dimensions. Moreover, by its nature, this method can only explore percep-
tions derived from attributes that exist in, or are associated with, the products
being compared. Thus, if a group of evaluators is invited to compare a set of
cameras and none has a particular feature-say, instant developing-then the
possible utility of this feature would not be incorporated in the perceptual
dimensions generated. That is, the method would have been blind to the
possible value of instant developing prior to Edwin Land's invention of the
Polaroid camera.
In focus group methods, market researchers assemble a group of users
familiar with a product category for a qualitative discussion of perhaps two
hours' duration. The topic for the focus group, which is set by the market
researcher, may be relatively narrow (e.g., users' perceptions of x brand) or
somewhat broader (e.g., camera users' perceptions of the photographic expe-
rience). The ensuing discussion is recorded, transcribed, and later reviewed
by the researcher, whose task it is to identify the important product attributes
that have implicitly or explicitly surfaced during the conversation. Clearly, as
with similarity-dissimilarity ranking, the utility of information derived from
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focus group methods depends heavily on the individual analyst's ability to
accurately and completely abstract from the interview data the attributes
users feel important in products.
In principle, however, the focus group technique need not be limited to
only identifying attributes already present in existing products, even if the
discussion is nominally focused on these. For example, a topic that extends
the boundaries of discussion beyond a given product to a larger framework
could identify attributes not present in any extant product in a category under
study. If discussion of the broad topic mentioned earlier, camera users' percep-
tions of the photographic experience, brought out dissatisfaction with the time
lag between picture taking and receipt of the finished photograph, the analyst
would be in possession of information that could induce him to identify an
attribute not present in any camera prior to Land's invention, instant film
development, as a novel and potentially important attribute.
But how likely is it that an analyst will take this creative step? And, more
generally, how likely is it that either method discussed above, similarity-
dissimilarity ranking or focus groups, will be used to identify attributes not
present in extant products of the type being studied, much less a complete list
of all relevant attributes? Neither method contains an effective mechanism to
encourage this outcome, and discussions with practitioners indicate that in
present-day practice, identification of any novel attribute is unlikely.
Finally, both of these methods conventionally focus on familiar product
categories. This restriction, necessary to limit the number of attributes that
completely describe a product type to a manageable number, also tends to
limit market research interviewees to attributes that fit products within the
frame of existing product categories. Modes of transportation, for example,
logically shade off into communication products as partial substitutes ("I can
drive over to talk to him, or I can phone"), into housing and entertainment
products ("We can buy a summer house, or go camping in my recreational
vehicle"), indeed, into many other of life's activities. But since a complete
description of life cannot be compressed into 25 attribute scales, the analysis is
constrained to a narrower-usually conventional and familiar-product cate-
gory or topic. This has the effect of rendering any promising and novel cross-
category new product attributes less visible to the methods I have discussed.
In sum, then, we see that marketing researchers face serious difficulties if
they attempt to determine new product needs falling outside of the real-world
experience of the users they analyze.
Lead Users as a Solution
In many product categories, the constraint of users to the familiar does not
lessen the ability of marketing research to evaluate needs for new products by
analyzing typical users. In the relatively slow-moving world of steels and
autos, for example, new models often do not differ radically from their imme-
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diate predecessors. Therefore, even the "new" is reasonably familiar and the
typical user can thus play a valuable role in the development of new products.
In contrast, in high technology industries, the world moves so rapidly that
the related real-world experience of ordinary users is often rendered obsolete
by the time a product is developed or during the time of its projected commer-
cial lifetime. For such industries I propose that lead users who do have real-
life experience with novel product or process needs are essential to accurate
marketing research. Although the insights of lead users are as constrained to
the familiar as those of other users, lead users are familiar with conditions that
lie in the future for most-and, so, are in a position to provide accurate data
on needs related to such future conditions.
I define lead users of a novel or enhanced product, process, or service as
those who display two characteristics with respect to it:
1. Lead users face needs that will be general in a marketplace, but they face
them months or years before the bulk of that marketplace encounters
them, and
2. Lead users are positioned to benefit significantly by obtaining a solution to
those needs.
Thus, a manufacturing firm with a current strong need for a process innova-
tion that many manufacturers will need in two years' time would fit the
definition of lead user with respect to that process.
Each of the two lead user characteristics provides an independent contribu-
tion to the type of new product need and solution data such users are hypothe-
sized to possess. The first specifies that a lead user will possess the particular
real-world experience manufacturers must analyze if they are to accurately
understand the needs the bulk of the market will have tomorrow. Users "at
the front of the trend" typically exist simply because important new technolo-
gies, products, tastes, and other factors related to new product opportunities
typically diffuse through a society, often over many years, rather than impact
all members simultaneously.8
The second lead user characteristic is a direct application of the hypothesis
we have focused on in this book, and assumes it correct: Users who expect
high rents from a solution to a need under study should (I reason) have been
driven by these expectations to attempt to solve their need. This work in turn
will have produced insight into the need and perhaps useful solutions that will
be of value to inquiring market researchers.
In sum, then, lead users are users whose present strong needs will become
general in a marketplace months or years in the future. Since lead users are
familiar with conditions that lie in the future for most others, I hypothesize
that they can serve as a need-forecasting laboratory for marketing research.
Moreover, since lead users often attempt to fill the need they experience, I
hypothesize that they can provide valuable new product concept and design
data to inquiring manufacturers in addition to need data.
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Testing the Method
Glen Urban and I, with the able assistance of our student, David Israel-
Rosen, have conducted a prototype lead user market research study in the
rapidly changing field of computer-aided-design (CAD) products. (Over 40
firms compete in the $1 billion market for CAD hardware and software. This
market grew at over 35% per year over the period 1982 to 1986 and the
forecast is for continued growth at this rate for the next several years.) Within
the CAD field, we decided to specifically focus on CAD systems used to
design the printed circuit (PC) boards used in electronic products, PC-CAD.
Printed circuit boards hold integrated circuit chips and other electronic
components and interconnect these into functioning circuits. PC-CAD sys-
tems help engineers convert circuit specifications into detailed printed circuit
board designs. The design steps that are, or can be, aided by PC-CAD
include component placement, signal routing (interconnections), editing and
checking, documentation, and interfacing to manufacturing. The software
required to perform these tasks is quite complex and includes placement and
routing algorithms and sophisticated graphics. Some PC-CAD manufacturers
sell only such software, whereas others sell systems that include both special-
ized computers and software. (Important suppliers of PC-CAD in 1985 in-
cluded IBM, Computervision, Redac, Calma, Scicards, and Telesis.)
The method Urban and I used to identify lead users and test the value of the
data they possess in the PC-CAD field involved four major steps: (1) identify
an important market or technical trend, (2) identify lead users with respect to
that trend, (3) analyze lead user data, and (4) test lead user data on ordinary
users. I will discuss each in turn.
Identifying an Important Trend
Lead users are defined as being in advance of the market with respect to a
given important dimension that is changing over time. Therefore, before one
can identify lead users in a given product category of interest, one must
specify the underlying trend on which these users have a leading position.
To identify an "important" trend in PC-CAD, we sought out a number of
expert users. We identified these by telephoning managers of the PC-CAD
groups of a number of firms in the Boston area and asking each: "Whom do
you regard as the engineer most expert in PC-CAD in your firm?" "Whom in
your company do group members turn to when they face difficult PC-CAD
problems?"9 After our discussions with expert users, it was qualitatively clear
to us that an increase in the density with which chips and circuits are placed on
a board was, and would continue to be, a very important trend in the PC-
CAD field. Historical data showed that board density had in fact been
steadily increasing over a number of years. And the value of continuing
increases in density was clear. An increase in density means that it is possible
to mount more electronic components on a given size printed circuit board.
This in turn translates directly into an ability to lower costs (less material is
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used), to decreased product size, and to increased speed of circuit operation
(signals between components travel shorter distances when board density is
higher).
Very possibly, other equally important trends exist in the field that would
reward analysis, but we decided to focus on this single trend in our study.
Identifying Lead Users
To identify lead users of PC-CAD systems capable of designing high-density
printed circuit boards, we had to identify that subset of users: (1) who were
designing very high-density boards now and (2) who were positioned to gain
especially high benefit from increases in board density. We decided to use a
formal telephone-screening questionnaire to accomplish this task, and we
strove to design one that contained objective indicators of these two hypothe-
sized lead user characteristics.
Printed circuit board density can be increased in a number of ways and each
offers an objective means of determining a respondent's position on the trend
toward higher density. First, the number of layers of printed wiring in a
printed circuit board can be increased. (Early boards contained only 1 or 2
layers but now some manufacturers are designing boards with 20 or more
layers.) Second, the size of electronic components can be decreased. (A re-
cent important technique for achieving this is surface-mounted devices that
are soldered directly to the surface of a printed circuit board.) Finally, the
printed wires, vias, that interconnect the electronic components on a board
can be made narrower and packed more closely. Questions regarding each of
these density-related attributes were included in our questionnaire.
Next, we assessed the level of benefit a respondent might expect to gain by
improvements in PC-CAD by means of several questions. First, we asked
about users' level of satisfaction with existing PC-CAD equipment, assuming
that high dissatisfaction would indicate expected high benefit from improve-
ments. Second, we asked whether respondents had developed and built their
own PC-CAD systems rather than buy the commercially available systems
such as those offered by IBM or Computervision. (We assumed, as we noted
previously, that users who make such innovation investments do so because
they expect high benefit from resulting PC-CAD system improvements.)
Finally, we asked respondents whether they thought their firms were innova-
tors in the field of PC-CAD.
The PC-CAD users interviewed were restricted to U.S. firms and selected
from two sources: A list of members of the relevant professional engineering
association (IPCA) and a list of current and potential customers provided by a
cooperating supplier. Interviewees were selected from both lists at random.
We contacted approximately 178 qualified respondents and had them answer
the questions on the phone or by mail if they preferred. The cooperation rate
was good: 136 screening questionnaires were completed. One third of these
1)9
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Lead Nonlead Lead Non- Non-
User User User lead (A) lead (B)
Indicators of user position on
PC-CAD density trend
Use surface mount? 87% 56% 85% 7/ 100%
Average line width
(mils) 11 15 11 17 13
Average layers (number) 7.1 4.0 6.8 4.2 4.4
Indicators of user-expected
benefit from PC-CAD improvement
Satisfactiona 4.1 5.3 4.1 5.2 5.2
Indicators of related user
innovation
Build own PC-CAD? 87 % 1 % 100 % 0 %/ 0 %
Innovativenessb 3.3 2.4 3.2 2.1 2.8
First use of CAD (year) 1973 1980 1973 1980 1979
Number in cluster 38 98 33 46 57
a7-point scale-high value more satisfied.
b4-point scale-high value more innovative.
were completed by engineers or designers, one third by CAD or printed
circuit board managers, 26% by general engineering managers, and 8% by
corporate officers.
Simple inspection of the screening questionnaire responses showed that fully
23% of all responding user firms had developed their own in-house PC-CAD
hardware and software systems. This high proportion of user-innovators that
we found in our sample is probably characteristic of the general population of
PC-CAD users. Our sample was well dispersed across the self-stated scale with
respect to innovativeness: 24% indicated they were on the leading edge of
technology, 38% up-to-date, 25% in the mainstream, and 13% adopting only
after the technology is clearly established. This self-perception is supported by
objective behavior with respect to the alacrity with which our respondents
adopted PC-CAD.
We next conducted a cluster analysis of screening questionnaire data relat-
ing to the hypothesized lead user characteristics in an attempt to identify a
lead user group. The two- and three-cluster solutions are shown in Table 8-2.
Note that these analyses do, indeed, clearly indicate a group of respondents
who combine the two hypothesized attributes of lead users and that, effec-




In the two-cluster solution, what we term the lead user cluster is, first,
ahead of nonlead users in the trend toward higher density. That is, lead users
report more use of surface-mounted components, use of narrower lines, and
use of more layers than do members of the nonlead cluster. Second, lead users
appear to expect higher benefit from PC-CAD innovations that would allow
them even further progress. That is, they report less satisfaction with their
existing PC-CAD systems (4.1 vs. 5.3, with higher values indicating satisfac-
tion). Strikingly, 87% of respondents in the lead user group report building
their own PC-CAD system (vs. only 1% of nonlead users) in order to obtain
improved PC-CAD system performance." Lead users also judged them-
selves to be more innovative (3.3 vs. 2.4 on the four-statement scale with
higher values more innovative), and they were in fact earlier adopters of PC-
CAD than were nonlead users.
Note that 28% of our respondents are classified in this lead user cluster.
The two clusters explained 24% of the variation in the data.
In the three-cluster solution the lead user group was nearly unchanged, but
the nonlead group was separated into two subgroups. Nonlead group A had the
lowest use of surface-mounted components, the widest line widths, the fewest
layers, and the latest year of adoption, and it rated itself as lowest on adoption
of innovations. Nonlead group B also differed from the lead user group in the
expected ways, except for one anomalous result: Nonlead group B showed a
higher usage of surface-mounted components than did the lead user group. In
the three-cluster solution 37% of the variation is explained by cluster member-
ship.
A discriminant analysis indicated that building one's own system was the
most important indicator of membership in the lead user cluster. (The dis-
criminant analysis had 95.6% correct classification of cluster membership.
The standardized discriminant function of coefficients were: build own .94,
self-stated innovativeness .27, average layers .25, satisfaction -. 23, year of
adoption -. 16, surface mounting .152.)
Analyzing Lead User Insights
The next step in our analysis was to select a small sample of the lead users
identified in our cluster analysis to participate in a group discussion to develop
one or more concepts for improved PC-CAD systems. Experts from five lead
user firms that had facilities located near MIT were recruited for this group.
The firms represented were Raytheon, DEC, Bell Laboratories, Honeywell,
and Teradyne. Four of these five firms had built their own PC-CAD systems.
All were working in high-density (many layers and narrow lines) applications
and had adopted the CAD technology early.
The task set for this group was to specify the best PC-CAD system for laying
out high-density digital boards that could be built with current technology. (To
guard against the inclusion of "dream" features impossible to implement. we
conservatively allowed the concept the group developed to include only fea-
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tures that one or more of them had already implemented in their own organiza-
tions. No one firm had implemented all aspects of the concept, however.)
The PC-CAD system concept developed by our lead user creative group
integrated the output of PC-CAD with numerically controlled printed circuit
board manufacturing machines; had easy input interfaces (e.g., block dia-
grams, interactive graphics, icon menus); and stored data centrally with access
by all systems. It also provided full functional and environmental simulation
(e.g., electrical, mechanical, and thermal) of the board being designed and
could design boards of up to 20 layers, route thin lines, and properly locate
surface-mounted devices on the board.
Testing Product Concept Perceptions and Preferences
From the point of view of marketing research, new product need data and
new product solutions from lead users are only interesting if they are pre-
ferred by the general marketplace.
To test this matter, we decided to determine PC-CAD user preferences for
four system concepts: the system concept developed by the lead user group,
each user's own in-house PC-CAD system, the best commercial PC-CAD
system available at the time of the study (as determined by a PC-CAD system
manufacturer's competitive analysis), and a system for laying out curved
printed circuit boards. (This last was a description of a special-purpose system
that one lead user had designed in-house to lay out boards curved into three-
dimensional shapes. This is a useful attribute if one is trying to fit boards into
the oddly shaped spaces inside some very compact products, but most users
would have no practical use for it. In our analysis of preference, we think user
response to this concept can serve to flag any respondent tendency to prefer
systems based on system exotica rather than practical value in use.)
To obtain user preference data regarding our four PC-CAD system con-
cepts, we designed a new questionnaire that contained measures of both
perception and preference. First, respondents were asked to rate their cur-
rent PC-CAD system on 17 attribute scales. (These were generated by a
separate sample of users through triad comparisons of alternate systems,
open-ended interviews, and technical analysis. Each scale was presented to
respondents in the form of a five-point agree-disagree judgment based on a
statement such as "my system is easy to customize."' Next, each respondent
was invited to read a one-page description of each of the three concepts we
had generated (labeled simply, J, K, and L) and rate them on the same
scales. All concepts were described as having an identical price of $150,000
for a complete hardware and software workstation system able to support
four users. Next, rank-order preference and constant-sum paired comparison
judgments were requested for the three concepts and the existing system.
Finally, probability-of-purchase measures on an 11-point Juster scale were
collected for each concept at the base price of $150,000, with alternate prices
of $100,000 and $200,000.
Our second questionnaire was sent to 173 users (the 178 respondents who
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TABLE 8-3 Test of All Respondents' Preferences
Among Four Alternative PC-CAD System Concepts
Average
Probability of
PC-CAD Concept % First Choice Constant Suma Purchase
Lead user
group concept 78.6 2.60 51.7
Respondents'
current PC-CAD 9.8 1.87 b
Best system
commercially available 4.9 0.95 20.0
User system
for special
application 6.5 0.77 26.0
aWarren S. Torgerson, Theory and Methods of Scaling (New York: Wiley, 1958).
bProbability of purchase only collected across concepts.
qualified in the screening survey less the 5 user firms in the creative group).
Respondents were called by phone to inform them that a questionnaire had
been sent. After telephone follow-up and a second mailing of the question-
naire, 71 complete or near-complete responses were obtained (41%) and the
following analyses are based on these.' 2
Lead User Concept Preferred
As can be seen from Table 8-3, our analysis of the concept questionnaire
showed that respondents strongly preferred the lead user group PC-CAD
system concept over the three others presented to them: 78.6% of the sample
selected the lead user creative group concept as their first choice. The constant
sum scaled-preference value was 2.60 for the concept developed by the lead
user group. This was 35% greater than users' preference for their own current
system and more than twice as great as the preference for the most advanced
existing commercially available product offering.
The concept created by the lead user group was also generally preferred by
users over their existing systems (significant at the 10% level based on the
preference measures: t = 12 for proportion first choice and t = 2.1 for con-
stant sum). And, the lead user group concept was significantly preferred over
the special application user system developed to lay out curved boards. (The
lead user concept was significantly better than the user-developed special
application system on all measures at the 10% level (t = 12.3 for first choice, t
= 7.9 for preference, and t = 8.5 for probability). 13
Respondents maintained their preferences for the lead user concept even
when it was priced higher than competing concepts. The effects of price were
investigated through the probability of purchase measures collected at three
prices for each concept. For the lead user concept, probability of purchase
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TABLE 8-4. Concept Preferences of Lead Versus Nonlead Users
Average
Probability of
% First Choice Constant Sum Purchase
PC-CAD Concept Lead Nonlead Lead Nonlead Lead Nonlead
Lead user
group concept 92.3% 80.5% 3.20 2.37 53.1 51.2
Respondents'
current PC-CAD 7.7 11.1 2.64 1.56 0 0
Best system
commercially available 0 2.8 0.67 1.06 10.2 23.9
User system
for special
application 0 5.6 0.52 0.87 16.3 29.9
increases from 52.3% to 63.0% when the price is decreased from $150,000 to
$100,000 (t = 2.3) and drops to 37.7% when the price is increased to $200,000.
Probability of purchase of the lead user concept was significantly higher at all
price levels (t greater than 4.4 in all paired comparisons), and it was preferred
to the best available concept even when the specified price was twice as high
as that of competing concepts. All three concepts displayed the same propor-
tionate change in purchase probability as the price was changed from its base
level of $150,000. The probability measures indicate substantial price sensitiv-
ity and provide a convergent measure on the attractiveness of the concept
based on lead user solution content.
Similarity of Lead and Nonlead User Preferences
The needs of today's lead users are typically not precisely the same as the
needs of the users who will make up a major share of tomorrow's predicted
market. Indeed, the literature on diffusion suggests that in general the early
adopters of a novel product or practice differ in significant ways from the bulk
of the users who follow them.'4 However, in this instance, as Table 8-4
shows, the product concept preferences of lead users and nonlead users were
very similar.
A comparison of the way in which lead and nonlead users evaluated PC-
CAD systems showed that this similarity of preference was deep-seated. An
examination of the PC-CAD attribute ratings and factor analyses derived
from each group showed five factors in each that explained the same amount
of variation (67.8 for lead users and 67.7 for nonlead users). The factor
loadings were also similar for the two groups, and their interpretation sug-
gested the same dimension labels. Also, analysis showed that each group




From the point of view of marketing research, I think that the results of this
first test of a lead user method must be seen as encouraging. Lead users with
the hypothesized characteristics were clearly identified; a novel product con-
cept was created based on lead user insights and problem-solving activities;
and the lead user concept was judged to be superior to currently available
alternatives by a separate sample of lead and nonlead users. I should point
out, however, that the high level of actual product innovation found among
lead users of PC-CAD can only be expected in product areas where the rents
expected by such users are sufficient to induce user innovation. Where ex-
pected user benefit is less, need data available from lead users should still be
more accurate and richer in "solution content" than data from nonlead users,
but it may not include prototype products such as those we have observed in
the study of PC-CAD.
From the point of view of my underlying hypothesis regarding the ability to
predict the sources of innovation on the basis of innovators' related expecta-
tions of rent, I think the lead user application has also shown very encourag-
ing results. Users who identified themselves as dissatisfied with existing prod-
ucts were shown more likely to be involved in developing new ones responsive
to their need.
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In the course of collecting and cross-checking the data on the functional locus of
innovation coded in chapters 2 and 3 of this book, my students and I generated what
were, in effect, minihistories of the innovations under study. I present these as a data
base for others interested in exploring the functional source of innovation. Also, I will
mention here a few hard-won bits of practical wisdom regarding data collection on this
topic that others may find useful.
Suggestions Regarding Data Collection
Our data collection strategy was built around the principle of independent access to the
various functional categories of firms and individuals that may have played a role in an
innovation under study. That is, we searched all likely functional communities directly
for evidence of possible involvement in the innovation process. This strategy proved
very useful. Since "success has many fathers," reliance on a single data source as a
gateway to others would almost certainly have introduced a systematic bias to our
data. For example, a data collection strategy that relied on manufacturers to point out
the innovation-related contributions of users and others would predictably produce
findings biased toward the contributions of manufacturers.
A short anecdote may serve to give the reader the flavor of the problem. We
inquired of the first responsible project engineer at what was apparently the first
commercial manufacturer of an instrument as to its innovation history. "All mine," he
said. When we ran a computer search of the chemical literature, we found three
articles, published several years earlier, describing experimental versions of the innova-
tion and the interesting results obtained through their use. A parallel search of trade
journal ads produced information about a functionally equivalent Canadian instru-
ment that had apparently been introduced to the marketplace prior to the introduction
of the U.S. company's version.
We went back to our original informant to discuss these findings. He admitted, in
honest confusion, that he was aware of the articles and product we had found, but he
had not mentioned them to us because he did not consider them to be related to his
innovation. To be sure, the function and operating principles of the experimental
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devices and the Canadian instrument were the same, but the product engineering of his
device was entirely his own-and this had been the innovation, in his view.
Our data collection procedure used three major elements for each sampled innova-
tion involved. First, we started our work by identifying the first firm to develop and
commercialize an innovation and the date of commercial introduction. This was done
by asking personnel of firms now manufacturing "me-too" devices if they knew which
was the first firm to commercialize them and by asking expert users, manufacturers,
and suppliers of the innovation. Ambiguities were cleared up by searching the techni-
cal or trade literature and seeking the earliest references to, advertisements regarding,
and/or new product announcements for the innovation in question.
When the first commercializing firm and the date of commercialization were firmly
established, we interviewed, either in person or by telephone, everyone at the commer-
cializing firm who claimed substantial, firsthand knowledge of the innovation work. As
a routine part of a structured interview, each interviewee was asked to provide the
names of others he or she felt might have some important information to contribute,
and these individuals were contacted in turn.
Second, in addition to our interviews with personnel in the first commercializing
firms, we searched the technical and trade literature of the period prior to the first
commercial innovation, seeking references to products or processes functionally simi-
lar to the innovation being studied. Authors of relevant articles were contacted and
interviewed, usually by telephone. As part of the interview, they were asked for the
names of knowledgeable people in user and other firms, and these people were subse-
quently contacted.
Where we could identify very early purchasers of the commercialized innovation, we
also canvassed these firms for information regarding their contribution, if any, to the
innovation and/or the name of individuals who might have information bearing on the
innovation process, and so forth. Thus, insofar as possible, we interviewed all key
individuals identified as being directly involved with each innovation studied.
Third, information from the various sources was assembled, discrepancies were
noted, and interviewees with information bearing on the discrepancies were contacted
again for further discussion. Some areas of confusion were cleared up by means of this
process; others were not. We always attempted to accurately preserve differing ver-
sions of events where they existed and did not attempt to determine "who was right."
If proper coding of an item would require us to make such a judgment, we coded it NA
(not available).
Other Matters
Our ability to accurately collect data regarding innovations that had often been devel-
oped a number of years ago was greatly enhanced by our definition of an innovator
(discussed earlier) as one who had developed an innovative product or process to a
concrete, usable state. Development work carried to this stage usually leaves many
contemporaneously generated documents and artifacts-reports, publications, proto-
types-that are most helpful in reconstructing innovation process events.
Defining the innovator as the first to develop a product or process to a useful state
ignores any contributions by firms or individuals that might be valuable but that do not
reach the state of implementation. This is a loss, but I am not sure how much of a loss.
As has been shown by studies such as Project Hindsight,1 any innovation is built upon
a great web of earlier developments in technology and science stretching back, cer-
tainly, to the Renaissance and even earlier. Is it meaningful to try and allocate the
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locus of a particular innovation among all these precursors? For our purposes I think
not. We are interested in determining who builds upon prior art and science to produce
very specific innovations. In practice I find that at this level of specificity the people
who innovate have a particular need or market in mind that can only be served by a
completed device. Since there is little benefit to be derived from half an innovation, I
find, as a practical matter, that innovators strive to bring the innovations they work on
to a useful-state. Therefore, my definition of the innovator as the firm or individual
that first develops a specific product or process to a completed, useful state appears to
accurately reflect the realities of this type of innovation.
Finally, in this book I focus on the three innovation categories of user, supplier, and
manufacturer. For other research purposes, one might wish to segment such major
categories more finely. For example, one could divide the general category of users of
scientific instruments into subsets such as research users, teachers, and pupils-each of
which use a scientific instrument in different ways. Such subsets will cause no trouble
in analyses of the functional locus of innovation as long as they are made clear. For
example, if the distinction between research/user of scientific instruments and teacher/
user is understood, one can separately analyze the innovation-related benefits atten-
dant upon firms holding each of these types of functional relationship and determine
the appropriate role of each in the innovation process. (Appropriate segmentation of
user subsets can sometimes be aided by application of segmentation techniques often
used by marketing researchers. 2)
Notes
1. Raymond S. Isenson, "Project Hindsight: An Empirical Study of the Sources of
Ideas Utilized in Operational Weapon Systems," in Factors in the Transfer of Technol-
ogy, ed. William H. Gruber and Donald G. Marquis (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1969), 155-76.
2. Glen L. Urban and John R. Hauser, Design and Marketing of New Products
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1980).
DATA SET FOR SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENT INNOVATIONS
The data set for scientific instrument innovations contains information on the gas
chromatograph (GC), the nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spectrometer, and the
transmission electron microscope (TEM). In the following pages the innovation his-
tory of each basic instrument type is followed by histories of the major improvements
to it that have been commercialized over the years. The histories of all the innovations
not coded NA in chapter 2 will be found in this data set, with two exceptions: the
innovations identified in our study of ultraviolet absorption spectrophotometry and all
minor improvements to electron microscopy. In these instances we have no data
beyond that presented in chapter 2.
Selection criteria for the samples in this data set will be found in chapter 2.
THE GAS CHROMATOGRAPH (GC)
The gas chromatograph is used for the quantitative and qualitative analysis of un-
known chemical mixtures. It provides much faster and more accurate analyses than
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earlier wet chemistry methods and is very frequently used. The GC operates by
physically separating a chemical mixture into its components. The mixture is passed in
the form of a gas over a surface containing a partitioning agent that selectively adsorbs
its components, thus slowing the rate of movement of some components relative to
others. The adsorbing surface is contained in a column. Gas injected into one end of
the column as a mixture (combined with carrier gas) emerges from the other end as a
sequence of components that pass in series through any of several types of detectors
for identification.
Development History
The analytical technique embodied in the gas chromatograph-gas-liquid partition
chromatography--can be traced back to a 1941 paper by A.J.P. Martin and R.L.M.
Synge. 2 This paper suggested the idea and described the process theoretically-an
accomplishment for which the authors were later awarded a Nobel Prize. In 1952
Martin suggested to A. T. James-a young scientist wol 'ng with him at the Mill Hill
Medical Research Laboratories in England-that he try to build a GC along the lines
outlined in the 1941 paper. James did, and the device worked. Their initial paper in
1952 described the apparatus and gave some results they had obtained with it.3
After the publication of the James and Martin article, many scientists in industry and
universities began to experiment with the technique. By 1953-54 there were perhaps
two dozen homemade GC devices in use around the world.4
Commercialization
Commercial GCs were first produced in 1954-55. British instrument firms (among them
Griffin and George, London, and Metropolitan Vickers Electrical Company, Manches-
ter) began producing commercial instruments before American firms entered the mar-
ket. The first two American firms to begin commercial production in the spring of 1955
were the Burrell Corporation and the Perkin-Elmer Corporation. 5 In the instance of
Perkin-Elmer, we have learned by interview that the transfer to commercialization
came about as follows: Dr. Z. V. Williams, vice president of Perkin-Elmer, often
traveled to England on company business and had contact among scientists there
(among other products, Perkin-Elmer sold spectrophotometers to industrial and univer-
sity scientists). On one of these trips in 1953, Williams heard of gas-liquid partition
chromatography and suggested to Harry Hausdorff, a young employee of Perkin-Elmer
with a background in chemistry, that it might be worth looking into as a commercial
possibility. Hausdorff made a trip to England, visited laboratories where homebuilt gas
chromatography apparatus was in use, attended a lecture at Oxford on gas chromatogra-
phy, and came back (he recalls) with about 20 journal articles on the subject. Dr.
Hausdorff was convinced of the commercial potential of gas chromatography after his
trip but had some difficulty interesting his superiors in the project (they noted that the
device had no optical parts and optics was, aftei all, Perkin-Elmer's forte). Eventually,
Hausdorff prevailed and was allowed to proceed with commercialization. 6
Notes
1. National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, Chemistry:
Opportunities and Needs (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1965).
2. A.J.P. Martin and R.L.M. Synge, "A New Form of Chromatogram Employing
Two Liquid Phases ," Biochemical Journal 35 (1941): 1358-68.
3. A. T. James. and A.J.P. Martin, "Gas-liquid Partition Chromatography: The
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Separation and Micro-estimation of Volatile Fatty Acids from Formic Acid to Dodeca-
noic Acid," Biochemical Journal 50 (1952): 679-90.
4. L. J. Ettre, personal communication while at Perkin-Elmer Corp., Norwalk,
Conn.
5. L. J. Ettre, "The Development of Gas Chromatography," Journal of Chromatog-
raphy 112 (1975): 1-26.
6. Dr. H. H. Hausdorff, interview at Perkin-Elmer Corp., Norwalk, Conn., 1971.
Temperature Programming
Raising the temperature of the gas chromatograph allows one to analyze substances
that volatilize at greater-than-room temperatures. Raising the temperature of the
instrument during an analysis in a preprogrammed manner allows one to rapidly
analyze a sample containing components of very different boiling points. This very
useful improvement in performance was obtained by modifying the various compo-
nents of the GC to tolerate high temperatures and then installing the entire instrument
in a special-purpose temperature-controlled oven.
Development History
Courtney Phillips appears to have originated temperature programming at Oxford
University in 1952.1 Gas chromatographs with temperature programming were then
built by numerous users for their own use. Over 20 publications related to temperature
programming appeared in the literature prior to the appearance of the first commercial
instrument on the marketplace. 2
Commercialization
Frank Martinez was a glass blower at Du Pont who was involved in constructing
several of the temperature-programmed GCs built at Du Pont for the use of that firm's
scientists. When interest was shown in the device by non-Du Pont people, Martinez
left the firm and formed F&M Scientific Corporation in April 1959 to manufacture a
Du Pont-designed instrument that included temperature programming-reportedly a
design developed by S. Dal Nogare, a Du Pont scientist. This new firm was the first to
offer temperature-controlled GCs for commercial sale.
Notes
1. J. Griffiths, D. James, and C. Phillips, "Gas Chromatography," Analyst 77 (De-
cember 1952): 897-904.
2. W. E. Harris and H. W. Habgood, "Annotated Bibliography of Programmed
Temperature Gas Chromatography: 1952-1964, Part I. 1952-1961," Journal of Gas
Chromatography 4 (April 1966): 144-46.
Capillary Column
The capillary column is a long thin tube coated on the inside with partitioning agent.
When the short, granule-packed column normally used in a GC is replaced by such a
column, the sensitivity and resolution of the instrument is significantly improved.
To understand the reason for this improvement I must elaborate slightly on my
previous description of the operating principles of a GC. As noted earlier, GCs sepa-
rate the components of a gaseous chemical mixture by passing them through a granule-
packed column. A coating on the granules adsorbs (clings to) some components of the
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mixture more strongly than others. The more strongly a particular component is ad-
sorbed, the more slowly it is moved through the column by the stream of carrier gas
passing steadily through the column. The result of this effect is the physical separation
of the components of the mixture, with those least strongly adsorbed emerging from
the end of the column first.
Efficiency of component separation attainable by the GC is clearly lessened because
the gas must pass through a column of granules: Gas flow will inevitably be less rapid
between some granules than others, and some paths available to gas molecules through
the maze of granules will be longer than others. The capillary column, being a simple
hollow cylinder coated with partitioning agent, greatly reduces these sources of error.
Development History
The capillary column concept was developed by Marcel Golay, a mathematician who
worked as a consultant to Perkin-Elmer Corporation. According to Harry Hausdorff,I
the gas chromatography group at Perkin-Elmer set Golay the task of developing a
"universal" column. Their motivation was to reduce the number of types of specialized
prepared granular columns they had to keep in inventory to service customer needs.
Golay presented the concept of the capillary column in 1957.2 In 1958 both he3 and a
user group4 presented practical results obtained with such columns at a conference in
Amsterdam.
Commercialization
Perkin-Elmer, the employer of Golay, observed the strong user interest displayed in
capillary columns and quickly commercialized them, first making them available in
March 1959.
Because Perkin-Elmer was the first to develop the capillary column as well as the
first to commercialize it, the firm was in a position to patent the innovation and did so.
Interestingly, however, tentative moves to enforce the patent were abandoned in the
face of user protests. According to Perkin-Elmer interviewees, scientist/users working
at nonprofit institutions felt that free sharing of innovations was the established norm
in the field.
Notes
1. Dr. H. H. Hausdorff, conversation with the author at Perkin-Elmer Corp.,
Norwalk, Conn., 1975.
2. M. Golay, in Gas Chromatography 1957: Lansing Symposium, ed. V. Coates, H.
Noebels, and I. Fogerson (New York: Academic Press, 1958), 1-13.
3. M. Golay, in Gas Chromatography 1958: Amsterdam Symposium, ed. D. Desty
(London: Butterworths, 1958), 36-55.
4. G. Dijkstra and J. de Gory, in D. Destry, ed., Gas Chromatography 1958, 36-55.
Silanization of Column Support Material
As mentioned earlier, gas chromatography is a physical means of separating chemical
mixtures. Since any chemical reactions that occur within the instrument itself will cause
false results, it is important that materials that come into contact with the sample be
chemically inert with respect to it. A major step forward in rendering the granular
column packing material (column support material) inert to important classes of sample
material was a chemical treatment called silanization. Prior to the introduction of a
quality-controlled silanized support material, investigators had great difficulty analyz-
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ing such materials as steroids, alkaloids, bile acids, and pesticides with the GC: These
had tended to break down owing to chemical interaction with earlier support materials.
Development History
Silanization of column support material was developed by E. C. Horning, M. Horning,
W. Van den Heuvel, and others, at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Bethesda,
Maryland, and at Baylor University College of Medicine, Houston, Texas. The work
was performed in the 1958-64 period and resulted in numerous publications.
Commercialization
In the late 1950s and 1960s, E. C. Horning and his colleagues were involved with work
on atherosclerosis at NIH. For their work they required special chemicals that were
available from only two companies. One of these, Applied Science Libraries, State
College, Pennsylvania, was a company founded by a former chemistry professor, Dr.
Arthur Rose, of Pennsylvania State University. Horning became a customer of Ap-
plied Science Laboratories and a friendship developed between Horning and Rose.
When Horning developed his novel column support material, he convinced the firm to
enter the business of producing column supports. 
The problems involved in producing large batches of Horning's silanized column
support material of consistent quality were addressed and solved by Applied Science
Laboratories personnel. Gas-Chrome Q, the first commercially produced silanized
column support material, was introduced to the market by Applied Science Laborato-
ries in December 1964. The first competitors, F&M Scientific and Johns Manville,
entered the market approximately one and a half years later.
Note
1. Dr. E. C. Horning, Baylor University College of Medicine, Houston, Tex., and
R. Kruppa, Applied Science Laboratories, State College, Penn., telephone interviews,
1975.
Thermal Conductivity (TC) Detectors
When components of a chemical mixture being analyzed emerge from the partitioning
column of a gas chromatograph, their presence must be detected. The first commercial-
ized means of performing this task was the thermal conductivity detector. "Basically, a
TC cell consists of a block (usually metallic) containing a cavity through which the
carrier gas flows. A heated element (thermistor or resistance wire) is positioned in the
cavity and loses heat to the block at a rate depending upon the TC of the gas. Since
absolute measurement of TC is difficult, a differential means is usually employed.
Thus, for example, two cavities can be drilled in the block, each one containing an
element. Only carrier gas passes through one cavity and the column effluent passes
through the other."' The difference in thermal conductivity is then measured in terms
of the difference in electrical resistance of the two detectors.
Development History
The use of thermal conductivity for detection of gases is itself an old concept. It was
apparently first applied to gas chromatography in 1954 by N. H. Ray, a scientist at ICI
in England.2 Ray visited the A.J.P. Martin and A. T. James laboratory (according to
Martin, the originator of gas chromatography) and expressed an interest in examining
compounds that were not detectable by titration. Martin suggested that Ray try a TC
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detector as this technique had already been used successfully by Caesson at Shell
Amsterdam as a detector for his gas-solid chromatograms. 3
Commercialization
Knowledge of thermal conductivity detection was widespread and detectors embody-
ing this principle were installed on all of the early commercial gas chromatographs
introduced around 1954 by firms such as Griffin and George, London, and Perkin-
Elmer, Norwalk, Connecticut.
Notes
1. Alexander E. Lawson, Jr., and James M. Miller, "Thermal Conductivity Detec-
tors in Gas Chromatography," Journal of Gas Chromatography 4 (August 1966): 273-
84.
2. N. H. Ray, "Gas Chromatography: II. The Separation and Analysis of Gas
Mixtures by Chromatographic Methods," Journal of Applied Chemistry 4 (February
1954): 82-85.
3. A. Martin, "The Past, Present and Future of Gas Chromatography," in Gas
Chromatography 1957: Lansing Symposium, ed. V. Coates, H. Noebels, and I.
Fogerson (New York: Academic Press, 1958), 237-47.
Argon Ionization Detector
The argon ionization detector is a great deal more sensitive to the presence of organic
compounds than earlier detectors. Its operation is based on the observation by J. E.
Lovelock that argon when used as a carrier gas could be ionized and then would
transfer significant amounts of excitation energy to any organic vapors that were
present. A beta ray ionization detector could then be used to sensitively detect any
such transfer as a loss in ionization current. This in turn would signal the presence of
the vapor.1
Development History
Lovelock, an English scientist without organizational affiliation, had been working
with fatty acids in red blood cells and had difficulty in achieving good results with
existing detectors used in gas chromatography. He turned his attention to this problem
and developed the argon ionization detector around 1957.2 Lovelock patented the
innovation.
Commercialization
The argon ionization detector was first commercialized in 1959 by W. G. Pye and
Company, an English manufacturer of gas chromatographs. Pye had begun production
of GCs early on, 1954-55. Many of their customers, the petrochemical companies, had
complained about problems with existing detectors (e.g., gas density balance and ther-
moconductivity). Pye knew of Lovelock's work with the new argon ionization detec-
tor, sought him out, and licensed his detector. Shortly after Pye's commercial introduc-
tion, other instrument makers began producing this detector by license from
Lovelock. 2
Notes
1. J. E. Lovelock, "A Sensitive Detector for Gas Chromatography," Journal of
Chromatography 1 (1958): 35-46.
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2. Dr. S. R. Lipsky, Yale Medical School, New Haven, Conn., telephone interview,
1975. (Lovelock and Lipsky collaborated in 1958-59 to develop the electron capture
detector. Based on his acquaintanceship with Lovelock, Lipsky felt able to comment
on the history of the argon ionization detector.)
Electron Capture Detector
The'electron capture detector is an improved version of the argon ionization detector
(see preceding entry). It has great sensitivity to materials such as pesticides, which are)
often present in samples in trace amounts only.
Development History
Lovelock and Lipsky met at a meeting of the New York Academy of Sciences in 1958-
59 and decided to combine their efforts in order to improve GC detectors. Lovelock
went to New Haven for six months as Lipsky was affiliated with the Yale Medical
School. Together, they developed the electron capture detector.l
Commercialization
The electron capture detector was first commercialized by Barber-Coleman in 1960.
Information on the device was transferred to Barber-Coleman by Lipsky who con-
sulted for that firm. Shortly after the Barber-Coleman introduction, many firms began
producing electron capture detectors.
Lipsky reports that his relationship with Barber-Coleman developed as a result of
that firm being a supplier of GCs to his laboratory. 2
Notes
1. J. E. Lovelock and S. R. Lipsky, "Electron Affinity Spectroscopy-A New
Method for the Identification of Functional Groups in Chemical Compounds Sepa-
rated by Gas Chromatography," American Chemical Society Journal 82, no. 1 (20
January 1960): 431-33.
2. Dr. S. R. Lipsky, Yale Medical School, New Haven, Conn., telephone interview,
1975.
Flame Ionization Detector
The flame ionization detector was introduced at approximately the same time as the
argon ionization detector (see above) and provided similar major advantages over
previously existing detectors used in gas chromatography. The detector measures the
effect of organic vapors on the electrical conductivity of a flame.
Development History
The flame ionization detector was developed independently and nearly simultaneously
by two groups: I. G. McWilliam and R. A. Dewar of ICI; and J. Harley of the
Engineering Research Section, South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation,
with M. Nel and V. Pretorius of the University of Pretoria, South Africa. 2 There is
some controversy over which group had priority. Patent rights, however, were ob-
tained by ICI and licenses were issued by that firm to instrument manufacturers.
Commercialization
The flame ionization detector was described at an international symposium on gas
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chromatography in 19583 and also in an article in Nature in 1958.4 Instrument firms
immediately saw the commercial value of the idea and proceeded with commercializa-
tion even before the ICI patent was issued. The first firm to put the detector in the
marketplace was apparently Perkin-Elmer Corporation in September 1959.
Notes
1. I. G. McWilliam and R. A. Dewar, "Flame Ionization Detector for Gas Chroma-
tography," Nature 181, no. 4611 (15 March 1958): 760.
2. J. Harley, W. Nel, and V. Pretorius, "Flame Ionization Detector for Gas
Chromatography," Nature 181, no. 4603 (18 January 1958): 177-78,
3. I. McWilliam and R. Dewar, in Gas Chromatography 1958: Amsterdam Sympo-
sium, ed. D. Desty (London: Butterworths, 1958), 142-45.
4. McWilliam and Dewar, "Flame Ionization Detector," 760.
Mass Spectrograph Detector
The mass spectrograph is an instrument that distinguishes molecules on the basis of
their mass. It is an important instrument and widely utilized in its own right. Applying
it as a detector to the gas chromatograph was a logical step but difficult to achieve-the
gaseous output of a gas chromatograph is normally too large and too rapidly changing
for a mass spectrograph to utilize. Several successful means (e.g., a device that sepa-
rates the high volume of carrier gas from the sample gas) have been used to adapt the
output of the gas chromatograph to the input requirements of the mass spectrograph.
Development History
The first successful linkage of a mass spectrograph and a gas chromatograph appears to
be that of R. S. Gohlke, a researcher at Dow Chemical.1 In 1957 Gohlke used a Bendix
time of flight mass spectrograph owned by Dow as his detector. In 1960, L. P.
Lindeman and J. L. Annis published a means to link the gas chromatograph to a
magnetic mass spectrograph.2 In the early 1960s Ryhage also developed and patented a
jet separator linkage for this purpose. 3
Commercialization
When Gohlke published his paper on the linkage he had accomplished between the gas
chromatograph and the Bendix time of flight mass spectrograph, Bendix personnel
heard about the achievement and produced a commercial version in January 1959.
Their system was, however, expensive and difficult to operate and was not a commer-
cial success. In the early 1960s Ryhage attempted to commercialize his linking device
on his own and failed. A Swedish company, LKB, then obtained exclusive rights to the
Ryhage patent and successfully commercialized the device in November 1965.
Notes
1. R. Gohlke, American Chemical Society, Division of Petroleum Chemistry Pre-
prints 2, no. 4, D77-D83 (1957).
2. L. P. Lindeman and J. L. Annis, "Use of a Conventional Mass Spectrometer as a
Detector for Gas Chromatography," Analytical Chemistry 32, no. 13 (December
1960): 1742-49.
3. Klaus Biemann, Professor of Chemistry, MIT, conversation at MIT, Cambridge,
Mass., 1975. Professor Biemann developed a GC/MS linking device that has been
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commercialized by both Consolodated Electrodynamics and Varian Associates, and he
is intimately familiar with related work in this field.
Gas Sampling Valve with Loop
The gas sampling valve with loop is a simple innovation that had the effect of making
the gas chromatograph into an instrument that could conveniently yield quantitative as
well as qualitative results. To achieve this end it is necessary to inject a precisely
known volume of the sample. The means chosen was the addition of a prechamber to
the input valve of the gas chromatograph in the form of a loop of metal tubing. A gas
sample of known volume and pressure was accumulated in this prechamber prior to
injection into the gas chromatograph itself.
Development History
Investigators interested in achieving quantitative results with a gas chromatograph
utilized various ad hoc means to this end. To my knowledge, however, no one made an
addition to the instrument to accomplish that end conveniently and routinely prior to
H. H. Hausdorff, E. Watson, and Bresky of Perkin-Elmer Corporation; they devel-
oped the gas sampling valve with loop at Perkin-Elmerl and assigned it to that firm. E.
Watson received a patent for the innovation. 2
Commercialization
Perkin-Elmer's gas chromatography group was motivated to develop the gas sampling
valve with loop by the commercial possibilities associated with making the GC a more
convenient instrument to use in quantitative studies. The same commercial assessment
led them to quickly commercialize the valve, first making it available in 1956.
Notes
1. H. H. Hausdorff and L. J. Ettre, interview at Perkin-Elmer Corp., Norwalk,
Conn., 1975.
2. U.S. Patent No. 2,757,541.
Process Control Chromatography
Gas chromatographs are extensively used in the on-line control of chemical process
plants. Adopting the GC to this purpose required the development of special valves
that would automatically sample a stream of gases moving through a plant. It also
required the improvement of the long-term stability of GC performance: Users needed
to be sure that a change in readings indicated a real change in plant performance rather
than merely variations in performance of the monitoring instrumentation.
Developmental History
Early work in adapting GCs to process control was carried out by users in chemical
and petroleum firms. An early U.S. application of a GC to this end was by research-
ers at Esso, who in 1956 reported on an application in an Esso refinery in Linden,
New Jersey.1 Another early developer was Keulemans, a researcher at Shell in the
Netherlands.
Commercialization
Three companies were active in the introduction of process control gas chromatogra-
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phy: Beckman Instruments, Consolidated Electrodynamics, and Podbielniak Corpora-
tion. There is some uncertainty as to which of these firms was first on the market-
probably Podbielniak was first. Seaton Preston, then at Podbielniak, reports that
firm's first sale of a process control gas chromatograph to an Italian customer in 1956.
The other two firms did not enter the market until 1957.2 Podbielniak's equipment
adopted the sampling valve developed by Keulemans of Shell. Initially, they built the
valve in-house. Later, they turned to the Dutch firm that had fabricated valves for
Keulemans.3
Notes
1. "Gas Chromatography Growing," Chemical and Engineering News 34, no. 15 (9
April 1956): 1692-96.
2. "Chromatography Reaches the Plant," Chemical and Engineering News 35, no.
33 (19 August 1957): 77-79.
3. Seaton Preston, telephone interviews, 1975. (Preston was an employee of Podbiel-
niak Corp. at the time of the commercialization of process control gas chromatography.)
Preparative Gas Chromatography
Gas chromatographs used to identify chemicals in a mixture were only large enough to
isolate a sufficient amount of each chemical to allow identification: They were not
large enough to isolate sufficient material that would be useful in further chemical
procedures. Since the material isolated by gas chromatography was very pure, it
seemed desirable to scale up the process to the point at which useful amounts of
chemical could be isolated through gas chromatographic techniques. Scaling up was
achieved by increasing column size, by installing multiple columns, and by employing
other means.
Development History
D.E.M. Evans and J. C. Tatlow at Birmingham University in England reported scaling
up a GC column to separate fluorinated hydrocarbons in 1955.1 Others soon reported
other scale-up techniques to achieve preparative gas chromatography. 2
Commercialization
The first firm to commercialize a preparative GC was Beckman Instruments Corpora-
tion, which introduced its Megachrom in March 1958. This device utilized larger-than-
standard multicolumns that operated in parallel. A recycling system for the carrier gas
(helium) was used for cost efficiency. D. Carle, one of the developers of the Mega-
chrom at Beckman, advises that this scale-up approach was not copied from a user
instrument but was original to Beckman. 3
Notes
1. D.E.M. Evans and J. C. Tatlow, "The Reactions of Highly Fluorinated Organic
Compounds. Part VIII. The Gas-chromatographic Separation on a Preparative Scale,
and Some Reactions, of 3H- and 4H-Nonafluorocyclohexene," Journal of the Chemi-
cal Society (London) 1955: 1184-88.
2. D. Ambrose and R. R. Collerson, "Use of Gas-Liquid Partition Chromatogra-
phy as a Preparative Method," Nature 177, no. 4498 (14 January 1956): 84.
3. D. Carle, Beckman Instruments Corp., telephone interview, 1975.
142
Innovation Histories
THE NUCLEAR MAGNETIC RESONANCE (NMR) SPECTROMETER
The nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometer identifies structural properties of mole-
cules. It operates by simultaneously applying a steady magnetic field and a radio
frequency signal to a sample of atoms or molecules. Adjustment of the frequency of
the radiation and the strength of the magnetic field produces variations in the amount
of radiation absorbed. The absorption is the result of NMR and occurs in spectra that
are characteristic for different molecules and atoms and that can be used to identify
them.
Development History
The original discovery of the NMR phenomenon was made by Felix Bloch, Professor
of Physics at Stanford University, in 1946.1 Bloch and E. M. Purcell, Professor of
Physics at Harvard University, received a Nobel Prize for their research related to the
phenomenon. The usefulness of the innovation to chemists was created with a discov-
ery of the so-called chemical shift-the shift of nuclear magnetic resonant frequencies
that occurs as a result of interactions with nearby atoms in a sample. This provides
information about the chemical structure of organic molecules and other materials.
The chemical shift phenomenon was discovered by W. G. Proctor and F. C. Yu in
1950.2 The authors worked for Bloch at Stanford University. W. C. Dickinson3 also
played an important role in this discovery. The technique was further developed by H.
S. Gutowsky.4
Commercialization
Prior to commercialization, there were only two NMR spectrometers in existence,
those of Bloch at Stanford and Purcell at Harvard. Russell Varian, who had studied
physics at Harvard, convinced Bloch to patent NMR, which Bloch did-receiving a
very broad patent. Russell and his brother then took a license to the NMR patent,
which they transferred to Varian Associates when they founded the company in April
1948. The first commercial NMR spectrometer was built by Varian Associates in 1950-
51. The first three high-resolution NMR spectrometers commercialized were delivered
to Humble Oil, Shell Development Corporation, and the Du Pont experimental sta-
tion. These were operating by 1952.
The circuits used in Varian's first spectrometer had been published in the literature.
As time went on, however, researchers employed by Varian Associates made signifi-
cant contributions to the evolving field of NMR. Key figures in addition to the Varian
brothers were James N. Shoolery, Emery Rogers, Forrest Nelson, Martin E. Packard,
and Weston A. Anderson. 5
In 1956 Perkin-Elmer introduced a low-resolution, broad-line spectrometer. This
model, however, was quickly discontinued and Varian then held a virtual monopoly in
high-resolution NMR until September 1966 when JEOL (a Japanese corporation)
introduced their model C60H. In April 1967 Perkin-Elmer introduced their model
R20, and in 1968 Brucker Magnetics entered the field by introducing their model
HX60. Varian and Brucker Magnetics are now the industry leaders. JEOL is third.
Notes
1. F. Bloch, "Nuclear Induction," Physical Review 70, nos. 7-8 (1-15 October
1946): 460-74.
2. W. G. Proctor and F. C. Yu, "The Dependence of a Nuclear Magnetic Reso-
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nance Frequency upon Chemical Compound," Physical Review 77, no. 5 (March
1950): 717.
3. W.C. Dickinson, "Dependence of the F19 Nuclear Resonance Position on Chemi-
cal Compound," Physical Review 77 (1 March 1950): 736-37.
4. H. S. Gutowsky and R. E. McClure, "Magnetic Shielding of the Proton Reso-
nance in H2, H 20, and Mineral Oil," Physical Review 81, no. 2 (15 January 1951): 276-
77.
5. F. Bloch, Professor of Physics, Stanford University, Dr. Emery Rogers, Hewlett-
Packard Corp., and J. N. Shoolery and W. A. Anderson, both of Varian Assoc.,
telephone interviews, 1974.
Spinning of a Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Sample
Samples placed in a nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometer are subjected to a strong
magnetic field. From a theoretical understanding of the NMR phenomenon, it was
known by both NMR spectrometer users and personnel of the then-only manufacturer
of NMR equipment (Varian Associates, Palo Alto, California) that increased homoge-
neity of the magnetic field would allow NMR equipment to produce more detailed
spectra. Physical spinning of the sample within the spectrometer, the innovation being
described here, is one way to improve the effective homogeneity of the field. Spin is
achieved by linking a small electric motor or air turbine to an appropriately designed
sample holder.
Development History
Felix Bloch (the discoverer of the NMR phenomenon) suggested rapid sample spin-
ning as one means of improving effective magnetic field homogeneity and, thus, the
resolution of NMR spectra.1 Two of Bloch's students, W. A. Anderson and J. T.
Arnold, built a prototype spinner and experimentally demonstrated the predicted
result.2
Commercialization
Varian engineers went to Bloch's laboratory, examined his prototype sample spinner,
developed a commercial model, and introduced it into the market by December 1954.
The connection between Bloch and Varian was so good and Varian's commercializa-
tion of the improvement so rapid that there was little time for other users to construct
homebuilt spinners prior to that commercialization.
Notes
1. F. Bloch, "Line-Narrowing by Macroscopic Motion," Physical Review 94, no. 2
(15 April 1954): 496-97.
2. W. A. Anderson and J. T. Arnold, "A Line-Narrowing Experiment," Physical
Review 94, no. 2 (15 April 1954): 497-98.
Pulsed NMR Spectrometer
Applying magnetic pulses rather than a steady magnetic field to samples being ana-
lyzed in an NMR spectrometer allows one to examine molecular dynamics. Among the





The spin echo phenomenon underlying pulsed NMR was discovered-and patented-
in 1950 by E. L. Hahn, Professor of Physics at the University of Illinois.l Numerous
authors explored and refined its application to NMR over the succeeding years.2 Some
12 users built their own equipment in the years before equipment embodying it was
commercially available.
Commercialization
Interviewees at Varian say that the firm did produce "one or two" pulsed NMRs in
1954 but then did not pursue commercialization further. The Harvey Wells Corpora-
tion was the first to make a significant commercialization effort: They brought their
ELH spin echo system to market in May 1964.
Professor John S. Waugh of MIT was reportedly responsible for kindling the interest
of the Harvey Wells Corporation in pulsed NMR. He had come to know the company
through purchasing their magnets to build his own pulsed NMRs. Waugh told the
Harvey Wells Corporation of the concept and suggested they license Hahn's patent-
which they did. Hahn and Waugh both consulted for Harvey Wells and aided their
effort to develop a commercial device.3 Pulsed NMR was next commercialized by
NMR Specialties and Brucker Magnetics, both in 1962.
Notes
1. E. L. Hahn, "Spin Echoes," Physical Review 80, no. 4 (18 November 1950): 580-
94.
2. See H. Y. Carr and E. M. Purcell, "Effects of Diffusion on Free Precession in
Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Experiments," Physical Review 94, no. 3 (1 May 1954):
630-38; see also M. Sasson, A. Tzalmona, and A. Loewenstein, "A Spin Echo Attach-
ment to Varian HR60 Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Spectrometer," Journal of Scien-
tific Instruments 40 (1963): 133-34.
3. John S. Waugh, Professor of Chemistry, MIT, conversation at MIT, Cambridge,
Mass., 1975.
Fourier TransformlPulsed NMR
Fourier transform/pulsed NMR was an innovation applicable to the same analyses of
molecular structure as conventional high-resolution NMR, but it offered an improve-
ment in sensitivity of two orders of magnitude. The innovation was accomplished by
coupling a computer capable of performing a fast Fourier transform algorithm directly
to an NMR spectrometer.
Development History
Fourier transform/pulsed NMR was developed by R. R. Ernst and W. A. Anderson,
two very creative researchers working at Varian Associates, a manufacturer of NMR
spectrometers. They published their concept in 1966.1 Development of a form of
Fourier transform that was susceptible to rapid computation-a fast Fourier trans-
form-by J. W. Cooley and J. W. Tukey in 19672 made the concept commercially
feasible using the computers of the day. The product was developed in-house at
Varian. Ernst and Anderson did not utilize the help of outsiders in their development
work, but they were aware that other user and commercial groups were probably




In July 1969 Varian reached the commercialization stage with the Ernst and Anderson
project and introduced a Fourier transform accessory for its HA line of NMR spec-
trometers. This accessory was to be used in conjunction with an IBM 7090 computer. It
was quickly followed by Digilab, which introduced an accessory in October 1969.
Other quick commercializers were: Fabri-tek Instruments in February 1970, with a
system based on a DEC PDP 8 computer; Brucker Magnetics in October 1970; and
JEOL in 1971, with the PS-100 spectrometer with integrated computer.
Notes
1. R. R. Ernst and W. A. Anderson, "Application of Fourier Transform Spectros-
copy to Magnetic Resonance," Review of Scientific Instruments 37, no. 1 (January
1966): 93-102.
2. William T. Cochran et al., G-AE Subcommittee on Measurement Concepts,
"What Is the Fast Fourier Transform?" IEEE Transactions on Audio and Electroa-
coustics Au-15, no. 2 (June 1967): 45-55.
Heteronuclear Spin Decoupling
Heteronuclear spin decoupling is most useful for NMR spectroscopy work involving
carbon 13 (C13). Organic molecules have carbon as a "skeleton" with protons attached
to them. This results in a very complicated NMR spectrum that can be simplified by
heteronuclear spin decoupling.
Heteronuclear spin decoupling involves observing the C13 spectrum while irradiating
the protons with a noise source tuned to their resonant frequency. This destroys the
coupling of the protons to the C13 spectrum and thus makes that spectrum simpler. It
also makes the C13 spectrum stronger (Overhauser effect), in effect increasing the
sensitivity of the instrument in this application.
Development History
Double irradiation, the phenomenon at the base of heteronuclear spin decoupling, was
first suggested by Felix Bloch in 1954. This basic idea was jointly developed and tested
by Bloch with Martin E. Packard and James N. Shoolery at Varian Associates. The
patent on the innovation is held by all three. In 1955 Arnold L. Bloom (also of Varian)
and Shoolery published a simplification of the technique.'
Commercialization
Felix Bloch, Professor of Physics at Stanford University, and Varian Associates al-
ready had a close relationship established at the time of this innovation. In 1958 Varian
commercialized a heteronuclear spin decoupler accessory. In 1960 Varian discontinued
this accessory, and in 1962 they allowed a field engineer for Varian, a Mr. Yeiko, to
offer the accessory in a new company he was founding, NMR Specialities. In 1962
Perkin-Elmer offered the capability. In 1964 Varian reintroduced the heteronuclear
spin decoupling capability on its HA line of spectrometers. In 1966 JEOL (a Japanese
corporation) offered it on its C60H model and in 1968 Brucker Magnetics offered it on
their HF and HX series NMR spectrometers.
Note
1. Arnold L. Bloom and James N. Shoolery, "Effects of Perturbing Radiofrequency




Homonuclear spin decoupling is used in proton spectroscopy. It allows one to associate
particular lines in the spectrogram with particular protons. It is accomplished by irradi-
ating one specific proton line while observing another proton line or group of lines. If
irradiating the former affects the latter, then one knows that the two lines are closely
related. If they were not, they would not display this coupling behavior.
Development History
Homonuclear spin decoupling goes back, as does heteronuclear spin decoupling, to a
suggestion by Felix Bloch in 1954. W. A. Anderson of Varian Associates, however,
was the first to demonstrate homonuclear decoupling of protons.I In 1959 Junkichi
Itoh and Siro Sato2 published a modification of the technique that considerably simpli-
fied the equipment required.
Commercialization
In 1964 Varian introduced homonuclear spin decoupling as an accessory on its HA60
and NMR spectrometer. James N. Shoolery of Varian estimates that between one- and
two-dozen homemade versions of homonuclear spin decouplers were in use by users
prior to commercialization. In 1967 Perkin-Elmer introduced homonuclear spin decou-
pling on its R20 NMR. In 1964 Brucker introduced it on its HX60 and JEOL intro-
duced it on its C60 HL. In 1969 Varian introduced the innovation on its XL100 NMR
spectrometer.
Notes
1. Weston A. Anderson, "Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Spectra of Some Hydrocar-
bons," Physical Review 102, no. 1 (1 April 1956): 151-67.
2. Junkichi Itoh and Siro Sato, "Double Proton Magnetic Resonance by a Side
Band Method," Journal of the Physical Society of Japan 14 (1959): 851-52.
Frequency Synthesizer
The NMR spectrometer requires a very stable frequency source to operate properly.
The most stable frequency sources commonly used in science incorporate quartz crys-
tal references. Prior to the development of the frequency synthesizer, quartz crystal
references were only available in the form of single-frequency oscillators. Each time
one wanted to change frequencies, one had to change oscillators. The frequency
synthesizer allows one to dial in on any frequency one wants with quartz stability-a
major convenience for users.
Development History
Frequency synthesizers existed as commercial products prior to their application to
NMR spectrometers by spectrometer manufacturers. Users who wished to have this
feature on their NMRs simply purchased a synthesizer and wired it into their equip-
ment appropriately.
Commercialization
In 1968 Brucker was the first to offer a frequency synthesizer built into their B-
KR321S and B-KR322S models of NMR spectrometers. In September 1969 Varian
offered a frequency synthesizer in their XL100 NMR spectrometers.
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Superconducting Solenoids
The performance of NMR spectrometers improves as the magnetic field strength
applied to the sample being analyzed is increased. Higher field strength increases both
sensitivity and resolution of the instrument. Superconducting solenoids are capable of
reaching significantly higher field strengths in the NMR application than are iron
magnets. They are, however, somewhat less convenient to use as they must be cooled
to liquid helium temperature for operation.
Development History
The NMR spectrometer with superconducting magnets was developed at Varian Asso-
ciates, manufacturers of NMR spectrometers. Varian was induced to undertake the
project by Bill Phillips of Du Pont. Phillips said that if Varian would build a supercon-
ducting NMR, Du Pont would place an order and provide some development money.
Varian's development work involved research on field homogeneity, probe design for
use with superconductors, and magnetic shielding as well as work on the superconduct-
ing magnets themselves. 
Commercialization
Varian introduced the NMR spectrometer with superconducting magnets in March of
1964. In February of 1965 Magnion offered a superconducting instrument appropriate
for applications in which field homogeneity was not critical. In 1966 Varian introduced
the HR-220 with a superconducting magnet system, and in 1971 Brucker introduced a
superconducting magnet system.
Note
1. F. A. Nelson and H. E. Weaver, "Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy in
Superconducting Magnetic Fields," Science 146 (9 October 1964): 223-32.
Shim Coils
To achieve high-quality NMR spectra it is important to subject the sample to a homoge-
neous magnetic field. Shim coils are a means of improving the homogeneity of the
magnetic field. They consist of small electromagnetic coils attached to each pole face
of the primary magnetics of the NMR spectrometer. The current flowing through these
shim coils is carefully adjusted to correct any inhomogeneities detected in the magnetic
field affecting the samples.
Development History
J. T. Arnold of Varian Associates was the first to propose the use of shim coils in
NMR. 1 His paper appeared in 1956. In 1958 M. Golay, a scientist employed in Perkin-
Elmer Corporation, another manufacturer of NMR spectrometers, published an im-
proved shim coil design.2 In 1959 H. Primas, Professor of Physics at the Swiss Federal
Research Institute and a user of NMR, also published an article on shim coils.3
Commercialization
As far as we can determine, a Swiss firm, Trub-Tauber & Cie located in Zurich, was
the first to commercialize NMR spectrometers with a shim coil, apparently in 1958. 4
Trub-Tauber & Cie obtained their design for shim coils from Professor Primas, an
established consultant to that firm. Primas used NMR in his work and also was in-
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volved in designing NMR equipment. Varian Associates commercialized shim coils
about 1960. In January 1966 Varian introduced a more sophisticated version of shim
coils, Auto shim, on their HA100 model NMR spectrometer.
Notes
1. James T. Arnold, "Magnetic Resonances of Protons in Ethyl Alcohol," Physical
Review 102, no. 1 (1 April 1956): 136-50.
2. Marcel J. E. Golay, "Field Homogenizing Coils for Nuclear Spin Resonance
Instrumentation," Review of Scientific Instruments 29, no. 4 (April 1958): 313-15.
3. H. Primas, R. Arndt, and R. Ernst, Zeitschriftfur Instrumentenkunde 67 (1959):
295.
4. Charles A. Reilly, "Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Spectrometry," Review of Fun-
damental Developments in Analysis 30, no. 4 (April 1958): 839-48.
Primas Polecaps
Primas polecaps are yet another means of improving homogeneity of magnetic field
strength in the sample cavity of an NMR. The Primas design has the virtue of being of
value for differing field strengths instead of being optimized for a particular field
strength.
Development History
Primas polecaps are based on an idea by H. Primas, Professor of Physics at the Swiss
Federal Research Institute. Primas was a user of NMR and also a consultant at Trub-
Tauber & Cie, a manufacturer of NMR spectrometers.
Commercialization
In his role as consultant to Trub-Tauber & Cie, Primas transferred the design for
Primas polecaps to that firm. When Brucker Magnetics, another manufacturer of
NMR, acquired Trub-Tauber & Cie around 1964, they also acquired information
regarding the Primas polecap design. Brucker commercialized these polecaps in 1968.
Field Frequency Lock
A field frequency lock keeps the ratio between the magnetic field and the radio
frequency of an NMR spectrometer constant. The lock produces precisely correct
spacing of absorption lines, which in turn allows exact superposition of sequential
spectra for a given sample because, for each pass, the spectral lines are exactly aligned.
This allows time-averaging experiments to improve signal-to-noise ratios when the
signal is very weak. It therefore allows investigation of dilute samples and rare mole-
cules.
Development History
After 1948 users of NMR knew that one could in principle build field frequency locks. 
Since most users were chemists rather than electrical engineers, few actually did build
such locks prior to the commercialization of the innovation. One of the users who did
build such a lock was Saul Meiboom at Bell Laboratories.
Commercialization
In 1961 Varian Associates offered an external field frequency lock on their A60 and
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NMR model. (An external field frequency lock is one in which the magnetic field
sensing device is not quite in the same position as the sample. An internal field
frequency lock is one in which the sensing device for the magnetic field is in the sample
chamber itself.) In 1962 W. A. Anderson of Varian wrote an article on an internal field
frequency lock control system, 2 and in February 1964 Varian was the first to commer-
cialize an internal field frequency lock. In September 1966 JEOL (a Japanese corpora-
tion) offered both internal and external locks on their C60H NMR spectrometer. In
July 1968 Brucker Magnetics commercialized internal and external field frequency
locks on their HF60 model.
Notes
1. Martin E. Packard, "A Proton-Controlled Magnetic Field Regulator," Review of
Scientific Instruments 19, no. 7 (July 1948): 435-39.
2. Weston A. Anderson, "Applications of Modulation Techniques to High Resolu-
tion Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Spectrometers," Review of Scientific Instruments 33,
no. 11 (November 1962): 1160-66.
Trho
The Tlrho is used to measure slow motion in semisolids by measuring relaxation time.
Earlier approaches to measuring slow motion involved lowering the magnetic field of
the NMR instrument, but this caused signal-to-noise problems. The approach of the
Tjrho accessory is to lower the amplitude of the radio frequency field. The radio
frequency field then becomes the energy source that the material absorbs to relax.
Maintaining high magnetic field strength during this process retains the high sensitivity
of the NMR spectrometer.
Development History
Tirho experiments were first done by physicists at the University of Illinois in a group
working under Charles P. Slichter.1 Numerous other groups did work on the problem
over the next 10 years.2 Although the original work was done on metal samples,
interest grew among people doing research on biological materials and polymers.
Commercialization
In 1953 the Tlrho accessory was commercialized by Brucker Magnetics. As far as can
be determined, the Brucker development group obtained the information they needed
from published documents rather than through consultation with the developers of the
technology.
Notes
1. Charles P. Slichter and David Ailion, "Low-Field Relaxation and the Study of
Ultraslow Atomic Motions by Magnetic Resonance," Physical Review 135, no. 4A (17
August 1964): A1099-1110.
2. Brian D. Sykes and John M. Wright, "Measurement of Nuclear Spin Relaxation
Times on an HA-100 Spectrometer," Review of Scientific Instruments 41, no. 6 (June
1970): 876-77. These Harvard University authors describe modification of a Varian
HA100 for the performance of Trho experiments.)
150
Innovation Histories
Pulsed Field Gradient Accessory
The pulsed field gradient accessory measures diffusion coefficients in semiliquid or
liquid samples. It is an improvement on the pulsed NMR spin echo technique (see
above). It involves reducing the field gradient during the times at which the radio
frequency pulses are being applied to the sample and also at the time of appearance of
the echo. This results in a broad echo that can be measured more accurately. The
technique allows a one or two order-of-magnitude improvement in the accuracy of
measurement of diffusion coefficients.
Development History
The pulsed field gradient accessory was developed by E. O. Stejskal and J. E. Tanner,
researchers in the Department of Chemistry at the University of Wisconsin.' These
authors had been using the spin echo method of E. L. Hahn2 as developed by H. Y.
Carr and E. M. Purcell. 3 Stejskal and Tanner were motivated to develop the pulsed
field gradient accessory to eliminate some experimental limitations that they found in
the spin echo method. Important precursors to their work were that of A. G. Ander-
son et al.4 who noted diffusion in field gradients as well as that of D. W. McCall, D. C.
Douglass, and E. W. Anderson s who noted the experimental possibilities of this tech-
nique in measuring self-diffusion coefficients. The basic apparatus used by Stejskal and
Tanner6 closely resembles that described by J. C. Buchta, H. S. Gutowsky, and D. E.
Woessner earlier. 7
Commercialization
The pulsed field gradient accessory was first commercialized by Brucker Magnetics.
Brucker apparently acquired the information they needed to commercialize the unit
from publications and conferences rather than consultants. Stejskal himself was not
contacted by Brucker for help with the design.8
Notes
1. E. O. Stejskal and J. E. Tanner, "Spin Diffusion Measurements: Spin Echoes in
the Presence of a Time-Dependent Field Gradient," Journal of Chemical Physics 42,
no. 1 (1 January 1965): 288-92.
2. E. L. Hahn, "Spin Echoes," Physical Review 80, no. 4 (18 November 1950): 580-
94.
3. H. Y. Carr and E. M. Purcell, "Effects of Diffusion on Free Precession in
Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Experiments," Physical Review 94, no. 3 (1 May 1954):
630-38.
4. A. G. Anderson et al., "Spin Echo Serial Storage Memory," Journal of Applied
Physics 26, no. 1 (November 1955): 1324-38.
5. David W. McCall, Dean C. Douglass, and Ernest W. Anderson, "Self-Diffusion
Studies by Means of Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Spin-Echo Techniques," Deutsche
Berichte der Bunsen-Gesellschaft fiir Physikalische Chemie 67, no. 3 (1963): 336-40.
6. E. O. Stejskal, "Use of an Analog-to-Digital Converter in Pulsed Nuclear Reso-
nance," Review of Scientific Instruments 34, no. 9 (September 1963): 971-75.
7. J. C. Buchta, H. S. Gutowsky, and D. E. Woessner, "Nuclear Resonance Pulse
Apparatus," Review of Scientific Instruments 29, no. 1 (January 1958): 55-60.




The electronic integrator integrates the area under the peaks of the NMR spectrome-
ter spectrum. This area is proportional to the total number of protons contributing to
that peak. It allows a much more accurate count of this number than was possible
previously.
Development History
Integrators are used for a range of purposes in scientific research and were available as
modules in the commercial marketplace prior to their commercialization as a built-in
feature of an NMR spectrometer. Interested users could purchase these units and wire
them into their equipment if they so desired. Among the users who did this were
people such as Baker at Dow Chemical Research.1
Commercialization
J. N. Shoolery and W. A. Anderson were the researchers at Varian Associates who
developed that firm's electronic integrator. Varian offered it as an accessory in 1960.
In 1961 the Varian model A60 and NMR spectrometer had a built-in integrator. In
1965 JEOL offered an electronic integrator.2
Notes
1. J. N. Shoolery, Varian Associates, Palo Alto, Calif., telephone interview, 1975.
2. W. A. Anderson, Varian Associates, Palo Alto, Calif., telephone interview,
1975.
Multinuclei Probe
The multinuclei probe allows a user to examine any of more than 70 nuclei types
without changing any hardware. The major advantage this innovation presents to users
relative to old-style probes can be appreciated when one understands that such probes
were restricted to the examination of only a single nucleus type and cost several
thousand dollars each. Also, the time involved in changing from one probe to another
could take several hours.
Development History
The multinuclei probe was developed by Daniel Traficante, a visiting scientist in MIT's
Department of Chemistry, and by Michael Mulcay, president of United Development
Corporation in Lexington, Massachusetts. The two lived in the same town and knew
each other socially. One day Traficante told Mulcay, an electronics engineer, about his
idea for a multinuclei probe, and they decided to get together to work on it. The first
probe they developed was installed at MIT in 1972. The second was installed at
Michigan State University in 1974; one was also installed in Australia in 1974. All of
these multinuclei probes were built and installed by Traficante and Mulcay according
to a design they published in September 1974.1
Commercialization
Interest in multinuclei probes on the part of users apparently stimulated Varian Associ-
ates to develop their own multinuclei probe in cooperation with Paul Ellis of the
University of South Carolina. This probe design was commercialized in 1974. In late
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1974 Brucker Magnetics commercialized a multinuclei probe of the Traficante and
Mulcay design. The arrangement at that time was that Brucker would supply Trafi-
cante and Mulcay with parts and components and that those two would build the
probes and would sell them back to Brucker for marketing.
Note
1. Daniel D. Traficante, James A. Simms, and Michael Mulcay, "An Approach to
Multinuclei Capability in Modern NMR Spectrometers," Journal of Magnetic Reso-
nance 15 (September 1974): 484-97.
Proton-Enhanced Nuclear Induction Spectroscopy
Proton-enhanced nuclear induction spectroscopy allows the examination of the molecu-
lar structure of molecules that either are naturally rare or that have extremely small
magnetic moments. When a nucleus is rare, the signal is weak. The normal solution to
weak signals (time averaging) cannot be used here because the relaxation times of the
spins are too long. That is, the spin takes too long to recover its original polarization,
which is lost during an observation-the relaxation time may be one hour. The proton-
enhanced nuclear induction spectroscopy method solves this problem by replenishing
the polarization of the rare spins from the abundant spins rather than in the usual way
through the lattice. This makes use of the coupling between rare and abundant spins in
the way proposed by S. R. Hartmann and E. L. Hahn.l One establishes the coupling
by double resonance and polarizes the rare spins in (perhaps) a millisecond. In effect,
one pumps the polarization of the abundant spins out through the rare spins and thus
elicits their spectra. The abundant spins are usually protons. 2
Development History
S. R. Hartmann and E. L. Hahn, Department of Physics, University of California,
Berkeley, introduced the double resonance method in 1962. F. M. Lurie and C. P.
Slichter, University of Illinois, performed a double resonance experiment on lithium
metal and carried it further in 1964. 3 In 1965 R. Freeman and W. A. Anderson
published their experiments with double resonance that used modulated perturbing
radio frequency fields.4
Commercialization
Brucker Magnetics was induced to work on commercializing proton-enhanced nuclear
induction spectroscopy by John S. Waugh, Professor of Chemistry, MIT. Waugh was a
consultant to Brucker. Varian Associates also initiated work on the technique by 1973.
Notes
1. S. R. Hartmann and E. L. Hahn, "Nuclear Double Resonance in the Rotating
Frame," Physical Review 128, no. 5 (1 December 1962): 2042-53.
2. John S. Waugh, Professor of Chemistry, MIT, conversation at MIT, Cambridge,
Mass., 1974.
3. Fred M. Lurie and Charles P. Slichter, "Spin Temperature in Nuclear Double
Resonance," Physical Review 133, no. 4A (17 February 1964): A1108-22.
4. R. Freeman and W. A. Anderson, "Nuclear Magnetic Double Resonance. Trans-
mission of Modulation Information Through the Nuclear Spin-Spin Coupling," Jour-
nal of Chemical Physics 42, no. 4 (15 February 1965): 1199-1229.
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THE TRANSMISSION ELECTRON MICROSCOPE (TEM)
The First Electron Microscope
The electron microscope is the electronic analog to the optical microscope. The conven-
tional optical microscope uses glass lenses to bend and focus beams of light to create an
enlarged image of a sample. Analogously, the electron microscope uses magnetic and
electric fields to bend a beam of electrons to achieve an enlarged image of a sample.
Because the wavelength of electrons is more than 1000 times shorter than the wave-
length of light used in conventional light microscopy, the electron microscope can
achieve 1000 times greater resolution than can the light microscope. Although the
optical microscope is limited in resolution to about 1000 angstroms (A), the resolution
of a modern electron microscope can be on the order of 1A.
The very great improvement in resolving power offered by the electron microscope
over the best previously available optical microscopes made it enormously important
to researchers in many fields, ranging from metallurgy to biology.
Development History
The first work in the electron microscope was done at the Technische Hochschule in
Berlin by Max Knoll and his student Ernst Ruska. These two were working on high-
speed oscilloscopes for the purpose of building devices capable of measuring the
effects of lightning more effectively. Their investigations of the optics of electrons in a
vacuum led to their development of the electromagnetic lens, a key element in the
electron microscope. In 1931 they reported their observation of the enlargement of the
images of apertures. 2
A few days after Knoll reported his initial results, G. R. Rudenberg, an employee of
Siemens, a German electrical manufacturer, applied for a patent on the theory of the
electron microscope. 3 The close timing of these two events plus the apparent lack of
prior work on the part of Rudenberg that could be logically linked to an electron
microscope caused some skepticism regarding the source of his insight. Rudenberg's
patent covered the basic use of magnetic and electrostatic lenses to form electrooptical
instruments in which electrons took the same part as light does in light optics. Also in
1931 E. Bruche (of the German firm AEG) published a report of work in electron
optics.4 By 1932 Knoll and Ruska had built an improved electron microscope that
operated with an electron beam of 65 kv and reached 120 times magnification. 5
L. Marton, a researcher in Belgium, had read some of Knoll and Ruska's early
papers and started to build his own electron microscope in 1932. Marton focused on
the problem of preparing samples to be observed under the electron microscope,
especially biological samples. It had early been thought that an electron beam would
destroy biological samples, but Marton demonstrated that, indeed, they could be
prepared and examined. 6
In 1933 Knoll and Ruska had improved their electron microscope to the point that it
was able to exceed the resolution of an optical microscope. Biologists and chemists at
the Technische Hochschule in Berlin made use of this microscope and became very
interested in its possibilities. In 1935 Marton built an electron microscope that was able
to exceed the resolution of an optical microscope by a factor of 10.
Commercialization
In 1937 Ruska and B. von Borries were hired by Siemens to develop an electron
microscope for production. They had a prototype ready by the end of 1938, and in 1939
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Siemens started production of commercial electron microscopes. In total, Siemens
produced about 30 units during 1939 and the early war years.7 In 1938 Marton left
Europe to come to RCA in the United States, and he brought along with him an
electron microscope of his own design.8 In 1940 RCA also hired J. Hillier, another
early researcher in electron microscopy. Before the end of 1941 Marton left RCA for
Stanford University. In 1941 RCA commercialized a microscope of Hillier's design,
which was known as the RCA Type B or the EMB.
Notes
1. Martin M. Freundlich, "Origin of the Electron Microscope," Science 142, no.
3589 (11 October 1963): 185-88.
2. L. Marton, Early History of the Electron Microscope (San Francisco: San Fran-
cisco Press, 1968), 5.
3. T. Mulvey, "Origins and Historical Development of the Electron Microscope,"
British Journal of Applied Physics 13 (1962): 197-207.
4. Marton, Early History of the Electron Microscope, 19.
5. Mulvey, "Origins and Historical Development of the Electron Microscope,"
200-1.
6. Marton, Early History of the Electron Microscope, 19-22; and Mulvey, "Origins
and Historical Development of the Electron Microscope," 202-4.
7. Mulvey, "Origins and Historical Development of the Electron Microscope,'" 206;
and Ralph W. G. Wyckoff, Electron Microscopy: Technique and Applications (New
York: Interscience, 1949), 14.
8. Marton, Early History of the Electron Microscope, 35.
Pointed Filaments
The electron microscope operates by accelerating a beam of electrons. The coherence
of this beam of electrons is very important to achieving high resolution in the electron
microscope, especially in the region below 8 A resolution. The source of electrons in
an electron microscope is a filament much like the filament in an electric light bulb. It
was found that making this filament in a pointed shape greatly improved the coherence
of the electron microscope beam.
Development History
Pointed filaments were developed in the early 1960s by H. Fernandez-Moran, a biolo-
gist at the University of Chicago.'
Commercialization
Various versions of pointed filaments were commercialized in the late 1960s by two
firms that specialized in electron microscope accessories and supplies. These two firms
were the C. W. French Company and the Ladd Company. We have little information
on how these firms got involved in the production of pointed filaments. Ladd reported2
that he visited the Fernandez-Moran laboratory and observed the fabrication of
pointed filaments there.
Notes
1. T. Hibi, "Operating Condition of Point Cathode and Resolution of Elec-
tronmicroscope," in Electron Microscopy 1964 (Proceedings of the Third European
Regional Conference, Prague, 26 August-3 September 1964), ed. M. Titlbach, Vol. A
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(Prague: Publishing House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1965), 121-22;
H. Fernandez-Moran, "Applications of Improved Point Cathode Sources to High
Resolution Electron Microscopy," in Electron Microscopy 1966 (Sixth International
Congress for Electron Microscopy, Kyoto, Japan, 28 August-4 September 1966), Vol.
1: Non-Biology, ed. Ryozi Uyeda (Tokyo: Maruzen, 1966), 27-28.
2. Mrs. Margaret Ladd, Burlington, Vt., telephone interview, 1974; C. W. French,
Agawam, Mass., telephone interview, 1974.
Telefocus Electron Gun
The telefocus gun was a magnetic and electronic innovation that allowed the user of an
electron microscope to separately control the diameter and the intensity of the electron
beam of an electron microscope. Separate control of these functions is important to
users, but they had been inherently linked in earlier gun designs.
Development History
The telefocus gun was designed by K. H. Steigerwald, a researcher at the Max Planck
Institute in Germany.1 Steigerwald reported his development in 1949. His design was
quickly replicated by several metallurgists who had great need for it in their studies
that required the use of the electron microscope.
Commercialization
Steigerwald was a consultant for Siemens, a German producer of electron micro-
scopes. Siemens introduced the telefocus design in 1951. In the late 1950s Philips
Corporation, Eindhoven, the Netherlands, commercialized it, and in 1965 RCA
started selling a kit to retrofit their existing microscopes with the innovation.
Note
1. K. H. Steigerwald, "Ein Neuartiges Strahlerzeugungs-System fiir Elektronen-
mikroskope," Optik 5, no. 8/9 (1949): 469-78.
Double Condenser Lens
The double condenser lens replaces a single condenser lens in the optical system of an
electron microscope. This substitution provides the user with several important im-
provements. First, the intensity of the electron beam can be varied over a wider range.
This permits a greater range of specimen-viewing conditions for users: Strong illumina-
tion is possible for thick specimens, weak illumination is possible for delicate speci-
mens. Second, the double condenser lens creates more working space between the
condenser and objective lenses. This is the space in which users place their sample.
The increase in space allows users to design accessories for handling samples with
greater freedom. Finally, the double condenser lens enables users to reduce the area of
their sample that is exposed to the electron beam. This in turn allows users to reduce
specimen damage of delicate specimens.
Development History
L. Marton claims that he developed the double condenser lens at Stanford University
in the 1940s.1 It is possible that this was also done independently by other users since





The double condenser lens was first offered commercially by Siemens about 1952.2
Several other microscope makers quickly followed, but RCA delayed until 1959, when
they introduced a double condenser retrofit kit for their EMU3 electron microscope. 3
Notes
1. L. Marton, Early History of the Electron Microscope (San Francisco: San Fran-
cisco Press, 1968), 41; also L. Marton, "A 100-kv Electron Microscope," Journal of
Applied Physics 16 (March 1945): 131-38.
2. B. v. Borries, "The Physical Situation and the Performance of High-Resolving
Microscopy Using Fast Corpuscles," in Proceedings of the Third International Confer-
ence on Electron Microscopy, London 1954 (London: Royal Microscopical Society,
1956), 4-25, esp. 4 and Plate V.
3. John Coleman, former employee of RCA's Electron Microscope Division, con-
versations at MIT, Cambridge, Mass., 1974.
Correction of Astigmatism in the Objective Lens
Electron microscope lenses are subject to imperfections (e.g., astigmatism) just as
optical lenses are. Astigmatism in the objective lens is the result of imperfections in the
pole piece of the electromagnet used in that lens.
Development History
Many users were trying to improve the resolution of their microscopes by (among
other things) polishing, boring, and mechanically adjusting the pole pieces of their
objective lenses in order to eliminate astigmatism.
Commercialization
The first to commercialize an adjustable astigmatism corrector for an objective lens
was RCA on their advanced EMU model in 1947. The correction was achieved by
eight screws built into the objective pole piece. This commercial version was devel-
oped by J. Hillier and E. G. Ramberg at RCA.2
Notes
1. Dr. John Riesner, RCA Sarnoff Laboratories, conversations at Cherry Hill,
N.J., 1974.
2. James Hillier, "Further Improvement in the Resolving Power of the Electron
Microscope," Journal of Applied Physics 17 (April 1946): 307-9; also James Hillier
and E. G. Ramberg, "The Magnetic Electron Microscope Objective: Contour Phenom-
ena and the Attainment of High Resolving Power," Journal of Applied Physics 18
(January 1947): 61-71.
Well-Regulated High-Voltage Power Supplies
Electron microscopes require high voltages to operate. A very high stability in the
high-voltage supply of an electron microscope is a well-known prerequisite for achiev-
ing high resolution.
Development History
The first electron microscope and the first few precommercial replications used batter-
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ies connected in series to supply the high voltages required. A very stable high voltage
could be obtained by this means, but the major inconvenience associated with this
solution can be readily imagined: voltages on the order of 80,000 v were needed-
supplied by nearly 40,000 single wet-cell batteries connected in series. A visitor to the
laboratory of L. Marton, an early and outstanding experimenter in electron micros-
copy, recalls an entire room filled with batteries on floor-to-ceiling racks with a full-
time technician employed to maintain them. The first commercial electron micro-
scope, built by Siemens in Germany in 1939, substituted a power supply for the
batteries but could not make its output voltage as constant as could be done with the
batteries. 
Commercialization
When RCA decided to build an electron microscope, an RCA electrical engineer, Jack
Vance, undertook to build a highly stable power supply and by several inventive means
achieved a stability almost good enough to eliminate voltage stability as a constraint on
the performance of a high-resolution microscope. Vance achieved this by using radio
frequency rather than line-voltage frequency to actuate the high-voltage rectifier tubes
in the power supply and by incorporating a reference battery in a feedback circuit to
stabilize the high voltage. 2
Vance's innovative power supply was commercialized in 1941 in RCA's first-pro-
duced electron microscope, the RCA Type B (EMB).
Notes
1. Ralph W. G. Wyckoff, Electron Microscopy: Technique and Applications (New
York: Interscience, 1949), 16.
2. A. W. Vance, "Stable Power Supplies for Electron Microscopes," RCA Review
5, no. 3 (January 1941): 293-300.
Regulated Lens Power Supply
The lenses of electron microscopes are electromagnets. To provide a steady magnetic
field they require a very stable supply of electric current. This current is provided by
the lens power supply. Early electron microscopes built by users and the early
Siemens's commercially produced electron microscope used batteries in conjunction
with water cooling as their lens power supply system. The batteries supplied the
current necessary, while the water cooling prevented the resistance in the lens wiring
from changing with temperature, thus changing current flow in the lens magnetic field.
As can be imagined, both the batteries and the water cooling contributed significantly
to the cumbersomeness and expense of the early electron microscopes.
Development History
Jack Vance of RCA eliminated both the need for batteries and the need for water
cooling in the lens power supply he designed. He replaced the high-current, low-
voltage battery supply with a low-current, high-voltage supply from a regulated power
supply and designed a current regulator into this power supply, so that changes in
temperature of the lens windings would not affect lens performance.
Commercialization
The regulated lens power supplies designed by Vance were commercialized in the




1. A. W. Vance, "Stable Power Supplies for Electron Microscopes," RCA Review
5, no. 3 (January 1941): 293-300.
Rubber Gasket Sealing of Vacuum System
The interior of an electron microscope is kept under a very hard vacuum. This is
essential to its operation as electron beams cannot travel effectively in air. The elec-
tron microscope has many joints that are opened and closed frequently by the opera-
tor. In modern electron microscopes, rubber gaskets are used to make these joints
airtight when they are closed.
Development History
Early electron microscopes used carefully machined surfaces covered with a special
grease to achieve a vacuum-tight seal. Although this procedure had often been fol-
lowed in high-vacuum work of the period, it proved very troublesome in the case of
electron microscopy. Sealing grease from the joints infiltrated the vacuum chamber of
the electron microscope, where it became charged by the electron beam. This charged
material then distorted the electron beam in various unanticipated ways, destroying
the microscope's performance. L. Marton realized the problem and designed rubber
gaskets into the electron microscopes he built in the late 1930s.1 However, Siemens's
1939 production unit-the first electron microscope commercialized-used machined
surfaces and vacuum grease.
Commercialization
When Marton came to RCA in 1938, he carried with him one of his microscopes that
used rubber gaskets to seal the vacuum system.2 This feature was adopted for the RCA
Type B (EMB) electron microscope commercialized in 1941.
Notes
1. L. Marton, Early History of the Electron Microscope (San Francisco: San Fran-
cisco Press, 1968), 22.
2. Ibid., 35.
Three-Stage Magnification
Creating a three-stage magnification system for the electron microscope involved in-
serting a third intermediate lens in the electron optical system. Three-stage magnifica-
tion allowed users to adjust the magnification more widely. It thus allowed them to
examine the total specimen at one time at a low magnification.
Development History
In 1944 an electron microscope containing three-stage magnification was built by J. B.
le Poole, Director of the Institute for Electron Microscopy in Delft, the Netherlands.
The microscope was used for a month and then taken apart and hidden from the
German enemy until the end of the war. After the war it was described in a Philips
Technical Review.2 An electron microscope with three-stage magnification was also




J. B. le Poole, designer of the electron microscope containing three-stage magnifica-
tion, was a consultant to Philips Corporation in Eindhoven, the Netherlands. In 1947
Philips introduced commercially a 100 kv electron microscope patterned after the
microscope built at Delft.
Notes
1. L. Marton, Early History of the Electron Microscope (San Francisco: San Fran-
cisco Press, 1968), 41.
2. J. B. le Poole, "A New Electron Microscope with Continuously Varying Magnifi-
cation," Philips Technical Review 9, no. 2 (1947): 33-45.
3. "A New Electron Microscope for 100 kV," Philips Technical Review 9, no. 6
(1947): 179.
Scaled-up Objective Pole Piece
A pole piece is part of an electromagnetic lens like those used in electron microscopes.
An objective pole piece is, therefore, part of the objective lens of the electron micro-
scope. The innovation of enlarging the objective pole piece had several advantages
over previous pole piece design. It reduced spherical aberration-a type of flaw in lens
performance-and it increased intensity of the image. It also reduced the cost of
producing the lens by reducing both the machining accuracy needed and the precision
with which the pole piece must be aligned in the electron microscope.
Development History
The scaled-up objective pole piece was developed by L. Marton when he was at RCA
in 1940.1 He incorporated it in his model No. 4, which was also known as the RCA
Type A. Marton, in his 1968 book on the early history of the electron microscope,
reports that this innovation was partly inspired by two theoretical papers, one by R.
Rebsch and W. Schneider and the other by W. Glaser.2
Commercialization
Although the scaled-up objective pole piece was developed at RCA, it was first com-
mercialized by Metropolitan Vickers Electrical Company in 1949 in their model EM-
33; Philips followed in 1950.4
Notes
1. L. Marton, M. C. Banca, and J. F. Bender, "A New Electron Microscope," RCA
Review 5, no. 2 (October 1940): 232-43.
2. L. Marton, Early History of the Electron Microscope (San Francisco: San Fran-
cisco Press, 1968), 38.
3. M. E. Haine, R. S. Page, and R. G. Garfitt, "A Three-Stage Electron Micro-
scope with Stereographic Dark Field, and Electron Diffraction Capabilities," Journal
of Applied Physics 21 (February 1950): 173-82.
4. A. C. van Dorsten, H. Nieuwdorp, and A. Verhoeff, "The Philips 100 kV Elec-




A specimen stage is a device used to mount specimens properly within the electron
microscope. A goniometer stage is a device that can be tilted in one or two directions
while it is in the microscope. This feature is useful in many instances and is necessary in
certain materials science work.
Development History
The earliest microscope stages were simple screens upon which the sample to be
observed was placed. As electron microscopes and microscopy matured starting in the
early 1960s, users started to need stages that would allow them to observe their
samples under various special conditions. U. Valdre was apparently either the first or
among the first to develop goniometer type stages. He was a materials scientist at the
University of Bologna and needed such a stage for his work. 
Commercialization
Siemens and Philips commercialized Valdre-type goniometer stages in the early 1960s.
RCA commercialized such stages in 1964.
Note
1. U. Valdre, "A Universal Specimen Stage and Combined Cartridges for an Elec-
tron Microscope," in Electron Microscopy 1966 (Sixth International Congress for Elec-
tron Microscopy, Kyoto, Japan, 28 August-4 September 1966), Vol. 1: Non-Biology,
ed. Ryozi Uyeda (Tokyo: Maruzen, 1966), 165-66.
Cold Specimen Stage
A cold specimen stage is one that can keep samples cold while they are being examined
under the electron microscope. Cooling can be achieved quite simply by thermally
connecting the stage to a source of liquid nitrogen outside the electron microscope.
Development History
Cold stages were developed very early in the history of electron microscopes by L.
Marton.1 Both the microscope Marton brought to RCA when he became an employee
and the one he developed at RCA had such stages.
Commercialization
In the mid-1950s Siemens was first to commercialize the cold stage.2 In the mid-1960s
demand for such stages began to pick up among biologists who were eager to reduce
the radiation damage inflicted on their samples by electron microscopy.
Notes
1. L. Marton, "A New Electron Microscope," Physical Review 58 (1 July 1940): 57-
60.
2. F. S. Sj6strand and J. Rhodin, eds., Electron Microscopy, Proceedings of the




A high-temperature stage can heat up to perhaps 3000°C-a very high temperature-
while inside the microscope. It is important that the electron microscope be designed
in such a way that the expansion of metals, and so on, associated with the high
temperatures not deform the microscope or degrade its resolution.
Development History
The first high-temperature specimen stage was developed by M. von Ardenne, a
researcher at an institute in Berlin.
Commercialization
In the late 1950s metallurgists started to demand high-temperature stages from manu-
facturers. In 1965 (approximately) RCA commercialized such a stage.
Note
1. Abstract in V. E. Cosslett, ed., Bibliography of Electron Microscopy (London:
Edward Arnold, 1950), 18.
Biased Electron Gun
The device in the electron microscope that generates the electron beam used for
"seeing" the sample is called an electron gun. It is important to the performance and
resolution capability of an electron microscope that the electron gun generate an
intense, stable, and coherent electron beam. On all these dimensions, the biased
electron gun represented an improvement over the basic thermionic emission gun used
in the first electron microscopes commercialized by Siemens and RCA.
Development History
The biased electron gun was developed by A. Wehnelt.
Commercialization
The biased electon gun was first commercialized by Siemens.'
Note
1. Ralph W. G. Wyckoff, Electron Microscopy: Techniques and Applications (New
York: Interscience, 1949), 16.
Out-of-Gap Objective Lens
The specimen to be examined by electron microscope must be mounted in, or near, the
so-called objective lens of the microscope. An effective design for such a lens will not
only have superior electrooptical qualities, it will also have a geometry that allows
users to surround the specimen with any needed experimental equipment. The out-of-
gap lens performed well on both dimensions. Its unique feature was a geometry that
allowed one to place the specimen entirely to one side of the confines of the lens, that
is, out-of-gap.
Development History
In 1935 E. F. Burton, who had seen the electron microscope work being done in
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Berlin, came to the University of Toronto, Canada, and transferred the idea of an
electron microscope to that university. J. Hillier and A. Prebus, working for Burton in
Toronto, built successful electron microscopes.' Hillier brought the knowledge of that
work with him when he became an employee of RCA in 1940. At RCA Hillier built an
electron microscope modeled on the design developed by the Toronto group. This
design included an out-of-gap objective lens like that used in Toronto.
Commercialization
The out-of-gap objective lens developed in Toronto was commercialized by RCA in
their first electron microscope, the RCA Type B of 1941. RCA continued to use this
lens design in its commercial microscopes until about 1968.
Note
1. E. F. Burton, J. Hillier, and A. Prebus, "A Report on the Development of the
Electron Supermicroscope at Toronto," Physical Review 56 (1 December 1939): 1171-
72; see also Albert Prebus and James Hillier, "The Construction of a Magnetic Elec-
tron Microscope of High Resolving Power," Canadian Journal of Research 17A, no. 4
(April 1939): 49-63.
DATA SET FOR SEMICONDUCTOR PROCESS INNOVATIONS
The innovations described in this data set are innovations in the process by which
silicon-based semiconductors are manufactured. Most of the innovations are embodied
in novel process machinery, but a few are embodied in novel techniques carried out
largely by hand.
Selection criteria for this sample will be found in chapter 2. Owing to these criteria, a
few important innovations familiar to many readers (e.g., float zone refining) are not
represented. In addition, we were unable to find any information on the innovation
histories of four innovations included in our sample. These were coded NA in all
relevant chapter 2 tables.
Growth of Single Silicon Crystals: The Crystal Puller
Silicon semiconductors-whether individual transistors or integrated circuits-are built
up on a wafer sliced from a single crystal of silicon. It is crucial to the performance of the
semiconductor that the single silicon crystal used be quite regular in structure and quite
free from impurities. The method used for making pure single crystals of silicon for
commercial semiconductor manufacture is called crystal pulling. It involves bringing a
small seed crystal of silicon into contact with the surface of a bath of molten silicon.
Molten silicon in contact with the small crystal is cooled enough to crystallize and thus
extend that crystal. Gradual pulling of the seed crystal away from the molten material as
crystallization occurs results in a long single crystal rod of pure silicon being grown over a
period of time.
Development History
The method of growing single crystals by pulling from a melt dates back to the work of
J. Czochralski in 1917.' Indeed, the method is sometimes called the Czochralski
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method. The method was later used by numerous researchers studying single crystals
and became well-known in the field.
When Gordon Teal of Bell Laboratories began to study the fabrication of single
crystals for use in semiconductors, he decided to adopt the crystal-pulling approach.
He and his colleagues first made single crystal germanium by this technique and then
began to work on the pulling of silicon single crystals. This proved a very difficult
technical task since silicon melts at 14200C, a temperature at which the containers
holding the molten silicon tend to contribute impurities to the melt.
In January 1953 Teal took a job with Texas Instruments, where he formed a materi-
als laboratory. He continued his work on the pulling of single silicon crystals with the
aim of producing a commercially usable process. He succeeded, and in June 1954
Texas Instruments used the method in the production of the first commercial silicon
transistor.
Commercialization
In the last two weeks of April 1952, Bell Laboratories held a symposium for 34 or so
companies who had paid $25,000 each to become licensees of all Bell's proprietary
semiconductor knowledge. Central to this information was the technique of crystal
pulling. Since the symposium included laboratory visits, demonstrations of equipment,
and so on, engineers of licensee companies learned enough to go and build their own
crystal pullers. Bell also privately printed a book, Transistor Technology, which was
distributed to licensees in September 1952.2 After Bell's 1952 licensing conference,
firms interested in manufacturing semiconductors began to build the crystal pullers
they needed in-house. Participants in the industry at that time suspected that user firms
may have called on outside manufacturers for help in fabricating the equipment to
their designs, but they cannot recall the names of any such firms. The first firm we can
identify that manufactured the Bell-designed crystal puller as a commercial product
was a small firm called Lepel Corporation in Maspeth, New York. According to
interviewees at that firm, they built a prototype puller for Bell Laboratories in 1956.
Notes
1. J. Czochralski, "A New Method for the Measurement of the Velocity of Crystalli-
zation of the Metals," Zeitschrift fiir Physikalische Chemie 92, no. 2 (1917): 219-21.
2. Transistor Technology was privately printed by Bell Laboratories in September
1952. An updated version (with the same title) was published by Van Nostrand, New
York, 1957.
3. J. A. Lenard and E. J. Patzner, "A Survey of Crystal-Growing Processes and
Equipment," Semiconductor Products and Solid State Technology 9, no. 8 (August
1966): 35-42.
Growth of Single Silicon Crystals: Resistance-Heated Crystal Puller
Early crystal pullers for the fabrication of silicon single crystals used radio frequency
heaters to melt the silicon being processed. As experience with the process grew, it
became clear that resistance heating was both more efficient than radio frequency
heating and also more precisely controllable-a very important attribute. As crystal
pullers were built that could produce larger diameter crystals, radio frequency heating




In the mid-1950s it became clear that users preferred the resistance-heated pullers they
were building in-house for use in the production of silicon single crystals. National
Research Corporation became interested in producing a commercial resistance-heated
puller because it was looking for products in which its knowledge of vacuum technol-
ogy would prove useful. Joseph Wenkus, then an employee of Microwave Associates,
a user of crystal pullers, was hired as a technical consultant on the project. Microwave
Associates had earlier received a contract from the U.S. Army Electronics Command,
Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to manufacture microwave silicon diodes. As part of
fulfilling this contract, Microwave Associates had built a resistance-heated silicon
crystal puller about 1953 or 1954. Wenkus transferred the insights he had gained on
this project to National Research Corporation, which developed a commercialized
version of the equipment.
Commercialization
National Research Corporation introduced its resistance-heated silicon puller in the
winter of 1957.
Growth of Single Silicon Crystals: Dislocation-Free Crystal Puller
Imperfections in the lattice structure of single crystals are called dislocations. Any
reduction in the number of dislocations in the silicon crystals used to build semiconduc-
tors improves the properties of those semiconductors.
Development History
The original work on dislocation-free crystal pulling was done by William C. Dash at
General Electric's Schenectady Research Laboratories. General Electric maintained a
fairly strong program in materials-purification technology and was a leader in the
development of silicon-powered diodes and silicon-controlled rectifiers. The thermal
stability and lower resistance of the dislocation-free material was important to the
construction of these devices. Dash began his work on dislocation-free growth of
crystals about 1956. In April 1959 he published a procedure for the growth of
dislocation-free crystals using existing crystal pullers.' The essence of the technique
was to initially pull the crystal from the melt at a rapid rate that results in a small
diameter rod of single crystal. This procedure allows any dislocation existing in the
seed crystal to "grow out." After this result has been achieved, the pulling rate is
slowed and the rod diameter is allowed to increase to the desired size.
Once Dash published the technique for growing dislocation-free crystals, most semi-
conductor manufacturers adopted it.
Commercialization
In 1968 Siltec introduced dislocation-free crystal pullers commercially. The hardware
difference between these pullers and earlier pullers is relatively small. According to
the manufacturer, the dislocation-free pullers required slightly greater standards of
cleanliness and temperature control. Appropriate user technique, however, was still
required to achieve the desired dislocation-free output.
Note
1. William C. Dash, "Growth of Silicon Crystals Free from Dislocations," Journal
of Applied Physics 30, no. 4 (April 1959): 459-74.
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Growth of Single Silicon Crystals: Automatic Diameter Control
The diameter of the single crystal rod produced by a crystal puller is critically depen-
dent on the rate with which the crystal is pulled from the melt. Since standard diameter
rods are needed for further production steps, any oversized rod sections must be
ground down and undersized rods must be eliminated before further processing can
take place. An automatic diameter control system effectively eliminates either over- or
undersized rods, thus eliminating the associated production costs and waste.
Development History
The automatic diameter control system for crystal pullers is essentially an infrared
optical system that observes the diameter of the rod being pulled and controls the rate
of pull accordingly. Initial work on such systems began at IBM's East Fishkill, New
York, facility about 1964 or 1965. The IBM effort was headed up by E. J. Patzner, R.
G. Dessauer, and M. R. Poponiak. At that time IBM was in great need of single-
crystal silicon for semiconductor production, having just entered into the production of
the 360 Series computer. The firm looked to automatic diameter control as one means
to increase production capacity.
An initial pilot system using automatic diameter control was in use in 1966. It was
turned over to IBM's production department in early 1967. In October 1967, IBM
researchers published a very detailed article describing the system and its capabilities.l
Commercialization
The first firm to manufacture the automatic diameter control system commercially was
Hamco Corporation of Rochester, New York. Hamco introduced it as a feature on the
first crystal grower of their manufacture, which they introduced in 1967. Hamco did
not license the technique from IBM-they simply adopted it. Other firms did license
the system from IBM at a fee that IBM describes as nominal. The first firm to license
from IBM was National Research Corporation, which already made crystal growers.
Indeed, the original system developed by IBM was built up on an NRC crystal puller.
Note
1. E. J. Patzner, R. G. Dessauer, and M. R. Poponiak, "Automatic Diameter
Control of Czochralski Crystals," Semiconductor Products and Solid State Technology
10, no.10 (October 1967): 25-30.
Float Zone Crystal Growing
The float zone method of manufacturing single silicon crystals is an alternative to the
dislocation-free crystal-pulling technique (which innovation see). It saw little commer-
cial use in the United States but was extensively used in Germany-especially by
Siemens. In the float zone technique, a rod of multicrystalline silicon is held in a
vertical position by supports attached to both its ends. A small heated ring circles-but
does not touch-one portion of the silicon rod. A seed crystal of silicon is next placed
against one end of the rod and the heating ring is brought adjacent to it. The heating
ring melts the silicon adjacent to the seed crystal. Slow movement of the ring down the
length of the rod causes the molten silicon to crystallize into a single crystal following
the pattern of the seed crystal. The surface tension of the molten silicon zone keeps the




Zone refining, a precursor of floating zone crystal growing, was developed by W. G.
Pfann, a metallurgist at Bell Laboratories, in 1951. The Pfann process was similar to
the floating zone process just described, but it involved placing the material to be
crystallized in a crucible rather than suspending it in space. Since molten silicon reacts
chemically with most container materials, the Pfann process did not prove usable with
silicon. About 1952 H. C. Theurer, also at Bell Laboratories, conceived of the float
zone process and reported it in his laboratory diary. Slightly later and independently,
Amis and Siemens as well as Paul H. Kech of the U.S. Army Signal Corps developed a
similar technique. Kech published his results in 1952.1 Later, Theurer's diary showed
his priority in the invention; eventually Bell Laboratories was assigned a patent. 2
Commercialization
According to H. C. Theurer, the first firm to commercialize the float zone technique
was the German firm of Siemens in the early 1950s. Siemens used the process in the
course of manufacturing silicon semiconductors. The first firm to commercially manu-
facture a float zone process machine was Ecco Corporation, North Bergen, New
Jersey, in 1953. Ecco was approached by Paul Kech of the Army Signal Corps, one of
the developers of the float zone technique. Ecco was a manufacturer of high-frequency
induction heating devices, and Kech placed an order with them for an induction
heating device appropriate for the float zone refining of silicon material. After the sale
of the initial device ordered by Kech, Ecco modified and enlarged the float zone
device, and today it manufactures float zone refining equipment for commercial sale.
Notes
1. Paul H. Kech and Marcel J. E. Golay, "Crystallization of Silicon from a Floating
Liquid Zone," Physical Review 89, no. 6 (15 March 1953): 1297.
2. U.S. Patent No. 3,060,123.
Wafer Slicing: OD Saw
After a rod of silicon single crystal is manufactured, it must be sliced into very thin
circular wafers. The blade thickness of the saw has an important effect on the yield of
wafers from a given length of a single crystal rod. Obviously, the thicker the blade, the
greater the proportion of single crystal that will be reduced to dust. The so-called OD
saw was apparently first used to slice the silicon single crystals used to manufacture
semiconductors. The design of the saw is somewhat like a bread slicer with a rotary
blade-the outer diameter of which (abbreviated as OD) bears against the single
crystal to be sawn.
Development History
Little is known about the development of OD saws. Apparently they were used in a
range of industries prior to their application to the semiconductor industry. Who first
applied them to the task of slicing semiconductor wafers is not known.
Commercialization
It is not known who was first to commercially manufacture OD saws. Apparently a
firm called Do-All was an important supplier of such machines to early semiconductor
firm purchasers.
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Wafer Slicing: ID Saw
The ID saw has a significantly thinner blade than that used on an OD saw (see
preceding entry). The blade of the ID saw is a thin sheet of metal of circular shape with
a large circular hole in the middle. This circular blade is clamped around its entire
outside circumference, and the edge of the large hole in its center is used as a cutting
blade-thus the name ID saw. Material to be sliced is slid into the hole, which is larger
than the diameter of a silicon single crystal rod, and then pressed against the cutting
edge for slicing.
The rigid clamping of an ID saw blade around its entire outer circumference and the
application of some radial tension to the blade makes an ID saw blade much more rigid
than an equally thick OD saw blade. Thus ID saw blades of similar performance can be
thinner, increasing the number of wafers that can be sliced from a given rod of a silicon
single crystal.
Development History
Little is known about the development history of the ID saw. We have learned of, but
have been unable to trace, a British patent credited to Sayers that describes the ID
slicer. We have also been told of an article in the field of dental research that appeared
in a Belgian journal in the mid-1950s. This article reportedly describes an ID saw being
used as a tooth slicer.
Commercialization
Capco Corporation, a British company, reportedly sold the first ID slicers used in the
semiconductor industry to GE and Raytheon around 1960. In 1961 the Do-All Com-
pany apparently licensed the British patent and started production of ID saws. In that
same year Hamco of Rochester, New York, began to produce ID saws without a
license. Hamco's decision to proceed without a license was apparently based on recol-
lection of the Belgian article, whose publication date preceded the date of the British
patent.
Wafer Polishing: Silicon Dioxide
Chemical/Mechanical Process
After wafers are sawn from single crystal rods of silicon, their surfaces must be pol-
ished. Original practice in the semiconductor industry was to polish these wafers much
as glass lenses are polished in the optical industry, that is, with very fine abrasives.
Polishing by abrasion was slow and did not leave an entirely damage-free wafer surface
on completion. The silicon dioxide chemical/mechanical polishing process cut the pol-
ishing time from approximately 11/2 hours to approximately 5 minutes. It also resulted
in a damage-free surface.
Development History
The silicon dioxide chemical/mechanical process of polishing silicon wafers was devel-
oped by R. J. Walsh and A. Herzog of Monsanto Corporation.' Monsanto was in the
business of supplying polished silicon wafers to the semiconductor industry and Walsh
and Herzog were aware of the need for an improved process. The process developed
by Walsh and Herzog was not developed theoretically, according to Walsh. When
searching for better mechanical abrasives, Walsh experimented with submicron parti-
cles of silicon dioxide suspended in an alkaline fluid. The excellent results achieved
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with this material turned out to be due to chemical as well as mechanical factors-but
this result was serendipitous. Monsanto first sold silicon wafers that had been polished
by the silicon dioxide chemical/mechanical technique in late 1962.
Commercialization
The silicon dioxide chemical/mechanical process for polishiing silicon wafers can be
implemented by using the innovative polishing material in existing polishing machines.
According to Monsanto, most suppliers of polished wafers are using the Monsanto
technique, but only Western Electric has licensed it from Monsanto. Since no special-
purpose machinery is required, no equipment supplier has become involved in the
commercialization or dissemination of this innovation.
Note
1. R. J. Walsh and A. Herzog, U.S. Patent No. 3,170,273, issued 23 February 1965,
and assigned to Monsanto. Also, Erich Mendel, "Polishing of Silicon," Semiconductor
Products and Solid State Technology 10, no. 8 (August 1967): 36-37.
Wafer Polishing: Cupric Salt
Chemical/Mechanical Process
The cupric salt chemical/mechanical method of polishing silicon wafers was signifi-
cantly faster than the silicon dioxide chemical/mechanical process used previously (see
preceding entry). The process also provides a damage-free mirror surface on silicon
wafers.'
Development History
The cupric salt chemical/mechanical method of polishing silicon wafers was developed
at IBM. IBM manufactures its own semiconductors on a large scale. Researchers were
concerned that the technique that IBM was using left imperfect wafer surfaces. Three
researchers at IBM had an idea that a solution of water-soluble salts of fluoride and
nitride would produce a very slow etching reaction that would improve the quality of
the surface. When they tried this solution of salts, they found that the wafers produced
were, indeed, perfectly polished. After continued experimentation, however, they
found that the valuable polishing action was actually being achieved by cupric ions.
These ions were being introduced to the solution inadvertently through corrosion of
some of the copper plumbing in the experimental equipment. When this serendipi-
tously discovered effect was understood, they found they could control it well enough
for use in commercial production. 2
Commercialization
IBM began to use cupric salt chemical/mechanical wafer polishing on its in-house
production of silicon semiconductor wafers in 1966. It is not clear whether any other
firms are using the technique. The innovation was an innovation in polishing solutions
only; no change in existing polishing equipment was required.
Notes
1. L. H. Blake and E. Mendel, "Chemical-Mechanical Polishing of Silicon," Solid
State Technology 13, no. 1 (January 1970): 42-46.
2. G. A. Silvey, J. Regh, and Gardiner, U.S. Patent No. 3,436,259, assigned to
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IBM. Also J. Regh and G. A. Silvey, paper presented at Electrochemical Society
Meeting, Philadelphia, Penn., 14 October 1966.
Epitaxial Processing: Pancake Reactor
Epitaxy is an important technique used in the fabrication of some semiconductors. The
process involves passing a gas containing atoms of silicon or other desired materials
over the heated surface of semiconductor wafers. Under proper conditions, atoms
contained in the vapor will attach themselves to the surface of the wafer in a manner
that continues the crystalline structure of the underlying wafer. The end result is a
layer of desired properties that has, in effect, been grown onto the surface of the
silicon wafer.
Development History
Researchers at Bell Laboratories had investigated the growing of epitaxial layers on
germanium as early as 1950. In 1960 they announced the process as a commercial
reality.
Commercialization
Engineers at Western Electric entrusted with setting up a production process for
semiconductors containing epitaxial layers began to search for a supplier of the needed
equipment-a pancake epitaxial reactor. Ecco Corporation, North Bergen, New Jer-
sey, was conveniently located and capable of performing the work. Ecco was given the
design requirements-possibly, but not certainly, including blueprints. Ecco shipped
the first commercial epitaxial reactor to Western Electric in September 1961.1 Sales of
Ecco Corporation in 1961 were approximately $1 million.
Note
1. V. Y. Doo and E. O. Ernst, "A Survey of Epitaxial Growth Processes and
Equipment," Semiconductor Products and Solid State Technology 10, no. 10 (October
1967): 31-39.
Epitaxial Processing: Horizontal Reactor
The horizontal epitaxial reactor performs the same function as the pancake epitaxial
reactor (see preceding entry) but is improved in so many respects that it represents a
new generation of equipment. Horizontal reactors have an increased wafer capacity
relative to pancake reactors and, because of increased automation, yield more uniform
results.
Development History
Apparently numerous users experimented with horizontal epitaxial reactor configura-
tions, one of these being Motorola, which in 1961 developed a production horizontal
epitaxial system for its own use. Motorola applied this system first to germanium
wafers and shortly thereafter to silicon. 1
According to interviewees at Motorola, much of that firm's technological informa-
tion related to horizontal epitaxial reactors came from publications that reported some
English experimental work. Motorola took out some patents on aspects of their hori-
zontal reactor about 1961. Names reportedly on the patent were T. Law, W. Corrigan,
G. Russel, and Klink.
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In late 1962 or early 1963 an engineer who had worked on the Motorola project,
Larry Jo, left Motorola and began to work at Fairchild Semiconductor. The latter firm
was working on an improved horizontal reactor; in 1964 Fairchild did develop both an
improved reactor that had larger capacity than earlier reactors and a susceptor made of
silicon carbide. (The susceptor is the surface upon which the wafers being treated lie.
The wafers can be contaminated by the susceptor if improper materials are used.) Jo
found that the Fairchild system was very operator dependent, that is, reproducibility of
results was greatly dependent on the individual operating the system. He, therefore,
set about developing an automated system.
Commercialization
The first firm to produce the horizontal epitaxial reactor commercially was Semi-
Metals, a New Jersey firm in 1965. This firm had not previously been in the business of
manufacturing equipment for the semiconductor industry, but was involved in the
manufacture of silicon wafers. It occurred to that firm, however, that manufacture of a
horizontal epitaxial reactor might be a commercially profitable venture. Larry Jo was
hired from Fairchild to be the engineer in charge of the project. According to Jo, the
reactor commercialized by Semi-Metals was effectively the same as the one developed
by Fairchild in 1964.
Note
1. V. Y. Doo and E. O. Ernst, "A Survey of Epitaxial Growth Processes and
Equipment," Semiconductor Products and Solid State Technology 10, no. 10 (October
1967): 31-39.
Epitaxial Processing: Barrel Reactor
The barrel epitaxial reactor serves the same function as the original pancake epitaxial
reactor (which innovation see). However, it represents an improvement over both the
pancake and horizontal reactors in terms of capacity as well as in terms of uniformity of
results obtained. The barrel reactor gets its name from its geometry. Silicon wafers to
be processed are attached to the outer surface of a cylinder looking somewhat like a
barrel. This cylinder is then placed within another concentric cylinder, and the gas
used to treat the wafers is passed between the two cylinders while the inner cylinder
rotates. The rotation of the inner cylinder insures that all wafers are exposed to the
same processing conditions.
Development History
Work on the barrel reactor was begun by IBM in the early 1960s. IBM was driven by a
need for higher production capacity for epitaxial wafers. In 1965 the development was
presented by IBM researchers at a meeting of the Electrochemical Society. A patent
was assigned to IBM in 1969. Apparently several other firms-including RCA, Texas
Instruments, and Motorola-replicated the IBM barrel reactor for their own use in the
1960s. It is not clear whether or not these firms licensed the technology from IBM.
Commercialization
In 1971 the barrel epitaxial reactor was commercialized by Applied Materials Technol-
ogy (AMT), Santa Clara, California. The AMT product utilized the basic configura-
tion of the IBM system. However, it also included an AMT-developed radiant heating
system rather than the radio frequency heating system used by IBM. (Wafers are
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heated as part of epitaxial processing.) AMT claims the use of radiant heat results in a
pure and more uniform product and they have patented it.2
Applied Materials Technology had sales of less than $16 million in 1971, the year in
which it commercialized the barrel reactor.
Notes
1. E. Ernst, D. Hurd, G. Seeley, and P. Olshefski, "High-Capacity Epitaxy Ma-
chines," paper presented at Electrochemical Society Meeting, Buffalo, N.Y., 10-14
October 1965.
2. V. Y. Doo and E. O. Ernst, "A Survey of Epitaxial Growth Processes and
Equipment," Semiconductor Products and Solid State Technology 10, no. 10 (October
1967): 31-39.
Resist Coating: Wafer Spinner
One of the early steps in semiconductor manufacture involves coating of a wafer with a
thin film of photoresist-a material formulated to change chemically when exposed to
light. This change allows one to selectively remove either the exposed or unexposed
portions of the resist film by further chemical processing. It is important to the manu-
facture of quality semiconductors that the resist coating be put on in a very thin, even
layer. Historically, this has been accomplished by placing wafers on a disk, putting a
drop of resist on the wafer surface, and then spinning the wafers very rapidly to
achieve a thin, even film of resist. The machine that performs these functions is called
a wafer spinner.
Development History
It is not clear which user firm was first to develop wafer spinners. It is clear, however,
that user firms developed these spinners before commercial equipment producers did.
In June 1962 employees then at Fairchild, a major semiconductor maker, report that
spinners were in use. These were crude machines-simple aluminum plates with a lip
on the outer diameter and a motor underneath. Operators would place several wafers
against the lip of the rotor, drip resist on each, and then turn on the motor.
Commercialization
The first commercially produced resist spinner was introduced commercially during or
before 1964. Industry participants no longer recall, however, which firm was first to
commercialize a spinner. Candidate firms are Micro Tech Manufacturing, Transmask,
Preco, and Applied Engineering.
Resist Coating: High Acceleration Wafer Spinner
Wafer spinners are used to spread thin coatings of resist on semiconductor wafer
surfaces (see description of basic wafer spinner above). High-speed photography
showed that most of the spreading of the resist occurred within the first few revolutions
of the spinner and that high acceleration of the spinner could produce a thinner, more
uniform coat of resist-both very desirable characteristics.
Development History
The high acceleration spinner was developed by Vern Shipman, an engineer who
founded a firm called Head Way Research Corporation, Garland, Texas. Shipman had
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worked at Collins Radio exploring how to put thin film resist on quartz substrates. He
started his firm in June 1964, and in October 1964 decided to build a resist spinner as
his first product. At that time he did not have semiconductor manufacturers in mind as
customers; instead, he was thinking of electronics firms (e.g., Collins Radio) that
needed thin films in order to manufacture other kinds of electronic components. He
completed his first machine in December 1964.
Commercialization
Shipman sold his first machine to Texas Instruments in December 1964. From the
user's point of view, the high acceleration feature of the Head Way spinner was
perhaps most important, but the machine had numerous other useful features as well
such as automatic braking on the completion of the resist coating cycle; this increased
its productivity.
The high acceleration wafer spinner was the first product of Head Way Research.
Mask Alignment: Split Field Optics
Several masks--each precisely aligned with preceding masks-are required in the
fabrication of a typical integrated circuit semiconductor. The mask alignment proce-
dure first used in the industry involved marking two dots at widely different points on a
wafer along with two similarly positioned dots on each mask. Operators would then
align succeeding masks by visually superimposing the dots on each mask with the dots
on the wafer surface.
Early process equipment consisted of a microscope that would allow an operator to
focus on one of these dots at a time. The operator would first align a dot on the wafer
with a matching dot on the mask as best he could: He would then shift to the other dot
and repeat the operation. Since alignment activities on the second dot would disturb
the alignment on the first dot, several shiftings back and forth were required before the
process was completed. Using this system, skilled operators might be able to align five
or six masks per hour.
The introduction of split field optics allowed the operator to see both dots at once
and to align both at once. This relatively simple innovation increased the productivity
of operators performing mask alignment tenfold.
Development History
Users who developed split field optics and other process innovations typically pre-
ferred not to publicize their innovations: They wished to keep knowledge of their
success from their competitors. We are thus forced to rely on the recollection of
interviewees as to priority in the development of split field optics. According to indus-
try interviewees, Jim Nall at Fairchild was the first to develop a split field alignment
system in late 1959 or early 1960.
Commercialization
The first firm to offer split field optic alignment systems commercially was Micro
Tech Manufacturing (now a division of Sprague Corporation) in 1963.1 It is not clear
whether Micro Tech developed the split field optics concept itself or whether it
acquired it from a user. Ed Forcier, the founder of Micro Tech, was an employee of
Fairchild at the time that Nall developed the split field system there. Thus, he might
have been in a position to learn of it at Fairchild. On the other hand, Ed Jasiewicz,
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general manager of Micro Tech in 1974, felt that the system was developed entirely
in-house.
In 1964 Kulicke and Soffa (K&S) also announced a split field mask alignment
system. The genesis of their product was, they report, an approach by a representative
of Nikon, the Japanese optical firm, who offered to sell them a set of split field optics
usable in a split field optics mask alignment system.
Note
1. Micro Tech Manufacturing, Advertisement, Semiconductor Products 6, no. 8
(August 1963): 62.
Mask Alignment: Automated System
An automated mask alignment system automatically performs the alignment work
previously performed by an operator using a split field optical system (see preceding
entry). The principal advantage of the system is increased speed and increased accu-
racy-the latter improves the yield of finished semiconductors of good quality.
Development History
The key firm in the development of automated mask alignment systems was Computer-
vision of Medford, Massachusetts. This firm is an equipment manufacturing firm;
according to industry interviewees, no user development work preceded their efforts.
Computervision was formed in the late 1960s by three engineers, one from Singer
Corporation and two from Concord Controls Corporation. Their goal was to produce
automated devices. One of their initial products was an automated mask alignment
system. According to Michael Cronin of Computervision, the company founders were
told by most manufacturers that it was impossible to build an automated alignment
system and that IBM had apparently tried with no success to fabricate one. Computer-
vision initially tried to induce Kulicke and Soffa, a firm well-known for optical align-
ment systems, to engage in a joint venture. When Kulicke and Soffa expressed no
interest, Computervision bought one of the standard K&S systems, modified it for
automatic operation, and then showed it to Kulicke and Soffa. At last, K&S was
sufficiently impressed with it to enter into a joint venture for the production of the
device.
Commercialization
The first models of the K&S/Computervision auto aligners were offered at the
WESCOM show in 1970. About 50 of the systems were sold, but they had problems that,
a year or two later, led K&S to discontinue its involvement with auto aligners and with
Computervision. Computervision then acquired Cobilt Corporation in California, a
small concern producing manual aligners, and in 1972 introduced a new series of auto
aligners, which became the first fully successful commercial product in the field.
Silicon Junction Fabrication: Diffused Junction Furnace
Silicon transistors are made up of regions "doped" with p-type and n-type impurities.
Where these regions meet, a so-called junction is formed. Such junctions are the real
operating heart of semiconductor devices.
The first silicon transistors sold commercially had so-called grown junctions. Grown
junction technology appears to have been developed independently at Bell Laborato-
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ries and at General Electric. At Bell Labs the initial work was carried on by Morgan
Sparks and Gordon Teal, with the first publication regarding the process appearing in
1951.1 Work at GE on grown junctions was carried out by R. N. Hall and his associ-
ates. Grown junctions are created by simply adding impurities of the proper type to a
silicon crystal as it is being grown. For example, if one begins to grow a crystal from
molten silicon containing a p-type impurity, then the resulting crystal will be p-type.
Addition of sufficient n-type impurity to overwhelm the p-type impurity during the
growing process of this crystal will result in a switch from p-type to n-type silicon-with
the point at which the transition takes place being a grown junction.
The dominant method used to produce silicon junctions today is called the diffusion
method. This method was developed at Bell Laboratories, which called a second
symposium of its licensees to inform them of the technology in 1956. This process
involves heating silicon wafers in a furnace to a precise temperature for a precise time,
and at the same time passing a gas containing the desired p- or n-type material that one
wants to use to form a junction through the furnace. The high temperature in the
furnace allows atoms of the impurity to diffuse into the crystal structure of the silicon
to a known concentration and a known depth, thus creating a diffused junction. The
process equipment used to create diffused junctions is called a diffusion furnace. It is
essentially a furnace in which the temperature and the introduction of the impurities
can be controlled very precisely.
Development History
The first diffusion furnaces used to manufacture diffused junction transistors commer-
cially were built by user firms. Later, manufacturers of laboratory furnaces custom-
built furnaces to user specifications.
It took several years for the furnace users to fully understand what the critical
parameters of the diffusion process were. When it became apparent that the tempera-
ture stability and control were extremely critical to the production of good diffused
junction semiconductors, furnace manufacturers were able to respond very quickly
with precisely controllable furnaces.
Commercialization
In 1961 the Heavy Duty Electric Division of Sola Basic Products Company introduced
a line of special-purpose diffusion furnaces at the WESCOM show.
Note
1. W. Shockley, M. Sparks, and G. K. Teal, "p-n Junction Transistors," Physical
Review 83, no. 1 (1 July 1951): 151-62.
Silicon Junction Fabrication:
Ion Implantation Accelerator
Silicon junctions in semiconductors are created by bringing n-type material into close
contact with p-type material. This is done by introducing n-type impurities into a
region of a p-type material, or vice versa. Ion implantation-a method of introducing
such impurities-has the potential of being more precise than the thermal diffusion
method (see preceding entry). The method involves first ionizing atoms of the desired
impurity and then accelerating them to a known speed by means of an ion accelerator.
The ion beam thus created is aimed at specified points on the silicon wafer surface, and




Some early experimental work on ion implantation was performed at Bell Laborato-
ries in the early 1950s. 1 The commercial success of the diffusion process, however,
delayed serious commercial interest in the ion implantation technique until the 1960s.
In the early 1960s a significant amount of experimentation with ion implantation was
conducted by Hughes Laboratory at Newport Beach, California (H. G. Dill and R. W.
Bowers were among the principal investigators); by Bell Laboratories at Murray Hill
(A. McRae was a principal investigator); at AFCRL (Dr. Rooslid was a principal
investigator); and at an Ion Physics joint venture with Signetics Corporation. The Ion
Physics/Signetics group apparently did produce some ion-implanted devices for the
U.S. Air Force in the early 1960s, and they published a discussion of methods for
producing such devices in 1965.
Commercialization
Early experimental work on ion implantation was conducted using laboratory-type ion
accelerators that were commercially available from several sources. Ion accelerators
specifically designed to be used in the production of semiconductors were probably
first commercialized by High Voltage Engineering in about 1969.
High Voltage Engineering was a partner in a venture to develop ion-implanted
devices called Ion Physics/Signetics. In its work it did develop ion implantation accel-
erators, but it was prevented by its partnership agreement from selling these commer-
cially-the venture was interested in selling devices only. When the Ion Physics/
Signetics venture was dissolved in 1968 or 1969, High Voltage Engineering was free to
pursue the sale of ion implantation accelerators. It sold only a few of these, however,
before deciding that the field was commercially unattractive.
The second firm to commercialize an ion implantation accelerator specifically de-
signed for semiconductor implantation work was Accelerators, Inc. Hughes had
bought 20% of Accelerators stock in 1968 or 1969, and Hughes scientists designed the
production-oriented accelerator sold by them. In 1970 Accelerators shipped their first
production-oriented accelerator to Hughes at Newport Beach. Previously, Accelera-
tors, Inc., had produced laboratory-type accelerators.
In 1971 Extrion Corporation began to produce production-oriented ion accelerators.
Extrion was a start-up company formed by employees of High Voltage Engineering
who left that firm when it decided to stop producing accelerators for semiconductor ion
implantation work.
Note
1. W. Shockley, U.S. Patent No. 2,787,564, issued in 1954.
Scribing and Dicing: Automated Mechanical Device
In the process of making semiconductors, many circuits are fabricated simultaneously
on a single wafer of silicon crystal. When completed, these circuits must be physically
separated from each other, and this is done by breaking the silicon wafer on which they
were fabricated into tiny square chips--each containing only one circuit.
In the earliest days of the industry, the scribing-and-dicing process step was carried
out by a worker who, with the aid of jigs and fixtures, scratched lines manually
between the circuits on a wafer with a sharp diamond point and then broke the wafer
along those lines with the aid of a straightedge. This manual process was slow and
subject to worker error. For example, a worker might easily tire and scribe a line
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through the middle of some circuits instead of along their edges-and thus ruin them.
To improve yield and to lower costs, automatic machinery was developed to perform
the scribing-and-dicing task. The initial generation of such equipment simply auto-
mated the process previously carried out manually. That is, a diamond point was
mounted on a machine that would move the point in such a way as to scribe the wafers
at the proper locations.
Development History
Several semiconductor manufacturing firms may have developed their own automatic
scribing-and-dicing machines. The device with the closest link to the first autoscriber
produced commercially was that built by Western Electric engineers at their Allen-
town, Pennsylvania, plant. Western began using their internally developed auto-
scribers in 1958 or 1959.
Commercialization
The first automatic scribing-and-dicing machine to be placed in the commercial market-
place was introduced by Kulicke and Soffa in March 1960. K&S was formed in the
early 1950s as a machine design firm. In 1958 they observed the automatic scriber and
dicer developed by Western Electric when they were invited into a Western Electric
plant to perform an unrelated machine design task. K&S felt that there might be a
commercial market for such a machine and proceeded to design a commercial version.
In 1965 Tempress also introduced a commercial automatic scribing-and-dicing ma-
chine. Tempress was formed by former Fairchild employees and, according to in-
terviewees at that firm, the Tempress product embodied scribing-and-dicing technol-
ogy developed at Fairchild.
Scribing and Dicing: Laser Scriber and Dicer
Laser scribing-and-dicing equipment performs precisely the same function in the semi-
conductor fabrication process as does the earlier mechanical scriber and dicer (see
preceding entry). Its main difference is that it substitutes a laser beam for the diamond
cutting tool used in the mechanical scribing-and-dicing machine. The laser beam offers
the user two major advantages over the earlier diamond scribing machine. First, it is
much faster. Second, the laser beam cuts much more deeply into the wafer than did the
diamond cutting tool. These deep cuts make the process of separating the wafer into
individual chips more accurate and thus increase yield.
Development History
Quantronics of Long Island, New York, was a manufacturer of lasers. In 1968 it was
actively involved in trying to find applications for these. During a trip to Texas Instru-
ments, a semiconductor manufacturer, Quantronics discovered that the firm had tried
unsuccessfully to build a laser scriber system. They tried to persuade Texas Instru-
ments that Quantronics could succeed where Texas Instruments had failed and that the
latter should join them in a joint venture. Texas Instruments was not interested,
however. Later in 1968, Quantronics was able to interest Motorola in a laser scribing
system.
In 1968 Quantronics and Motorola entered into an informal joint effort in which
Motorola supplied Quantronics with some development funds and a great deal of




Quantronics offered a laser scriber and dicer commercially in 1970. The first unit was
shipped to Motorola. Immediately thereafter Texas Instruments purchased 24 units at
$70,000 per unit.
In about 1971 Electroglas also commercialized a laser scribing-and-dicing machine.
In the 1970s Quantronics and Electroglas held the major share of the market for laser
scribing-and-dicing machinery.
Wire Bonding: Thermocompression Bonding
Semiconductor chips must be linked electrically to the outside world in order to func-
tion. This electrical linking is achieved by means of tiny metal wires that are physically
bonded to the semiconductor chip on one end and to an electrical connector on the
other. The bonding of the wire to the surface of a semiconductor chip is a difficult task.
The wire must make a good electrical connection that will not degrade with time.
The earliest means of bonding wires to commercially produced silicon semiconduc-
tor devices involved tiny balls of solder that in essence soldered the wire to the chip.
These solder bonds proved difficult to produce reliably. Sometimes the joint was
mechanically weak; at others the solder joints would form a diode junction with the
semiconductor materials and thus degrade the performance of the semiconductor.
Thermocompression bonding, the innovation under consideration, involves heating
the semiconductor surface to about 200°-300°C and then simply pressing the wire to be
bonded against the semiconductor chip surface at the appropriate place with a pressure
from 5000 to 10,000 lb/sq in. In a few seconds a bond with excellent physical and
electrical properties is formed. The machine that performs this task is called a thermo-
compression bonder.
Development History
Thermocompression bonding was developed by three scientists of Bell Laboratories:
O. L. Anderson, H. Christensen, and P. Andreatch. Most of the work of this team was
performed in the 1955-58 time period. The team published its findings,1 and the need
was so great that many semiconductor manufacturers built their own thermocompres-
sion bonders in-house in the 1957-59 period.
Commercialization
The first commercial thermocompression bonder was offered by Kulicke and Soffa in
late 1959. Demand for the product was so strong that within a year of introduction, net
sales exceeded $1 million.
K&S observed thermocompression bonding in production equipment that was oper-
ating at a Western Electric semiconductor plant in 1958. K&S engineers made only
minor mechanical modifications to the Western Electric thermocompression bonder
before commercializing it.
Note
1. O. L. Anderson, H. Christensen, and P. Andreatch, "Technique for Connecting




Wire Bonding: Ultrasonic Bonding
The ultrasonic bonding of metals involves rubbing together the two pieces of metal to
be bonded with such high energy that surface impurities on the two metal surfaces to
be bonded are scrubbed away and the underlying atoms of metal brought into close
enough contact to form a good bond. In ultrasonic bonding, the energy for mechani-
cally rubbing the two pieces of metal together is provided by a tool that vibrates
mechanically at an ultrasonic frequency.
Development History
Ultrasonic bonding as a general welding technique was discovered in the 1950s. Its first
application to the attachment of wires to semiconductor chips apparently occurred in
the mid-1960s, according to interviewees at Sonobond Corporation, Westchester,
Pennsylvania, a supplier of ultrasonic welding equipment. Who was actually first to
develop an ultrasonic bonder for semiconductor manufacturing use is not clear. It
appears that Sonobond initially supplied ultrasonic transducers-the generators of
ultrasonic energy needed for welding-to Fairchild and Motorola who then designed
the first ultrasonic bonding equipment in-house.
Commercialization
Ultrasonic bonding equipment for the bonding of wires to semiconductor chips was
commercialized by Sonobond in the 1960s. The corporation initially provided only the
source of ultrasonic energy to semiconductor manufacturers but later commercialized
a complete machine for the ultrasonic bonding of wires to semiconductor chips.
Mask Graphics: Optical Pattern Generator
The patterns of light and shadow that expose the resist-coated semiconductor wafers
are generated by so-called masks. These masks must be very precise, and their creation
is a demanding task. They are created on a large scale-perhaps 5 ft by 5 ft-and then
photographically reduced. Masks were first created by a hand technique much like
drafting: A desired pattern was cut out of a material called Rubylith by means of a
straightedge and a small hand-held knife. When integrated circuits became more com-
plex, the patterns needed in masks became more complex, and it was no longer
practical to produce these masks by hand. The solution to the problem was a numeri-
cally controlled machine that exposed a large sheet of photographic material in the
desired pattern.
Development History
Interest in automated mask generation began in the mid-1960s with the realization that
large-scale integration required masks too complex to be cut manually. Bell Laborato-
ries and IBM were among the first to attempt to create automated mask generation
machines. Their initial attempts involved computer-driven knives that basically auto-
mated the former handwork of cutting a Rubylith pattern. This technique was eventu-
ally found unpromising: Even though the Rubylith material was automatically cut,
human operators still had to select which sections of material were to be stripped away
from the pattern and which left behind. Mistakes made in this process were as devastat-
ing as mistakes made in the cutting process.
The innovation developed at IBM and elsewhere involved mounting a large photo-
graphic plate on a table that could be moved in the x and y directions under numerical
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control. A photographic projector would then project various-sized rectangles as speci-
fied by a computer program in order to create the pattern of light and shadow specified
for a particular mask design.2
Commercialization
In July 1967 R. C. Beeh, an employee of OPTO Mechanisms, described a device that
appeared to be a commercial automated pattern generator.3 OPTO Mechanisms is,
however, no longer in business and, although the product pictured in Beeh's article
appears to be a commercial device, it is not clear that one was ever sold. (According to
industry interviewees, OPTO Mechanisms did receive an order for one unit from
Texas Instruments. That unit was never accepted by Texas Instruments, however,
which apparently contributed to OPTO Mechanisms' eventual bankruptcy in about
1971.)
The first automated optical generator for the manufacture of semiconductor masks
that was produced by an equipment manufacturer and successfully sold was put on the
market in April 1968 by GCA/David W. Mann Company. The Mann system was much
like the IBM system described in July 1967. The machine involved a numerically
controlled pair of perpendicularly mounted slits. A light was mounted behind the slits
and, depending on the position of the slits, was projected on a photographic plate
mounted on an x-y table as a rectangle of any desired dimension. A suitable choice of
rectangles and suitable positionings of the x-y table could be combined to build up any
desired mask pattern.
Since its introduction in 1968, the original model 1600 optical pattern generator has
been steadily improved. By 1976, a model was available that was about 10 times faster
than the original model.
Notes
1. See H. O. Hook, "Automated Mask Production for Semiconductor Technol-
ogy," Semiconductor Products and Solid State Technology 10, no.7 (July 1967): 35-38;
and P. Donald Payne, "Photomask Technology in Integrated Circuits," Semiconductor
Products and Solid State Technology 10, no.7 (July 1967): 39-42.
2. See note 1.
3. Roland C. M. Beeh, "A High Accuracy Automated Microflash Camera," Semi-
conductor Products and Solid State Technology 10, no.7 (July 1967): 43-49.
Mask Graphics: Electron Beam Pattern Generator
The major advantage electron beam mask pattern generation devices provide relative
to optical pattern generators is their higher resolution: Optical systems are limited to
about 7 A spot size, whereas electron beam systems can produce a /2 A spot size. The
higher resolution obtainable with electron beam devices in turn allows users of the
systems to make more complex and denser masks for integrated circuits.
Development History
The early history of electron beam pattern generators is difficult for us to discover
because a great deal of the early work was apparently done outside the United States.
The earliest advertisement we can find for a commercialized electron beam device
appears in Solid State Technology in 1968: It describes a computer-controlled masked
generator of the electron beam type offered for sale by JEOL, a Japanese corporation.
The first work in the United States on an electron beam mask generator was appar-
180
Innovation Histories
ently begun in 1966. In that year research was begun at a Bell Laboratories research
center in Princeton, New Jersey, that resulted in the creation of experimental devices
during the next three or four years. In 1971 Bell Laboratories used a system of its own
design to manufacture actual integrated circuit masks at its Murray Hill facility.
Commercialization
The first electron beam mask pattern generator offered for commercial sale in the
United States was apparently that advertised by JEOL in 1968. The development
history of that system and its eventual commercial success or failure are not known to
us.
Mask Reduction: Two-Stage Step
and Repeat Reduction Process
A two-step process is used to reduce the black-and-white pattern for an integrated
circuit mask from its original size of perhaps several feet square to the miniature size
necessary for actual use in connection with producing tiny integrated circuits. The
process consists first of reducing the full-size layout by a factor of perhaps 20 by means
of a precision camera. A second precision camera then reduces the image by another
factor of 20 or so and then "steps" the reduced image across a photographic plate, thus
creating multiple images of the same mask pattern. This plate is then used to produce
multiple integrated circuits on a single wafer of silicon.
Development History
The two-stage step and repeat mask reduction process was developed almost simulta-
neously by two user groups and by a manufacturer of equipment-all apparently
working independently. The first work was done by users at Fairchild Semiconductor
about 1959. Gordon Moore of Fairchild recalls that Bob Noyce constructed a two-step
photo-reduction system for internal use at Fairchild about 1959. Fairchild, however,
made no attempt to commercialize this device; indeed, it strove earnestly to keep it
secret.
From 1959 through 1961 researchers at Diamond Ordnance Fuze Laboratories,
located in Washington, D.C., also developed a two-step mask reduction process. T. C.
Hellmers, Jr., and J. R. Wall reported their work in detail in a January 1961 article.
About 1960 GCA/David W. Mann Company began to develop a two-stage step and
repeat mask reduction machine for commercial sale. That firm had been receiving
orders for masks from semiconductor firms (the first such firm being Transitron) since
early 1960. Since GCA/David W. Mann was essentially an instrument-manufacturing
company, not a service-providing company, their thoughts naturally turned to manufac-
turing a device rather than providing a service.
Commercialization
GCA/David W. Mann was the first firm to make a two-stage step and repeat mask
reduction device available to semiconductor manufacturers commercially. They first
showed the device in the spring of 1961 and sold the first one to Clevite Corporation on
28 April 1961.
GCA/David W. Mann had sales of under $2 million in 1961. Fairchild Semiconduc-




1. T. C. Hellmers, Jr., and J. R. Nall, "Microphotographs for Electronics," Semi-
conductor Products 4, no. 1 (January 1961): 37-42.
DATA SET FOR PULTRUSION PROCESS MACHINERY
INNOVATIONS
The innovations described in this data set are associated with pultrusion process ma-
chinery. The innovation history of the pultrusion process is followed from the original
rudimentary equipment through the major process machinery improvements that have
been commercialized over the years. Sample selection criteria are discussed in chapter
3.
Because the manufacturers and users of pultrusion equipment do not often docu-
ment their innovations in publications, most of the information comes from interviews
held with employees of pultrusion equipment manufacturer and user firms who had
direct knowledge regarding the sampled innovations.
Original Batch Pultrusion Process
Pultrusion machines fabricate fiber-reinforced plastics products of constant cross-
section. An everyday example of a pultruded product is the fiberglass-reinforced rod
used by the makers of fiberglass fishing rods. In essence, pultrusion machines create
pultruded products by quite a simple process. Reinforcing material such as fiberglass
roving or cloth is first wetted with a thermoset resin such as polyester, then pulled
through a heated block of steel (a die) that has a hole in the middle of a cross-section
matching that of the desired pultruded product. When the wetted reinforcement has
been drawn completely through the die, the resin has cured around and between the
strands of reinforcing material, and the reinforced plastic product-a pultrusion-is
complete.
Reinforced plastic product made by means of the pultrusion process is characterized
by a very high percentage of reinforcing material that is aligned in known directions.
(In contrast, ordinary reinforced plastic is characterized by short lengths of reinforce-
ment fiber oriented randomly within the plastic matrix.) These characteristics make
pultrusion especially appropriate for applications in which high stress is applied to the
part in directions parallel to the embedded material.
Development History
The first pultruded products were long, thin fiberglass-reinforced cylinders used in the
manufacture of fiberglass fishing rods. These were manufactured by Ocean City Manu-
facturing Company, Philadelphia, starting approximately in 1947. The pultrusion pro-
cess developed by this firm was a simple batch process that involved hand tooling.
Fiberglass rovings (a threadlike form of fiberglass reinforcement) were collected by
hand into bundles about the thickness and length of a fiberglass fishing rod blank.
These bundles were dipped into a container of room-temperature-cure polyester resin
and then passed through a steel plate with a hole in it the size of the diameter of the rod
being produced. This primitive die served to squeeze the rovings tightly together and




The simple tooling required by this early pultrusion process was never produced com-
mercially by a machinery builder. Today, this process is obsolete.
Intermittent Pultrusion Process
The first pultrusion process simply pulled a bundle of resin-wetted reinforcement
through a die to shape it; it then would require several more hours to fully cure. If one
could cure the pultrusion fully while it was still inside the die, one would have much
more rapid processing times as well as more precisely dimensioned pultruded parts.
The innovation described here was designed to obtain these advantages. Instead of
simply being pulled through a thin plate for shaping as in previous practice, wetted
roving was pulled into a tubular die several feet in length. Because this die was heated,
the length of material within it was fully cured in a matter of minutes. After curing,
pull was resumed on the now-cured section of pultrusion in the same direction as
before. This pull drew the cured section out of the die and at the same time drew a new
uncured wetted roving into the die behind it. When the die was once again fully filled
with uncured material, pulling would stop and the curing cycle would begin again. A
crucial (patented) invention that made the process possible involved placing a cooled
section at the front of the heated die just described. This prevented resin from curing
before it was pulled inside the die and formed to proper dimension.
Development History
The intermittent pultrusion process was developed by Roger White, president of
Glastic Corporation, Cleveland, Ohio, in 1948. White had received a large order for a
part of constant cross-section (spacer sticks for motor armature windings). As White
recalls, attempts to fabricate the parts by conventional sawing and machining opera-
tions proved too expensive, thus inducing him to develop the new method.
Glastic Corporation was a small firm and did not have an established R & D budget.
White estimates that he spent perhaps $5000 in direct costs to develop the intermittent
pultrusion process.
Commercialization
White used the intermittent pultrusion process commercially within the Glastic Corpo-
ration from about 1950 to 1966. He tried to keep the process proprietary because it was
significantly cheaper than alternative ways of making motor armature spacer sticks and
allowed him to make a 30% or 40% profit on his sales of approximately $100,000 per
year for the years 1951 through 1956. In 1956 a competitor hired away one of White's
engineers and induced him to replicate White's proprietary process. As a consequence,
profits for spacer sticks fell. White sued in an attempt to enforce his patent and after
the expenditure of much time and money was awarded only $15,000 by the court,
which also allowed the competitor to continue his infringement.
It appears that White's process machinery innovation was never used beyond the
two firms discussed here. By the 1960s the continuous pultrusion process using a
heated die (which innovation see) had advanced so far that Glastic discontinued the
use of the process described here.
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Tunnel Oven Cure
Some pultrusions need not be finished to a high tolerance (e.g., fishing rod blanks are
machined after being pultruded; thus tolerances in the pultruded part are not critical).
For such applications it would be advantageous to achieve the rapid processing rates
characteristic of heat-cure pultrusion without the constraints of a heated die. Tunnel
oven curing meets these requirements. In this process, fiberglass roving is wetted with
resin, shaped, and then pulled through a tunnel oven-a long heated chamber in which
the shaped roving and resin bundle is cured by radiant energy from the chamber walls
rather than by contact with the heated die surface.
Development History
The tunnel oven cure/continuous pull pultrusion process was developed by Sam
Shobert, president of the Polygon Corporation, Walkerton, Indiana, in 1950. At that
time Shobert was involved in the manufacture of fishing rod blanks, using a slow,
labor-intensive molding technique. Large customer orders prompted him to search for
a faster method for making the product. Shobert estimates that the direct cost of the
development project was less than $10,000 for materials, plus labor.
Commercialization
The tunnel oven cure/continuous pull pultrusion process worked well. Shobert's firm
made hundreds of thousands of fishing rod blanks, and Shobert estimates that at "one
time" they had about 80% of the market. Their profit on these was not high, however,
ranging from 3% to 7% pretax. General Electric expressed some interest in using the
process to make winding pins-a component of electric motors. Polygon gave them a
license and built them two machines for a total price of approximately $50,000. Two
years later, GE asked Polygon to take back the machines and produce the part for
them, finding this a more economical arrangement. Polygon agreed, and produced
$750,000 to $1,000,000 of the parts for GE for many years at a pretax profit of 20%.
In recent years Polygon discontinued the tunnel oven process in favor of standard
pultrusion, using a heated steel die, which had improved over the years and had
become a more economical alternative.
Heated Die CurelContinuous Pultrusion Process
Prior to the die cure/continuous pultrusion innovation, pultrusions cured within a
heated steel die could not be moved while curing. This was because polyester resin, the
thermoset resin universally used in the early days of the pultrusion process, turned into
an excellent adhesive when partially cured, gripping the die tightly at that point. Later,
when fully cured, this stickiness disappeared and the completed pultrusion could be
slid from the die. It was found that the mixing of lubricants such as carnuba wax into
polyester prior to curing would prevent the partially cured polyester from sticking to
the die surface. With this discovery, it became possible to create pultrusion process
machines that steadily and continuously drew material through the die during the
curing process.
Development History
The discovery of the value of internal lubricants in the pultrusion process and the
development of the first truly continuous pultrusion process machine were achieve-
ments of Roy Boggs, an employee of Universal Molded Products Corporation in 1955
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(today known as Morrison Molded Fiberglass Company, Bristol, Virginia). In 1955
Morrison Molded Fiberglass had obtained a large order for fiberglass handrails from
the Federal Aviation Administration, and Boggs decided to experiment with new
methods for producing these. No formal R & D budget was involved. He simply put
equipment together out of material available on the shop floor. After numerous fail-
ures caused by partially cured polyester resin adhering to the inside of his steel dies,
Boggs hit on the key idea of embodying lubrication in the resin itself. When he got the
process to the point where it would run a few feet without jamming, he showed it to his
management, which encouraged him to patent. Eventually Boggs obtained and as-
signed to Universal Molded Products more than 30 patents on the pultrusion process.
Commercialization
Universal Molded Products quickly became the largest manufacturer of pultruded
products in the world. Its successor firm, Morrison Molded Fiberglass, retains this
distinction today, having an estimated 20% market share.
Morrison Molded Fiberglass has not licensed its patents to U.S. competitors nor
attempted to enforce its patent rights to the pultrusion process in the United States. It
did not have a really basic patent and perhaps felt it could not prevail in U.S. courts.
On the other hand, in 1960 it did begin an active program of licensing foreigners to use
the pultrusion process and did and does build machines for foreign licensees. Foreign
licenseees who buy pultrusion machines from Morrison pay an initial royalty fee of
$40,000; then, they are subject to a contract that provides for continuing royalties.
(When and if foreign licensees refuse to honor these contracts-as many have-
Morrison does not attempt to enforce its rights legally, suspecting that likelihood of
success would be slim.) Morrison's annual fees from foreign licensees from 1960 to
present was not more than $100,000 per year. Morrison currently has 13 licensees.
The continuous pultrusion process reduced labor content from 50%/60% to 5%/
10% of the product direct cost relative to the hand layup process it superceded. It is the
basis of all current pultrusion processes.
Tractor Pullers
Initial continuous-pull pultruders supplied the mechanical force needed to pull the
material through the process either by winches or by so-called nip roll pullers. Nip roll
pullers consisted simply of powered wheels squeezing the pultrusion between them and
pulling it along-much as the opposed rollers of an old-style washing machine laundry
ringer drew material between them. Both systems had major drawbacks, however.
Winches were obviously not suitable for providing continuous pull over a long span,
and it was quickly found that nip roll pullers could not exert sufficient force. The
traction required to pull pultrusions through a system was found to be as much as 200
lb/in. of perimeter of the pultrusion. To meet this problem, so-called tractor pullers
were designed. These looked much like the treads of two bulldozers put face to face.
They supplied greatly increased pulling power.
Development History
The first tractor puller used in pultrusion was designed by Roy Boggs of Universal
Molded Products (currently Morrison Molded Fiberglass, Bristol, Virginia). The de-
sign task was found to be relatively difficult: Too much pressure and the pultrusion
would be crushed; too little, and the tractor pullers would slip ineffectively. Boggs
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recalls that it took $20,000 in direct cost to build the first pullers capable of pulling
pultrusions with a 14-in. perimeter.
Commercialization
The ineffectiveness of nip roll pullers for pultruding products with perimeters larger
than 1 in.-or-so was glaringly apparent to all users of pultrusion process machinery. All
these firms quickly turned to tractor pullers and made these standard industry practice.
Since building pullers was relatively complex, and since Morrison-the innovator-
would not build them for U.S. competitors, many users searched for outside suppliers.
The firm that eventually emerged as a major producer of this component of pultrusion
machines is the Gatto Corporation. This firm had earlier been in the business of tractor
pullers for less demanding applications. When pultruders informed them of the new
application, they proceeded to develop an appropriate puller. Gatto estimates that it
cost them perhaps $50,000 to $100,000 to develop the new product.
Cut-off Saw
As the pultrusion process became more rapid and reliable, it became important to
have some means of automatically cutting the continuously emerging pultrusion into
the lengths required by customers. An automatically activated saw called a cut-off saw
filled this need.
Development History
Automatic cut-off saws were used in numerous other industries for sectioning continu-
ously produced products. It therefore seemed logical to apply this device to a similar
task in the pultrusion industry. The adaptation, although very useful, seemed so unre-
markable to participants in the industry that it is not clear to them who in fact was first
to do so. Probably several users brought this innovation to the pultrusion industry
independently.
Commercialization
The use of cut-off saws is universal in the pultrusion industry today. Since cut-off saws
did not have to be specially adapted to the requirements of the pultrusion industry, no
special source of saws can be pointed to. At the time cut-off saws were adapted to the
pultrusion process, the price of such a saw was approximately $1500. Interviewees
estimate it would have cost perhaps $500 to install the saw on a pultruder.
Augmented Radio Frequency Cure
Preheating of thick-walled pultrusions with radio frequency energy before they enter a
standard steel die is the essence of the radio frequency augmented cure technique. It
very effectively serves the purpose of accelerating the rate at which such products can
be cured because heated steel dies can only heat a product from the perimeter, and it
takes a long time for heat to penetrate to the center of a thick section. In contrast,
radio frequency energy heats the entire product at once.
Development History
Radio frequency augmented cure was developed by Brant Goldsworthy in 1968. The
innovation is simply implemented by placing a radio frequency heating unit ahead of
the die location on an otherwise standard pultruder. At the time of the innovation,
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Goldsworthy owned both a pultrusion process machine user company, Glastrusions,
Inc., and a commercial manufacturer of pultrusion equipment, Goldworthy Engineer-
ing.
Commercialization
From 1968 to 1977 Goldsworthy sold perhaps a dozen radio frequency augmented cure
systems. It was his practice to sell them as accessories, with a list price of approxi-
mately $25,000 for the commercial pultruders sold by Goldsworthy Engineering. No
other firm has undertaken to supply such units to pultruders.
Preforming Tooling
As the size of pultruded products increased and as their shapes became more complex,
it was no longer sufficient to simply pull the various strands of reinforcement material
making up a pultrusion into the die. Instead, accurate placement of the various strands
of roving and strips of reinforcement mat (a form of cloth made of reinforcement)
became necessary. The range of racks and hooks and other specially designed tooling
that performs this guidance function is called preforming tooling.
Development History
Preforming tooling is very much like software on computers in the sense that it must be
designed anew for each specific application. Thus, every user who must pultrude a new
product--or pultrude an old product on a new machine-is forced to design preform-
ing tooling. The use of preforming tooling is now universal in the industry, except for
the simplest shapes.
Commercialization
There are no commercial manufacturers of preforming tooling. All users devise their
own as part of their product-engineering task.
Hollow Product Tooling
The development of hollow products--especially those with hoop strength-required
tooling more complex than that required in the fabrication of solid products. Various
solutions were developed, including apparatus for braiding and apparatus for winding
strands of material in a hooplike fashion around the strands of reinforcement material
being pulled through the process machinery.
Development History
Any of three pioneering pultrusion user firms may have been the first to develop
hollow product tooling. Each used a somewhat different approach. Goldsworthy of
Glastrusions used an overwinder approach; Shobert of Polygon used a braiding ap-
proach; and Boggs of Universal Molded products developed a very elaborate special-
purpose approach. (Universal Molded Products had a massive order for 5-in. rocket
tubes from the U.S. Army Chemical Corps. Approximately $700,000 was expended to
tool up for this particular hollow product.)
Commercialization
There still is no standard approach in the field to manufacturing hollow products. User
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firms build their own hollow product tooling for each product at a cost typically
ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand dollars.
Improved Dies
Dies are built with a hole through the center that has the shape of the cross-section of a
pultrusion being produced. For this reason a new die has to be manufactured for each
new product one wishes to pultrude. Over the years, dies have been improved in
several ways. They have been made smoother; they have been heated in a more
precisely controlled manner; and their geometry has been improved. The result of
these incremental improvements has been twofold: (1) the amount of scrapped prod-
uct has been reduced down to approximately 5% from an initial rate several times
higher and (2) the speed of the pultrusion process has been increased.
Development History
As noted above, dies are built anew for each product to be pultruded. Typically, they
cost a few thousand dollars to build and their cost is charged to the customer as a set-up
or tooling charge. The incremental improvements that have been applied to dies over
the years are not the product of a separate R & D effort. Instead, lessons learned from
previous die performance cause designers to modify new dies slightly. Modifications
that result in improved performance are noted and become part of a firm's process
know-how.
Commercialization
Owing to the special-purpose design of each pultrusion die, no firm manufactures them
as a standard, commercial product. Dies are either built by user firms themselves or by
tool and die firms to the specifications of user firms.
DATA SET FOR THE TRACTOR SHOVEL
The data set for the tractor shovel documents the development of the wheeled tractor
shovel in 1939 and the 10 major innovations that significantly improved it over the
succeeding 20 years. Sample selection criteria are found in chapter 3.
Because manufacturers and users of construction equipment do not often document
their innovations in publications, most of the information contained in this data set
comes from interviews held with employees of tractor shovel manufacturer and user
firms who had been associated with the innovations studied. Interviewee recollections
of dates of innovation commercialization have been checked against the dates of
related advertisements that appeared in construction equipment trade journals.
The Original Tractor Shovel
The tractor shovel is a mobile, rubber-tired machine used for excavating and for the
general handling of such bulk materials as earth, coal, and chemicals. A tractor shovel
looks somewhat like a farm tractor with a large movable scoop mounted at the front
end. Today, tractor shovels are produced in a wide range of sizes. Very large tractor
shovels with massive 20 cu-yd scoops can be found working in open-pit mines, filling an
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entire truck with coal or ore with a single scoop. At the other extreme, one can find
small tractor shovels in warehouses shifting various materials from place to place 1 cu
yd at a time.
Development History
Prior to the development of a special-purpose machine known as the tractor shovel, a
few firms built loading attachments for use on farm tractors. These scoops had limited
mobility but were suitable for light material-handling tasks. One of the firms that
manufactured such attachments was the W. M. Blair Manufacturing Company. In
1933, W. M. Blair was bought by an entrepreneur named Frank G. Hough. In 1939,
for reasons not clear to those working with him, Hough decided to develop a special-
ized machine that could only be used for loading tasks but would be highly efficient at
that function. There is no indication that Hough was spurred to undertake this task
either by user requests for such a machine or user development activity.
Lowell Conrad, chief engineer at the Hough Company at that time, recalls that the
development of the first tractor shovel was carried out by all the engineers then working
at the company (only two or three!). The task took about six months and cost approxi-
mately $13,000 in parts and labor (engineers' wages were $200-$300 per month). Costs
were kept down in part by obtaining heavy-duty tractor parts from International Har-
vester on consignment. Other parts were made by Lowell Conrad at night in a neighbor-
ing machine shop.
Commercialization
The tractor shovel that Hough and his engineers developed was called the Model HS and
was first commercialized in 1939. Approximately 100 of the Model HS tractor shovels
were sold from first commercialization until 1941 when production was stopped by
wartime requirements.
In 1944 the Hough Company again began to produce tractor shovels, this time
offering a small model (HA) suitable for unloading box cars. In 1946 the first competi-
tion appeared in the form of a three-wheeled tractor shovel produced by the Scoop-
mobile Company located in Oregon. In 1950 the Tractomotive Company of Ohio
(later of Deerfield, Illinois) also produced a tractor shovel.
Side Lift Arm Linkage
The scoop of the original tractor shovel was attached to the tractor by a guide-frame
linkage-the same sort of linkage used on a modern forklift truck. The linkage consists
basically of two vertical rails attached to the tractor. The scoop-is moved vertically up
and down these rails. The side lift arm linkage that replaced it looks more like the
linkage that attaches the blade to a modern bulldozer. In this linkage the scoop is
attached to the tractor by two large horizontal beams that extend from the sides of the
scoop to the sides of the tractor. The scoop is lifted by pivoting these beams around
their point of attachment to the tractor.
The side lift arm linkage offers two great advantages to tractor shovel users. First,
the pivoting motion that lifts the scoop also has a horizontal component that pushes the
scoop slightly forward at the beginning of the lifting movement. This forward compo-
nent of motion, called crowding, is very helpful when the operator is trying to scoop up
hard-packed material. Second, the side lift arm linkage greatly reduces the overall
height of the tractor shovel. In the older guide rail linkage, the guide rails were
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vertically fixed permanently, with their upper ends always at the height of the maxi-
mum vertical extension of the tractor shovel scoop.
Development History
Lowell Conrad, chief engineer of the Hough Company, conceived of, and developed,
the side lift arm linkage innovation. Conrad recalled deciding to develop such a linkage
as a result of a trip to a tractor dealer in Kansas City. The dealer told Conrad of the
many underground mining operations in lead and limestone then existing around
Kansas City. Existing tractor shovels could not be used in these mines because of the
high clearance required by the guide frame linkage. The dealer emphatically told
Conrad that he could sell many tractor shovels to these customers if the clearance
problem could be eliminated.
Commercialization
In 1945 Hough was first to introduce side lift arm linkages on tractor shovels. Lowell
Conrad estimates the total direct cost of the development work-given the staffing,
salaries, and material costs of the day-at about $5000.
Side lift arm linkages were next commercialized by Scoopmobile on their Model C in
1948. Transco followed in 1950 as did Tractomotive.
Power Steering
The power steering systems used on tractor shovels are much like those used on cars
and trucks. That is, they involve a hydraulic system that assists the steering efforts of
the operator. Since the tractor shovel carries heavy loads on its front (steered) wheels,
steering effort is high and the introduction of power steering reportedly increased
tractor shovel productivity significantly.
Development History
In 1948 power steering was standard equipment on many types of heavy-duty construc-
tion equipment. The essential components of these systems were manufactured by firms
such as Vickers and Garrison, specialists in hydraulic equipment. In 1947 Garrison came
to the Hough Company and suggested they install power steering on their larger tractor
shovels. They offered technical help and what was in essence a kit of components that
could conveniently be adapted by Hough engineers to their equipment.
Commercialization
In 1947 Hough offered a kit based on Garrison components that users could install on
their machines in the field. In 1948 Hough offered a factory-installed version of the
Garrison system as an option on their four-wheeled drive (Model HF tractor shovel).
In 1948 the Dempster Company offered a Vickers hydraulic system on their Digster
model; Scoopmobile offered power steering on its Model C.
Hydraulic Bucket Control
The scoop of a tractor shovel is emptied by rotating it until the open side of the scoop
faces downward and the material carried simply falls out. Prior to hydraulic bucket
controls, the bucket was attached to a pivot point below the bucket's center of gravity.
On the release of a mechanical latch, the bucket simply flipped over in an uncontrolled
manner and released the total contents. The hydraulic bucket control substituted a
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hydraulic piston and valve so that the operator could regulate the rotation of the
bucket and thus dump a load partially or fully-a very useful capability. Hydraulic
rotation of the bucket was also valuable in the digging of hard-packed material. An
operator could wedge a lip of the scoop into the material and then rotate the bucket to
break it loose.
Development History
The physical embodiment of the hydraulic bucket control was a hydraulic piston
mounted between the bucket and a yoke fitted appropriately to the scoop lift linkage.
It was developed by Lowell Conrad's engineering group at Hough in 1947. Since a
source of hydraulic power was already on tractor shovels, development effort required
to design and install the hydraulic bucket control-once the insight was available-was
minimal in Lowell Conrad's recollection. Conrad estimates that it cost approximately
$5000 in labor and materials to design and prototype the first hydraulic bucket control.
Commercialization
The hydraulic bucket control was first commercialized in 1947 on the Hough HLD
Model. After Hough commercialized this innovation, other manufacturers of tractor
shovels quickly imitated and offered functionally equivalent systems.
Fluid Transmission Coupling
As owners of manual transmission automobiles are aware, when a clutch slips, it
rapidly wears out. Operators of tractor shovels found themselves often having to slip
the clutch when they were trying to move heavy loads. As a result clutches on these
machines often needed replacement after only a few weeks' use. The fluid transmission
coupling is an innovation designed to solve this problem. In essence, it is a hydraulic
component of the drive train that can absorb slip nondestructively. Tractor shovels
equipped with it allow operators the same mechanical torque advantages formerly
achieved by slipping the clutch, but without the associated clutch wear.
Development History
According to interviewees, frequent customer complaints and requests for replace-
ment parts made all tractor shovel manufacturers very aware of the clutch wear-out
problem. Since Scoopmobile engineers knew that fluid couplings had been successfully
used to solve clutch-slippage problems on other types of construction equipment, it
was natural for them to adopt the same solution.
Appropriate fluid couplings were available from suppliers as a standard component.
Since Scoopmobile used Chrysler industrial engines in its tractor shovels, it was able to
install Chrysler fluid couplings with a minimal development cost. (At this time,
Scoopmobile's entire engineering department consisted of three people, at an average
salary of $100 a week.)
Commercialization
In late 1948 Scoopmobile offered a fluid coupling on their Model C tractor shovel.
Planetary Final Drive
In the late 1940s tractor shovel manufacturers purchased heavy-duty truck axles from
major suppliers and adapted these to their machines. These axles were not strong
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enough for some of the rough conditions encountered by tractor shovel users, and they
often broke. The planetary final drive innovation was an ingenious idea that allowed
manufacturers of tractor shovels to continue to use truck axles but to reduce the torque
experienced by these and, thus, eliminate the breakage problem. This effect was
achieved by installing a final gear reduction in the form of a planetary gear system in
the hub of each driven wheel of the tractor shovel.
Development History
The principles of planetary gear systems have been well-known to engineers for many
years. Harry Fielding, chief engineer of Scoopmobile, recalls that he developed the
application of this principle to the problem of torque reduction in tractor shovel drive
axles as a result of seeing an old steering wheel from an early Ford car in a junkyard.
This steering wheel contained planetary drive-gear reduction in its hub. Fielding
quickly developed planetary final drive for Scoopmobile tractor shovels and recalls
that the direct cost of the development work as only several hundred dollars.
Commercialization
In late 1948 or early 1949 Scoopmobile was the first to commercialize planetary final
drive on their Model CF tractor shovel. In 1953 Clark Equipment Company offered
planetary final drive on their new line of tractor shovels (they made their entry into the
business at this time). In 1953 Hough also offered planetary final drive.
Double-Acting Hydraulic Cylinders
The pistons of double-acting hydraulic cylinders can be moved both in and out by the
application of hydraulic force. In contrast, the pistons of single-acting hydraulic cylin-
ders can only be moved in one direction by hydraulic force. Until the innovation of
double-acting cylinders, hydraulic pistons installed on tractor shovels were all of the
single-acting variety. This meant, for example, that tractor shovel operators could lift
the scoop of their machine with hydraulic force, but they were forced to rely on the
weight of the scoop itself for any motion in a downward direction.
The introduction of double-acting cylinders gave operators increased control over
the scoop of the tractor shovel and allowed them to apply increased downward force.
This was very useful in many tasks-as in, for example, scraping ice from streets in
winter.
Development History
Hough was the first company to introduce double-acting cylinders to tractor shovels.
According to interviewees at that company, they were motivated by a particular sensi-
tivity to the municipal market for street clearing. For this application it was quite clear
that down pressure provided by the weight of the bucket only was not sufficient. It was
also clear that increased down pressure would be useful in such tasks as breaking up
the asphalt surface of roads. Cost of implementing the innovation was quite low
because double-acting cylinders and the controls needed to operate them were stan-
dard products of the hydraulic supply industry. All that was needed was to install
double-acting cylinders in the locations occupied by single-acting cylinders and to add
appropriate reinforcement to affected linkage points.
Commercialization
Double-acting cylinders were first commercialized by Hough in 1948 on their Model
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HM. The rest of the industry quickly followed and also commercialized the improve-
ment.
Four-Wheel Drive
Four-wheel drive offers much the same advantages to users of tractor shovels as it does
to the users of four-wheel drive trucks and similar equipment. In essence, it offers
better traction, especially on rough terrain, and rough terrain was often encountered
by tractor shovels being used on construction sites.
Development History
The development of a four-wheel-drive tractor shovel was technically straight-
forward-but quite costly. Although the engineering required was well understood
and although the axles needed for four-wheel drive were available as standard compo-
nents from manufacturers, much of the tractor shovel had to be redesigned in order to
incorporate the four-wheel-drive feature. For example, many existing components had
to be shifted to make room for the new drive train needed. Also, provision had to be
made to allow the rear axle to oscillate so that it might keep better contact with the
ground on rough terrain. Total direct cost to develop the four-wheel-drive tractor
shovel is estimated by Lowell Conrad at $70,000.
Commercialization
In 1948 four-wheel drive was first offered commercially by Hough on the Model HF
tractor shovel. In 1953 Scoopmobile followed. Today, four-wheel drive is a common
feature of tractor shovels.
Torque Converter
A torque converter is a hydraulic mechanism used in transmissions that provides an
effect equivalent to infinitely variable gearing within a narrow range. When used in the
transmission of a tractor shovel, it enables operators to adjust the torque they apply to
a task more precisely than can be done with manual transmission alone. Tractor
shovels equipped with a torque converter need not also have a fluid coupling because
the function of this device is also inherent in the torque converter. (See the earlier
description of fluid coupling.)
Development History
Torque converters developed by Allis Chalmers had been used in construction machin-
ery as early as 1947. Tractomotive, a manufacturer of tractor shovels, had a history of
close association with Allis Chalmers, indeed, it was eventually acquired by that firm.
If Tractomotive were already using Allis Chalmers' transmissions and engines (which
seems likely, although we have no direct evidence), then adoption of the Allis
Chalmers torque converter would have involved almost no development work on the
part of Tractomotive. Design work necessary to integrate the Allis Chalmers torque
converter with the Allis Chalmers engine and transmission would already have been
done by that firm.
Commercialization
The torque converter was first offered as a commercial feature of tractor shovels by
Tractomotive in 1951. In 1953 the Hough Company offered it on their Model HMC.
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Articulation
Articulation like four-wheel drive involves major changes in the configuration of the
tractor shovel. In effect, the entire machine is split in two at a point between the front
and rear wheels and then reattached by means of a hinge. This hinge is controlled and
flexed by means of hydraulic cylinders mounted on either side of it. Articulation
eliminates the traditional steering system: The driver turns by bending the machine in
the middle at the hinge point.
Articulation offers several advantages to the user. First, it provides a shorter turning
radius. Second, it reduces maintenance costs and downtime related to, and caused by,
steering mechanisms and their failure. Third, with articulation the rear wheels follow
the same path as the front wheels, and both sets follow directly in the path of the front
scoop, which can thus be used to clear the way.
Development History
Articulation was developed at the Scoopmobile Company. The direct motivation to
the development work (according to Harry Fielding, chief engineer of that company)
was inventory reduction rather than performance. Front and rear axles are the most
expensive components of tractor shovels, and an articulated machine uses the same
type of axle both front and rear. Articulation had been developed and patented prior
to 1953 by a British manufacturer of construction equipment. Fielding claims Scoop-
mobile was unaware of the British patent when it did its own development work and
only found out about it when conducting a patent search.
Commercialization
Scoopmobile was first to commercialize articulation on tractor shovels, introducing the
innovation with their LD 10 model in 1953. Scoopmobile salesmen quickly became
expert at graphically illustrating the advantages of articulation. Competitive machines
would often embarrassingly fail to perform or mire down on customers' sites under
conditions the Scoopmobile LD 10 proved able to handle. Despite this demonstrable
superiority, competitors were relatively slow to adopt articulation. In part this was
probably because articulated machines looked decidedly odd to the traditional eye; in
part it was probably because Scoopmobile was a small regional company most of
whose sales were restricted to the Pacific Northwest. Therefore, the advantages of
articulation did not really offer a significant competitive threat in the major markets of
other producers.
In 1962 the Euclid Company developed an articulated machine that used the basic
method spelled out in the British patent. In 1964 Caterpillar, which did not begin to
produce tractor shovels until 1959, introduced articulated machines, as did the Hough
Company with their Model H120C. Today, all large tractor shovels use this innova-
tion.
Power Shift Transmission
The power shift transmission is a form specially suited for the requirements of tractor
shovel operation. All available gears are permanently in mesh, and each is mechani-
cally linked to a separate clutch. Thus, if the transmission has four gears, it has four
separate clutches. Selection of a gear in a power shift transmission simply involves
engaging the proper clutch by the simple motion of a hand lever connected to a
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hydraulic actuator. All foot action on the part of the operator in the shifting process is
eliminated.
On many tasks that tractor shovels perform, operators have to shift very fre-
quently-as often as 10 times a minute. In tasks requiring frequent shifting, operator
fatigue from that task significantly constrained tractor shovel productivity. This was
graphically illustrated by the increased productivity shown by tractor shovels equipped
with power shift transmissions.l
Development History
The first power shift transmission was developed by Clark Equipment Company in
1952 and 1953. Clark was a new entrant into the tractor shovel business, and they
wanted the first models they offered to have a power shift transmission.
Lowell Conrad left Hough to join Clark and develop the power shift transmission;
he estimates its development cost at $250,000.
Commercialization
Clark introduced the power shift on their new line of Michigan brand tractor shovels in
1954. This line of shovels was commercially very successful. Indeed, within two years
Clark was selling as many tractor shovels as Hough-the firm that had traditionally
dominated the industry. In 1955 Hough introduced a form of power shift transmission
based on the GM Truckmatic drive in their HO model.
Note
1. "Construction Equipment: Ten Years of Change," Engineering News Record 170
(21 February 1963): 45.
DATA SET FOR ENGINEERING PLASTICS
The data set for engineering plastics examines innovations in engineering thermoplas-
tic materials. Engineering plastic is the common term for materials that can compete
with traditional engineering materials such as metals, wood, and glass from the stand-
point of such properties as strength, temperature resistance, and ease of fabrication.
Engineering thermoplastics are thus suitable for such applications as gears and motor
housings-applications for which metals were traditionally used. Sample selection
criteria for this data set will be found in chapter 3.
Polycarbonate Resins (Lexan)
Polycarbonate resins (better known in the United States under the General Electric
trade name of Lexan) have several important properties that make them excellent
engineering materials. They have high-impact strength, superior dimensional stability,
transparency, and good electrical insulation qualities. They are also self-extinguish-
ing-an important property where fire safety is at issue. These properties have made
polycarbonate of great value in applications ranging from precision camera compo-
nents (an application where dimensional stability is important) to football helmets (an




Polycarbonate engineering plastics were developed independently by two firms: GE in
the United States and Farben Fabriken Bayer AG of West Germany. Research work
in both firms began about 1953. Commercialization (i.e., the sale of developmental
quantities of the material manufactured in a pilot plant), however, was first achieved
by GE; we, therefore, regard GE as the innovating firm.
Lexan polycarbonate resins were discovered by Dr. Dan Fox, a researcher at GE,
through serendipity. In 1953 Fox joined a team of GE researchers working to develop
an improved electrical insulation for magnet wire. Insulated magnet wire is a critical
part of electrical motors and other apparatus manufactured by GE. Development of a
thinner insulating material capable of withstanding high temperatures would allow the
construction of better performing and smaller electrical motors and generators.
When Fox joined the research team, a family of polymeric materials had been
discovered that had the proper flexibility, toughness, and resistance to high tempera-
ture, but all were somewhat degraded by water. Fox recalled some postdoctoral re-
search he had conducted at the University of Oklahoma in which he had used guaiacol
carbonate and found it extremely hydrolytically stable. He, therefore, decided to try to
make a polymer based on this material. He experimented with bisphenol-A and
started making a polymer by ester exchange with diphenyl carbonate. The resulting
polymer was Lexan.
The polymer discovered by Dr. Fox was not considered the most promising route to
a wire insulation of the desired properties and was put on the shelf until the completion
of the wire insulation project in 1954. In 1954 the chemical development department of
GE decided to make a polycarbonate resin to be used as a molding material-the first
such material of its own GE would attempt to commercialize. Development of Lexan
to the test-market stage was completed by 1958.1
Commercialization
General Electric began to test market polycarbonate resin in the United States in 1958;
Farben Fabriken Bayer AG began to introduce the product in Europe in 1959. Given
the independent research work of both firms in the polycarbonate field and given that
both had independent patent positions, these two firms entered into an agreement not
to contest each other's patents. Development cost for polycarbonate was approxi-
mately $10 million.2 Sales of Lexan grew quickly: In 1960 approximately 500,000 lb
were sold at a price of $1.50/lb; in 1969 approximately 31 million lb were sold at a price
of $0.80/lb.3
Notes
1. National Academy of Sciences, Applied Science and Technological Progress, A
Report to the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representa-
tives, GP-67-0399 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1967),
35-37.
2. Author's estimate based on information supplied by Dr. Dan Fox, General Elec-
tric, Schenectady, N.Y.
3. Dirk Oosterhof, Chemical Economics Handbook: Plastics and Resins, 580.1120A.
(Menlo Park. Calif.: Stanford Research Institute, March 1970), sections F and I.
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Acetal Homopolymer Resins (Delrin)
In the United States, acetal homopolymer is probably best known by the Du Pont
brand name, Delrin. Delrin is a nontransparent engineering plastic. The plastic has a
regular structure and high crystallinity that gives parts made from Delrin high strength
and rigidity, excellent dimensional stability, and resilience over a wide range of service
temperatures and humidities and a wide range of solvent exposures. In addition, the
plastic has excellent frictional properties, which allows the plastic to serve as a good
mechanical bearing.
Developmental History
Delrin is a polymer of formaldehyde. The existence of formaldehyde polymers had
been known since before the 1920s. Interest in them was limited, however, because
they were felt to be inherently unstable. In 1947 A. Barkdoll, Jr., of Du Pont's
chemical department, began to study formaldehyde monomer and discovered that the
pure monomer sometimes spontaneously polymerized into a polymer with attractive
properties. In the 1949-50 period a project under R. MacDonald was begun that was
explicitly devoted to the development of formaldehyde polymers. In late 1952 the
research looked so promising that the polychemicals department (one of Du Pont's
major industrial subdivisions) put 60 men to work on the project. Up to 1960, Delrin R
& D expenses were approximately $27 million.'
Commercialization
Du Pont invested $15 million in a plant at Parkersburg, West Virginia, capable of
producing about 15 million lb of Delrin annually, and introduced it commercially in
1960. Du Pont is the sole producer of acetal homopolymer. Its high expectations for
the commercial success of the plastic were not fully met, however, owing to the later
commercialization of an acetal copolymer called Celcon by Celanese in 1963. (See
discussion of acetal copolymer below for details.) In 1974 approximately 70 million lb
of acetal resins were produced with one quarter of this being acetal homopolymer resin
(Delrin). The sales price of Delrin was $0.95/lb in 1960 when the product was intro-
duced and was $0.80/lb in 1974.2
Notes
1. Herbert Solow, "Delrin: du Pont's Challenge to Metals," Fortune 60, no.2 (Au-
gust 1959): 116-19.
2. Chemical Economics Handbook: Plastics and Resins, 580.0121 (Menlo Park,
Calif.: Stanford Research Institute, October 1975), sections B and E. The percentage
of acetal resin production consisting of acetal homopolymers was obtained from The
Kline Guide to the Plastics Industry, ed. James A. Rauch (Fairfield, N.J.: Charles H.
Kline & Co., 1978), 56.
Acetal Copolymer (Celcon)
Acetal copolymer is a polymer of formaldehyde. It has slightly better properties with
respect to heat and solvent resistance than does the closely related acetal homopoly-
mer (Delrin) (see preceding entry).
Development History
Celanese Corporation is a basic producer of formaldehyde-the feed stock for acetal
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homopolymers and copolymers. Du Pont's demonstration in 1960 that a formaldehyde
polymer with commercially attractive properties could be produced induced Celanese
to accelerate its research in the area. Intensive research and development at Cela-
nese-with Drs. Brown, Barting, and Walling essential to the effort-allowed
Celanese to produce pilot-plant quantities of Celcon in April 1961 in Clarkwood,
Texas.l A long and difficult court battle then ensued between Du Pont and Celanese
over patents--Celanese finally won the case.
Commercialization
Du Pont's experience with the introduction of Delrin allowed Celanese to proceed to
full-scale production rapidly, confident of Celcon's commercial attractiveness. Cela-
nese's first plant for the production of Celcon went on-stream at Bishop, Texas, in
January 1962.2 Approximately 125 million lb of acetal resins were produced in 1974 by
Du Pont and Celanese.3 Approximately 35 million lb of this was exported; approxi-
mately 90 million lb was consumed in the U.S. market. Approximately three quarters
of the total volume was acetal copolymer.
Notes
1. "Celanese Celcon Plant On Stream," Modern Plastics, 39, no. 6 (February 1962):
45.
2. Chemical Economics Handbook: Plastics and Resins, 580.0121A (Menlo Park,
Calif.: Stanford Research Institute, October 1975), 580.
3. James A. Rauch, ed., The Kline Guide to the Plastics Industry (Fairfield, N.J.:
Charles H. Kline & Co., 1978), 56.
Polysulfone Resin
Polysulfone is composed of phenylene units linked by three different chemical groups-
isopropylidene, ether, and sulfone-each contributing properties to the polymer that
are conventionally obtained through stabilizers or other additives. Polysulfone is a
strong, rigid thermoplastic that can operate in high-temperature environments. The
heat distortion temperature of polysulfone at 264 lb/sq in. is 345°F. Polysulfone also has
a high rating for self-extinguishability. Its combination of characteristics has made it
important in applications involving long-term service at high temperatures under load.
Development History
Polysulfone was developed by Dr. H. Farnum and Dr. Robert Johnson, researchers at
Union Carbide Corporation. They were searching for a thermoplastic material that
could withstand high temperatures-motivated by a finding of Union Carbide's market-
ing research that there was a market for an engineering plastic that was stable at up to
175°C. Farnum and Johnson had a good theoretical sense that phenylene units in a
polymer chain would exhibit satisfactory high-temperature characteristics. They syn-
thesized and analyzed 40 to 50 possible molecular structures before deciding on the
presently commercialized polysulfone.
Commercialization
Polysulfone was commercialized by Union Carbide in 1965. Union Carbide remains
the sole producer. Production began in a plant constructed in Marietta, Ohio, capable
of producing 10 million lb/year. The initial price was $1.00/lb. 1 In 1976 production was




1. "New Engineering Thermoplastic-Polysulfone," Modern Plastics 42, no. 9 (May
1965): 87-89, 196.
2. James A. Rauch, ed., The Kline Guide to the Plastics Industry (Fairfield, N.J.:
Charles H. Kline & Co., 1978), 55.
Modified Polyphenylene Oxide (Noryl)
Noryl is a thermoplastic with outstanding dimensional stability at elevated tempera-
tures. It is hydrolytically stable and has both excellent dielectric properties and chemi-
cal resistance. It is widely used in automotive and appliance applications.
Development History
Noryl was developed by General Electric researchers and is a commercially successful
modification of an earlier GE polymer, polyphenylene oxide (PPO). Research that led
to PPO was begun by A. S. Hay in the mid-1950s in the GE Research Laboratory in
Schenectady, New York, where he was working on the oxidation of organic com-
pounds, particularly phenols. According to Hay his research had no application in
mind. In 1956 he discovered polymerization of phenols by oxidative coupling-a new
chemical technique for synthesizing plastics.
Because of GE's then-ongoing work on Lexan, Hay's discovery was not developed
further until 1960. In 1960 an effort was begun by J. R. Elliot of the chemical develop-
ment operation to find an economical means of producing the product commercially.
In 1965 a pilot plant was ready to produce PPO and the product was commercial-
ized. Various applications such as surgical instruments and appliance parts were made
with PPO, but by 1957 it was clear that PPO was a commercial failure. It had proven
hard for molders to process because it required specialized molding machinery and a
drying step.1 As the commercial failure of PPO became clear, work was begun to
modify the material. Noryl was the result of this research: an alloyed PPO that is easy
to process.
Commercialization
Noryl was introduced commercially in 1968. Its sole manufacturer is GE. In 1976
approximately 95 million lb were sold with a sales price of approximately $90 million. 2
Notes
1. National Academy of Sciences, Applied Science and Technological Process, A
Report to the Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representa-
tives, GP-67-0399 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1967),
37.
2. James A. Rauch, ed., The Kline Guide to the Plastics Industry (Fairfield, N.J.:
Charles H. Kline & Co., 1978), 55.
DATA SET FOR PLASTICS ADDITIVES
The data set for plastics additives contains information on innovations for two types:
plasticizers and ultraviolet stabilizers. Specific sample selection criteria will be found in
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chapter 3. Data on all innovations listed in that sample will be found here, with the
exception of four coded NA in chapter 3, Table 3-8. In these instances we could not
find needed data after diligent research.
A plasticizer is a material that is incorporated mechanically into a plastic to increase
its flexibility and workability. Without plasticizers polymers such as polyvinyl chloride
(PVC) are hard and brittle; with plasticizers they become softer, more flexible, and
easier to process. A UV stabilizer is a compound that protects plastic from the degrad-
ing effects of UV light. In the absence of UV stabilizers, polymers exposed to UV
show loss of physical properties and discoloration, often accompanied by surface craz-
ing (the formation of many fine cracks on the surface of a plastic), embrittlement, and
chalking.
In chemistry-related fields, Chemical Abstracts is a major resource for the type of
study conducted here. As a cross-check on our findings regarding the first to develop
innovations researched, we searched Chemical Abstracts for several years prior to the
date of each innovation to check for any application earlier than that we had identified
by interview. Market size and development cost estimates given by interviewees in
some of the innovation histories that follow are approximate and informal. Develop-
ment cost figures, when provided, refer to direct costs only.
PLASTICIZERS
Butyl benzyl phthalate
Butyl benzyl phthalate is a plasticizer used in polyvinyl chloride (PVC). Its main
advantage over earlier plasticizers used with PVC is that it fuses with PVC resins at a
much lower temperature. This meant that PVC could be processed on standard
rubber-processing machines that operate at 110 ° to 130°C rather than on special PVC
milling machines that operate at 150 ° to 160°C. Rubber processors were thus able to
change over from rubber to PVC processing without purchasing new machinery.
Development History
In the 1930s Bayer took out a patent for butyl benzyl phthalate as a plasticizer for
cellulose nitrate. A Monsanto research team under the leadership of Joe Darby (man-
ager of the plastic applications laboratory) reasoned that butyl benzyl phthalate might
also be a good plasticizer for PVC. When they discovered the attractively low tempera-
ture at which butyl benzyl phthalate could be blended with PVC, they took it to the
marketing department to be considered for commercialization. Monsanto also took
out process patents in 1946 to cover improved means of producing the plasticizer.
Commercialization
Monsanto introduced butyl benzyl phthalate in 1946 and marketed it to rubber and
PVC products. In 1974 approximately 80 million lb of the plasticizer was sold at a
market price of approximately $28 million. Monsanto interviewees estimate the cost of
the development of the plasticizer at approximately $500,000 to $1 million.
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2 ethyl hexyl di phenyl phosphate
2 ethyl hexyl di phenyl phosphate is a plasticizer that equaled the desirable cold flex
and volatility characteristics of competitive plasticizers and also imparted flame retar-
dancy to plasticized polyvinyl chloride (PVC). In addition, the plasticizer is nontoxic
and has Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval for use in food-packaging
films, a major application. 
Development History
In 1945 Union Carbide introduced a PVC insulation material that was plasticized with
di octyl phthalate. This product showed excellent cold flex characteristics and Mon-
santo was anxious to match it or exceed it. Monsanto, therefore, began looking for a
low toxicity, flameproof plasticizer that would be equivalent to di octyl phthalate in
cold flex and volatility. The product they developed succeeded in combining the good
cold flex properties of the di octyl phthalate with the excellent flame-proofing and
solvating properties of the aryl phosphates to give a product that generally has many of
the best properties of both compounds.
Commercialization
2 ethyl hexyl di phenyl phosphate was commercialized in 1947 by Monsanto. There is
no competitive producer of this product in the United States, but Monsanto itself has
since developed a second product of this type-iso decyl di phenyl phosphate-that
provides even better cold flex and volatility products. These two plasticizers have
tended to replace tri alkyl phosphates and tri butyl phthalates in the marketplace.
Note
1. J. Kern Sears and Joseph R. Darby, The Technology of Plasticizers (New York:
Wiley, 1982).
Citroflex Plasticizers
Citroflex-type plasticizers are used for vinyls and cellulosics. Examples of such plasticiz-
ers are: tri butyl citrate and acetyl di butyl citrate. The principal advantage these
plasticizers offered over existing plasticizers in 1957, the year of their introduction, was
FDA approval to use them to plasticize films used to package oily and greasy foods.
Phthalate plasticizers, by way of contrast, only have FDA approval for use in films to
package high-water-content foods.
Development History
Pfizer Corporation, a producer of citric acid, was anxious to develop uses for that acid.
Also, it was anxious to move out of the phthalic ester plasticizer business because it
was basic in neither the anhydride nor the alcohol components of this product. Both
problems were addressed by a research project that attempted to develop the citroflex
plasticizers. The work proceeded from 1953 to 1957 and resulted in the development of
a range of citroflex esters. The costs of development per ester were estimated by a
participant in the research project as approximately $125,000. Toxicological testing of




Pfizer introduced the citroflex-type plasticizers in 1957. It is the only supplier of these
esters to the present day. Dollar volume of sales in 1974 is held in confidence by Pfizer.
Note
1. Arnold L. Baseman, "A Compounder's Guide to . . . Plasticizers '65," Plastics
Technology 11, no. 10 (October 1965): 37-44.
Di N undecyl phthalate Plasticizers
The plasticizer di N undecyl phthalate is one of two long alkyl chain phthalates that are
widely used for plasticizing PVC cable wiring designed to operate at 75° C and above.
These plasticizers are superior to the branched tri decyl phthalates formerly used for
this purpose in three major ways: (1) they provide a superior cold flex at low tempera-
tures; (2) they fuse with PVC at a lower temperature than the earlier plasticizers,
which eases processing requirements; (3) they are more compatible with PVC than
were earlier plasticizers, which tended to bleed at flexing points in the cable.
Development History
The need for a good, highly compatible plasticizer suitable for use with PVC subjected
to high temperature was widely known within the plasticizer industry. From 1967 to
1970 the Monsanto plasticizer applications laboratories worked to develop such a
product. The approximate cost of the research over the three-year development period
was between $500,000 and $1 million.
Commercialization
The di N undecyl phthalate plasticizers were introduced commercially by Monsanto in
the early 1970s. Monsanto has requested that its sales and market share be kept
confidential.
Tri melitate Plasticizers
Tri melitate plasticizers are primarily used to plasticize polyvinyl chloride (PVC). The
product had a lower volatility than previous plasticizers and thus reduced application
problems such as the fogging of automobile windows by plasticizers volatilized from
automobile parts. The new plasticizer also offered improved cold flex properties.
Development History
The precursor to tri melitate plasticizer was provided by the Amoco Company in 1961.
In that year Amoco built a plant capable of producing 2 million lb of tri mellitic
anhydride per year. As part of the effort to develop markets for its product, Amoco
sent samples to at least three chemical companies suggesting that the product might be
a component of a good plasticizer. Monsanto, Pfizer, and W. R. Grace all added
alcohol to the sample to make tri mellitic esters and tested these as plasticizers.
Commercialization
On observing the good properties of tri mellitic esters, Monsanto, Pfizer, and W. R.
Grace all commercialized the chemical as a plasticizer in 1961. In 1974 approximately
23 million lb of the plasticizer were sold by all three companies together:
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Some $100,000 to $250,000 was spent on developing the new stabilizer. The market
size for the innovation about 1970 was approximately $300,000 per year.
ULTRAVIOLET STABILIZERS
2:4 dihydroxy benzophenone
Polymers such as polystyrene and polyvinyl chloride are particularly susceptible to UV
light in the 290 to 400 nm region. This UV light causes breakdown of the chemical
bonds in the plastic, which in turn causes the plastic to deteriorate. Unprotected
plastics may, for example, discolor and become brittle in the sun.
Benzophenone compounds were the first effective UV stabilizers on the market-
place. Typically, a PVC stabilized with a benzophenone compound would have a
useful life one hundred times greater than that of unstabilized polyvinyl chloride in
outdoor applications.
Development History
In the late 1930s or early 1940s Dow Chemical Company researchers patented 2
hydroxy 5 chloro benzophenone as a UV stabilizer. This compound proved to be only
a weak absorber of UV light and gave a strong yellow color when used. It was not
successfully developed commercially by Dow as a UV stabilizer for plastics.
I. G. Farben, a German firm, manufactured plastics of all sorts as well as a wide
range of additives. During World War II, assets of I.G. Farben in the United States
were sequestered by the U.S. Government. Employees of General Analine and Film
(GAF), operator of the sequestered assets, found a considerable amount of data in the
former I.G. Farben laboratories on UV-active compounds. A team of GAF research-
ers, Dr. F. Newmann, Dr. McKay, and Dr. Albert Strobel, began a program to
develop a range of stabilizers for cellulose acetate. The team investigated a whole
range of compounds found to be UV-active and determined that 2:4 dihydroxy
benzophenone was an excellent stabilizer. (According to Dr. Strobel, at the time the
GAF team did not know of Dow Chemical Company's earlier work on halogenated 2:5
benzephenones.)
Commercialization
General Analine and Film began commercial production of its first UV stabilizer
sometime between 1948 and 1950. The total market volume of benzophenone-type
stabilizers was perhaps $10 to $15 million per year in 1973. Dr. Strobel estimates that
the cost of development, including monies spent on developing a production process,
at about $1 million. The second producer of benzophenone UV stabilizers was Ameri-
can Cynamid.
Ethyl-2-cyano 3:3 diphenylacrylate
Acrylate UV light stabilizers are used in polar polymeric systems. Acrylates have
replaced benzophenones in applications where colorlessness is critical. Unlike benzo-




The acrylate group of ultraviolet stabilizers was developed by GAF as part of a pro-
gram to produce new UV stabilizer systems for the plastics business. The research
began in 1947 and continued until 1952.
The idea for the acrylate group of stabilizers was developed by Dr. Albert Strobel of
GAF through his knowledge of dye chemistry. As a result of experiments on dyes, he
knew that hydroxy benzaldehyde and cyanoethyl acetate reacted to give a dye that was
extremely light-stable and a powerful absorber of UV light. Dr. Strobel realized that if
he could alter the molecule to remove the dye properties while retaining the light
stability and the UV-absorbing properties, he would have a good UV stabilizer.
Through extensive research he was able to achieve this result.
Commercialization
Acrylate UV stabilizers were commercialized in 1952 by GAF. On the whole they have
been very successful commercially, replacing benzophenones in applications where
colorlessness is critical in polar polymers. In general-purpose applications, however,
they have not replaced benzophenones because they are more expensive on a cost-
performance basis. In 1973 the sales volume of acrylate stabilizers-approximately 1/3
of 1 million lb/year-made them probably the third largest UV stabilizer group in
volume terms. (In that year benzophenones sold approximately 2 million lb and
benzotriazoles sold approximately 500,000 to 1 million lb. The market value of 1/3 of 1
million lb of acrylate stabilizer is approximately $2 to $3 million.)
2 hydroxy 4 dodecyloxy benzophenone
Polyolefins are a commercially important plastic that absorbs ultraviolet light strongly
in the region of 300 A to 310 A. The absorption of this energy causes the polymer
chains to break; this in turn causes surface crazing, embrittlement, chalking, discolor-
ation, and loss of physical properties such as impact and tensile strength. 2H 4D benzo-
phenone was the first colorless stabilizer that was compatible with polyolefins.1 Prior
to the development of this stabilizer only filled pigmented polyolefins could be used
out-of-doors and even these were not as stable as was desired. Currently about 70% of
all UV plastic stabilizers are used in polyolefins.
Major uses of UV-stabilized polypropylenes are in fibers for carpeting and uphol-
stery and the like. Typically, the addition of a stabilizer extends the life of polyolefin 10
to 20 times in outside duty.
Development History
Most experts in the field of UV stabilizers were aware that a 4 long-chain alkoxy-
substituted hydroxy benzophenone would be a good stabilizer for polyolefins. The
major problem in producing such a compound was to economically alkylate the 4-
position OH group while leaving the 2 OH group unreacted. The problem was solved
by researchers at Eastman Kodak, who in 1958 took out a patent for 2 hydroxy 4
dodecyloxy benzophenone. 2 Dr. G. Arick of Eastman states that this product was
developed for internal use and that Eastman Kodak is a major user of its own product.
Commercialization
Eastman Kodak first introduced the innovation commercially in 1960. Although they
do sell the product, they also consume a substantial amount in-house. Eastman
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Kodak's first competitor was American Cyanamid, who in 1961 introduced 4 octoxy 2
hydroxy benzophenone.
Notes
1. Note that polar benzophenones had been produced by GAF in the early 1950s,
including 2 hydroxy 4 methoxy benzophenone. This was an excellent stabilizer, but it
was incompatible with polyolefins.
2. U.S. Patent No. 2,861,053.
Nickel Complexes
Nickel complexes are used primarily to stabilize polyolefin polymers with respect to
ultraviolet light. They have a significant advantage over previously available stabilizers
for this purpose in that they simultaneously provide a site to which dye can adhere.
Use of nickel complexes thus made it possible for the first time to dye polyolefins in
strong colors. (Untreated polyolefins are not sufficiently polar to accept conventional
dispersion dyes.)
Nickel complexes are synergistic in their effect with benzophenone UV stabilizers.
When used together, these two compounds give 4 to 10 times the protection provided
by either stabilizer used alone.1 Although benzophenones are strong absorbers of UV
light and thus protect the polymer, the nickel complexes act by a different mechanism.
They act to quench groups on the polymer chain that are excited by UV light, thus
preventing breakage of the molecule.
Development History
The nickel complex UV stabilizers were developed by Ferro Corporation. Ferro is a
company that specializes in producing additives for plastics and paints. They do not
produce the actual polymers themselves.
In the late 1950s Ferro engaged in a research effort to find additives in the
polypropylene field in order to increase their product range and break into a new
market. A. M. Nicholson of Ferro's research department headed a team that investi-
gated 1400 different compounds for their properties with respect to polypropylene.
The discovery that certain nickel compounds acted as dye sites was serendipitous.
Ferro Corporation patented the most promising nickel compounds in 1960.2
Commercialization
Ferro Corporation commercialized the nickel complexes for use as stabilizers and dye
sites in polyolefins in 1962. Ferro's first competitor was American Cyanamid.
Notes
1. Arnold L. Baseman, "UV Stabilizers for Plastics," Plastics Technology 10, no. 4
(April 1964): 30-35.
2. U.S. Patent No. 2,971,940 and No. 2,971,941. These patents, granted to A. M.
Nicholson, C. H. Fucksman, and S. B. Elliot, were assigned to Ferro Corporation.
P methoxy benzylidene malonic acid dimethyl esters
P methoxy benzylidene malonic acid dimethyl ester ultraviolet light stabilizers were
designed to compete with, and to be superior to, the acrylate stabilizers. They absorb
UV in the shortwave-length region of the spectrum and thus give a high degree of
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protection to polar plastics such as polystyrene and polyurethane. The intrinsic light
stability of the compounds and their absorptions on the low end of the spectrum give a
colorless product that shows little yellowing owing to side reactions such as can occur
with many of the benzophenone compounds.
Development History
P methoxy benzylidene malonic acid dimethyl ester UV light stabilizers were devel-
oped at American Cyanamid. This firm has an ongoing program to develop new and
improved stabilizers for polypropylene and other polymers. A major part of this work
consists of screening UV light-active compounds in order to determine their efficiency
as stabilizers and their suitability in plastics systems.
Dr. Suret Susi, and American Cyanamid researcher, became aware thre -gh a survey
of patent literature that the benzylidene types of materials might possibly be suitable
UV stabilizers. He then prepared the p methoxy benzylidene malonic acid dimethyl
ester compound and evaluated its properties as a stabilizer. A patent was applied for in
April 1964.
Commercialization
Commercial production of p methoxy benzylidene malonic acid dimethyl esters began
in 1964. Dr. Susi estimates that approximately $100,000 to $250,000 was spent on
developing the new stabilizers.
2:4 di t butyl phenyl 3:5 di t butyl phenyl 4 hydroxy benzoates
2:4 di t butyl phenyl 3:5 di t butyl phenyl 4 hydroxy benzoates are UV stabilizers for
polypropylene. They protect the. polymer by absorbing ultraviolet light as does ben-
zophenone, but they also react to stabilize polypropylene by a method that is not
entirely understood. As a result this compound is claimed both to give enhanced life to
polypropylene when judged relative to competitive UV stabilizers and to act as an
antioxidant as well.
Development History
The UV stabilizer 2:4 di t butyl phenyl 3:5 di t butyl phenyl 4 hydroxy benzoate was
developed by Dr. E. J. Smutney of Shell Corporation. Shell was a major manufacturer
of polypropylene and wished to develop a good UV stabilizer in order to extend its
market. In 1963 Dr. Smutney took out a patent on the innovative UV stabilizer.'
Commercialization
Shell Corporation did not commercialize the stabilizer. Although it knew it was a good
product, it apparently could not produce the substituted acid precursor cheaply
enough to make it a commercial success. Shell, therefore, approached several firms,
including Ferro Corporation, with the product.
Ferro, a manufacturer of plastic additives, took a license from Shell to produce the
innovation and developed an economical way of preparing the precursor acid for the
stabilizer. This was patented 2 and allowed Ferro to produce the product at a commer-
cially acceptable cost. Bill Meek of Ferro's research department states that he found a
brief reference in a British journal to a carboxylic acid preparation that worked margin-
ally well. He then improved the process by use of superior solvent chemistry. Ferro
commercially introduced the product in December 1973. At present there is no compet-
ing commercial product. The cost to develop the product was approximately $25,000 to
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$100,000. The cost to develop the process was approximately $100,000. The innovation
has had some success in replacing benzophenones and benzotriazoles. 3
Notes
1. U.S. Patent No. 3,112,338.
2. U.S. Patent No. 3,825,593.
3. Stephen C. Stinson, "Chemicals and Additives Today: The Pace of Development
Quickens," Plastics Technology 18, no. 7 (July 1972): 35-49.
Zinc Oxide and Zinc diethyl dithio Carbamates
Zinc oxide and zinc diethyl dithio carbamate stabilizers are used in heavily pigmented
plastic products. These products benefit only slightly from organic ultraviolet stabiliz-
ers since degradation occurs only at the surface of the product where there is only a
small concentration of the stabilizer. The diethyl dithio carbamate acts synergistically
with the zinc oxide giving a performance that is equal to, or better than, the perfor-
mance provided by organic UV stabilizers at a lesser cost. Manufacturers claim that
the life of pigmented plastics can be increased by 2 to 10 times when compared to
plastics using titanium dioxide pigment and organic stabilizers. 
Development History
The zinc oxide and zinc diethyl dithio carbamate stabilizers were developed by two
researchers at the firm of Debell and Richardson under the sponsorship of the Interna-
tional Lead and Zinc Research Organization. Stan Margosiak and Barry Baum of
Debell and Richardson knew that zinc oxide had been used as a stabilizer for paints
and that zinc diethyl dithio carbamate had been known to have antioxidant properties
in rubber. This lead them to experiment with the effects of these two compounds in
plastics. Debell and Richardson had been working on zinc stabilizer systems since
1967. A total cost of this particular project was about $100,000 to $200,000. The major
costs involved testing the stabilized plastic systems.
Commercialization
The International Lead and Zinc Research Organization made the research results on
the UV stabilizing properties of zinc compounds available to all its members. The
compounds required were already produced by some members: New Jersey Zinc
Company in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, produces zinc oxide; zinc diethyl dithio carba-
mate stabilizers are produced by R. T. Vandervuilt Company in Norwalk, Connecti-
cut. Thus, no commercialization expense had to be incurred by these firms. The value
of the compounds in the UV stabilization of plastics was simply publicized to the
plastics industry.2
Notes
1. Robert E. Hunt, "Chemicals and Additives '70," Plastics Technology 16, no. 7
(July 1970): 39-45.
2. D. S. Carr et al., "Zinc Oxide Stabilization of PP Against Weathering," Modern
Plastics 47, no. 5 (May 1970): 114-18; D. S. Carr et al., "UV Stabilization of Zinc
Oxide with Thermoplastics," Modern Plastics 48, no. 10 (October 1971): 160-61.
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85-88, 91
process control gas chromatography, GC inno-
vation, 14, 141-42
process innovation. See source of innovation
product design, source of innovation and, 7,
93-94, 95, 99, 107
product innovation. See source of innovation
profits. See economic rent, expectations of
Project Hindsight, 125, 132
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by users, 3, 8, 25-26, 30, 62, 67, 122
resist coating, semiconductor innovations in
high acceleration wafer spinner for, 21,
172-73
wafer spinner for, 21, 172
response time, ability to capture economic
rent by, 59-60, 61, 64, 73-74. See also
innovation-related knowledge
reverse engineering, 54, 55, 73n. See also
innovation-related knowledge
Rice, Ronald E., 41, 42, 127
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